

Philosophical Classics for English Readers

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BY

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
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PREFACE.



THIS volume is an attempt to present, for the first time, Berkeley's philosophic thought in its organic unity. The thought is unfolded in connection with his personal history, and it is compared with the results of later philosophical endeavours, including those of chief scientific and theological interest at the present day.

Besides important new biographical material, the author is fortunate in being able to present an original portrait of Berkeley, and one, too, from a picture taken at a much earlier period in his life than those hitherto published. It was painted when he was in Rome. The picture was inherited by his descendant, the late Mr Robert Berkeley, Q.C., Dublin, and has been kindly lent to the publishers by his widow. It is an old oil-painting, very difficult to copy; but even as it is, this glimpse of his sanguine youth, now first presented to the world, may be preferred to the familiar engravings which represent him at a more advanced age.



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BERKELEY.

PART I.—1685-1713.

CHAPTER I.

EARLY LIFE IN IRELAND.

TOWARDS the close of the reign of Charles the Second, a certain William Berkeley and his wife, according to credible tradition, occupied a cottage attached to the ancient castle of Dysert, in that part of the county of Kilkenny which is watered by the Nore. In this modest abode their philosophical son George, the eldest of six sons, was born, on the 12th of March 1685 (N. S.) Little is known about William Berkeley, except that he was an Irishman by birth and an Englishman by descent. It is said that his father (or grandfather) migrated from England to Ireland early in Charles's reign, in the suite of his kinsman the first Lord Berkeley of Stratton. William Berkeley's wife was probably Irish; but about her even so much as this cannot be confidently asserted.

Thus ignorant of the family, one cannot, on the ground of known facts, refer the singular mental dispositions of the eldest son either to heredity or to home education. The parents have left no mark. We have not light enough now to see into this Irish family life, as it went on two centuries ago in that secluded region. From occasional glimpses of the five younger brothers, on their respective courses afterwards, we may infer that they were little able to sympathise intellectually with the only one among them who revealed religious and philosophical genius. The little in the early history of the eldest brother that can be gleaned to explain his unique character, must be sought for elsewhere than in the known facts of the family life and its antecedents.

The ruined castle of Dysert, with the remains of the adjoining farmhouse, may still be seen on a grassy meadow on the bank of the Nore, about twelve miles below the city of Kilkenny. The occupants had within their view a scene well fitted to inspire a romantic boy with sympathy for nature and natural religion. The young idealist, if he was unintelligible to his family, had room to brood in solitude, during the latter years of the seventeenth century, in the fair vale through which the Nore descends, amidst the foliage of Woodstock, to its junction with the Barrow at New Ross. "I was distrustful at eight years," he says of himself afterwards, "and so by nature disposed for the new doctrines." The imagination of the thoughtful boy, moreover, may have been roused not only by surrounding nature, but also by contemporary doings among his countrymen. The "warre in Ireland" was going on while he was passing from his fourth to his sixth year. He was about six when the

battle of the Boyne was fought, and was, we may fancy, at Dysert when James made his rapid retreat down the Nore to Waterford, and William of Orange was entertained in the ancient castle of the Butlers at Kilkenny.

A few years later we find traces of George Berkeley in Kilkenny school. The register records his appearance there on a day in early summer in 1696, when he was eleven years old. He was placed at once in the second class. This fact seems to mean that he was unusually precocious, for the school record contains hardly another instance of similar advancement. At this well-known school he spent about four years. Kilkenny, noted for its learned masters and famous pupils, has been called the "Eton of Ireland." Swift as well as Berkeley has added to its fame. One of Berkeley's school-fellows was Thomas Prior, afterwards known as the Irish philanthropist, his constant friend and correspondent for half a century. There is an idle tradition that in these school-days young Berkeley fed his imagination with the "airy visions of romance," and thus weakened his natural sense of the difference between illusion and reality. The myth probably had its origin long after, in the popular misinterpretation of his philosophy. What we have evidence of is, that his eye was then open to the phenomena of nature, and that he diligently explored what was curious among them within his reach. He wrote a minute and characteristic account of the Cave of Dunmore in the neighbourhood, founded on these youthful observations.¹ The Kilkenny country, as well as Dysert, was fitted to call forth the sense of beauty in nature. The city has been compared to

¹ See Works, vol. iv. pp. 503-511.

Warwick, and Windsor, and Oxford. One who visits it cannot soon forget the charms of the Nore, as seen upwards or downwards on an autumn day from the school meadow; or the mingling of buildings, new and old, castle, cathedral, and round tower, so happily grouped on the high ground, with the free and careless grace of nature in all the neighbouring country.

It was out of this fair Irish vale, remote from the ways of men, that George Berkeley, thus dimly discernible at first, so unexpectedly emerged, in an island that was only beginning to take part in the intellectual and literary work going on in the world. In a few years more he became one of the acknowledged masters of English literature, and proved himself, before he reached middle life, to possess the most significant philosophical mind then at work in Europe.

In March 1700, Berkeley, fifteen years of age, left Kilkenny and the picturesque region of the Nore, to matriculate at Trinity College, Dublin. This was his home for the next thirteen years. Of his mental history for three or four years after his matriculation there is no direct record. But we are now able to trace the subsequent working of his mind, in the crisis of its development. His lately discovered "Commonplace Book" reveals him to us at Trinity College, in his twentieth year, suddenly exulting, with the impetuous enthusiasm of a warm imagination, in a new and revolutionary thought about the true meaning of that reality which we all attribute to the world that is presented to our senses. With this new thought he had somehow then and there become inspired. Under a conviction

of its value to mankind, he was longing to make it known. It was to make short work, he was certain, of all supposed "powers" in dead unconscious Matter; and so its promulgation would relieve perplexities and contradictions, otherwise inexplicable, by which scepticism in religious thought had been sustained. It solved for him the difficulties of natural science and of theology, in a new philosophy which showed that both science and religion were essentially reasonable. The conclusions to which this startling inspiration gave birth, could not long be kept to himself. Before the thirteen years at Trinity College were ended, they had overflowed in published as well as unpublished writings. An argumentative exposition and defence of this transforming belief, about the real meaning of the things we see and touch, was thus early pressed by him upon the world, with a subtle and ingenious advocacy, in small successive volumes.

The influences which turned the Kilkenny youth who was "distrustful at eight years" thus impetuously and permanently towards the metaphysics of matter, are worthy of investigation. Some of them, at any rate, can be ascertained.

When one looks back to Dublin and its College in the beginning of last century, new and strong intellectual forces begin to show themselves. The head of the College was Dr Peter Browne, already known as the literary antagonist of Toland the free-thinker. Toland's 'Christianity not Mysterious' about this time had raised a theological ferment in Dublin, which was probably not without effect in the end on young Berkeley. As a controversialist in metaphysical theology, Browne's name became afterwards more widely known. Long

after this, when Bishop of Cork, he was a vigorous critic of Locke's philosophy, and of the nature and limits of our theological knowledge. Those interested in this may refer to his two not forgotten volumes, on the 'Procedure and Limits of Human Understanding,' and on 'Divine Analogy.' The chief representative of the Irish Church in Dublin at the beginning of the eighteenth century, was not less eminent as a speculative thinker than the head of the College. The Archbishop of Dublin during the years in which Browne was Provost was William King, still remembered as a philosophical theologian. The Archbishop's speculations about the analogical and negative nature of man's knowledge of God were much in harmony with those afterwards published by Browne. King was already known as the author of the treatise on the 'Origin of Evil' which engaged the controversial pens of Bayle and Leibnitz.

But a stronger intellectual influence than either Browne or King was now perceptible in Trinity College. Locke's 'Essay on Human Understanding,' published in 1690, was already famous, and in its fourth edition, when Berkeley came to Dublin in 1700. The 'Essay' had been introduced into the course of study at Dublin, and it has ever since been a characteristic feature of the philosophical studies of the place. This early and emphatic recognition of Locke at Dublin was due to William Molyneux, a man not to be forgotten, either on his own account, or as the friend and philosophical correspondent of Locke, during the latter years of the English philosopher's life. Molyneux was a Dublin lawyer, and a member of the Irish Parliament, fond of the new experimental methods of research, and

above all an inquisitive and critical student of the new logic and philosophy.¹ Locke's 'Essay' had attracted him on its first appearance, and an enthusiastic eulogy of the book followed in 1692, in the "Dioptica Nova" of Molyneux. The eulogy led to that correspondence of Molyneux with the author of the 'Essay' which now throws so charming a light for several years upon Locke's recluse life at Oates in Essex, where Molyneux visited him in the month before his own sudden death. In this way the 'Essay on Human Understanding' was in the hands of reading men in Dublin in Berkeley's undergraduate days; and when Locke died in 1704, his name must have been familiar in Trinity College.

But besides Locke, other strong modern philosophical influences had been at work. Cartesianism, with its resolute scrutiny of all traditional beliefs, and its disposition to spiritualise the powers of matter, now affected the whole atmosphere of European thought. Descartes was thus a familiar classic in Dublin, and Malebranche was not unknown. Hobbes and Gassendi, representatives of the opposite tendency, had helped to make inquiring persons intimate with materialistic conceptions of the universe, reviving in modern forms the atomism of Democritus and the ethics of Epicurus. Active investigations were going on regarding the laws and qualities of the things we see and touch, as well as amongst the principles and facts of the world of mind. The Royal Society, too, had been in existence for forty years, and had already diffused its spirit as far as the Irish capital. Newton had pub-

¹ See 'Descartes,' by Professor J. P. Mahaffy, p. 79--Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics."

lished his 'Principia' a few years before Locke published his 'Essay,' and the method of fluxions was struggling with the calculus of Leibnitz among the mathematicians of Dublin.

Through these conspiring influences, it so happened that when Berkeley commenced his undergraduate course, he entered an atmosphere unusually charged with forces of reaction against the traditions and verbal logic of the schools, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Above all, however, the new methods of research recommended by Bacon and Descartes were taking shape in the theory of knowledge of which Locke was the European representative.

Such was Dublin when Berkeley began to study there. The youth himself, then fresh from his native valley on the Nore, was at first a mystery to the ordinary undergraduate. The opinion formed of him came to be that he was either the greatest genius or the greatest dunce in the college. Those who looked at him on the surface took him for a foolish dreamer; his intimates thought him a miracle of intellectual subtlety and goodness of heart. A mild and ingenious youth, inexperienced in the ways of men, he was also full of humorous and even eccentric inquisitiveness. Contarini, the "good uncle" of Oliver Goldsmith, and one of Berkeley's college friends, tells a story about him. They had gone together to see an execution, and young Berkeley returned curious about the sensations that accompany the process of dying. It was agreed that he should begin to try the experiment for himself, his friend relieving him before it was carried so far as to make a report impossible. He was accordingly tied to

the ceiling. Losing consciousness, the appointed signal for relief was looked for in vain. He might have died in good earnest, for on being released he fell senseless on the floor. His first words on recovery were, "Bless my heart, Conterini, you have rumbled my band!" There was already some undisciplined ardour in mental analysis, and a brave indifference to life in the service of knowledge.

Through all this surrounding misunderstanding, according to report, he steadfastly pursued his course, full of simplicity and enthusiasm. We have records of graver employments in his college manuscripts. Early in 1705, he and some of his friends formed a society to meet weekly for promoting inquiry in the line of the "New Philosophy," of Boyle and Newton in physics, and of Locke in metaphysics. There is evidence that Locke's 'Essay,' above all, was the prominent subject of debate and criticism at these meetings. The promotion of societies, literary and philosophical, was a work which through life Berkeley seemed fond of, for this Dublin reunion was the first of several with which he was connected.

The college books record the usual steps of academical advance. In 1702 Berkeley was elected a Scholar; in 1704 he passed Bachelor of Arts. He took his Master's degree in 1707, and in the same year was admitted to a junior fellowship. From 1707 onwards he was a college tutor, and Samuel Molyneux, the son of Locke's friend, was one of his pupils, or at least in intimate relations. His college duty must have been considerable, for he was tutor, Greek lecturer, and junior dean. Including fees, his income was hardly fifty pounds a-year, but this,

measured by our standard, means at least three times as much. Still, as the family resources were moderate, we must not suppose that in the early part of his life he was in easy circumstances.

Whether or not Berkeley was intended by his family for the Church, and sent to Dublin with that view, does not appear. At any rate he soon took orders. He was ordained deacon in 1709 in the old College Chapel. There is no evidence of any objection to church formularies or to ecclesiastical life. For more than twenty years after he was ordained, an occasional service or sermon sums up his work in this department. While ardently loyal in promoting the spiritual education of man, for which the Church professedly exists, he can hardly be called ecclesiastical in the partisan sense; nor can he often be charged with sacrificing the love of truth—his earliest and latest aspiration—to the spirit of the sectarian polemic.

Berkeley had hardly emerged from undergraduate life when he became, in a modest way, an author. Two mathematical tracts in Latin, entitled 'Arithmetica' and 'Miscellanea Mathematica,' written by him three years before, were published anonymously in 1707. Even in abstract science his impetuous temperament appears, as well as his interest in the metaphysics of mathematics, and also that inclination to what is novel and eccentric, which is so apt to animate courageous beginners in a course of research. These performances help us a little to take his measure both as a mathematician and a student of books when he was hardly twenty years old. Their allusions to Bacon, Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and the 'Philosophical Transactions,' show the bent of

his early reading. One of these tracts is dedicated to young Samuel Molyneux.

But a far fuller and more remarkable revelation of the state of Berkeley's mind in 1705 and the two following years than can be found either in recorded anecdotes, or in rules of philosophical societies, or in mathematical puzzles, is that treasured for us in his "Commonplace Book," charged with its startling inspiration.¹ On its pages he gives expression, just as they occurred, to rapidly forming thoughts about the metaphysical meaning of the things of sense, and of their ambient space. This must be ranked among the most precious records in existence of the crude, solitary struggles of subtle philosophical genius. It enables us to watch Berkeley when he was awakening into intellectual life, in company with Locke, and Descartes, and Malebranche. We find him gradually satisfying himself, as to the reasonableness of our beliefs about ourselves, and nature, and God, by the help of a new thought which had occurred to him about the meaning of the word "real," when applied to the things of sense. We have only, he argued, to look at things in the light of this new conception of which he had become conscious. The artificially induced perplexities of philosophers are then found to disappear, along with their metaphysical abstractions, which turn out to be only empty words. Throughout these private utterings of his thoughts, fresh and

¹ This college "Commonplace Book" of queries and occasional thoughts in psychology, metaphysics, and ethics, was contained in two small quarto MS. volumes. It was discovered among the Berkeley Papers in possession of Archdeacon Rose, and was first published in 1871, in the Clarendon Press Edition of Berkeley's Works, vol. iv. pp. 419-502.

earnestly real, written as they arose, one finds a mind everywhere labouring under the consciousness of a new world-transforming conception. the sense of which gives rise to successive flashes of speculative and moral enthusiasm. He was burdened with a thought, through which things were found to be different from what philosophers had argued them to be, and also from what ordinary men had without argument taken for granted that they were. The intellectual transformation was sure, he foresaw, to offend the unphilosophical. They naturally like to think about things as they have been accustomed to think about them; they are shocked by a metaphysic revolution which they cannot follow, with its inevitable accompaniment of new meanings thrown into old words, and the strain of demands that cannot be met by ordinary consciousness untrained in reflection. This new metaphysical conception of the material world he instinctively felt must disturb those accustomed to live only in the outward and visible; who take for an axiom that sensible outwardness and visibility must belong to whatever is real; and who never trouble themselves to ask in what the assumed reality of the seen and felt truly consists. So we find him in these curious effusions bracing himself to meet an enemy even in the common phrases of mankind. Despite the ridicule and dislike his transformed world was sure to encounter, amongst the many who are obliged to put words in the place of thoughts, he resolved to deliver himself of his intellectual burden through a book, but with the politic conciliation of an ingenious advocate.

Here are a few of the many characteristic sentences in the "Commonplace Book :"—

"The reverse of the [new] Principle I take to be the chief source of all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictory and inexplicable puzzling absurdities, that have in all ages been a reproach to human reason. I know there is a mighty sect of men who will oppose me. I am young, I am an up-start, I am vain, 'twill be said. Very well. I will endeavour patiently to bear up under the most lessening, vilifying appellations the pride and rage of man can devise. But one thing I know I am not guilty of—I do not pin my faith as the slave of any great man. I act not out of prejudice or prepossession. I do not adhere to any opinion because it is an old one, or a revived one, or a fashionable one, or one that I have spent much time in the study and cultivation of. If in some things I differ from a philosopher that I profess to admire [*e.g.*, Locke], it is for that very thing on account of which I admire him—namely, the love of truth. . . . From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way. . . . But he that would bring another to his own opinion must seem to harmonise with him at first, and humour him in his way of talking."

He sees one great bar to the popular acceptance of his new, world-transforming thought. It is concealed by "the mist and veil of words." The abstractions which were abstractions of verbal metaphysics at first, but which are now mixed up with ordinary language, had to be cleared away from his own mind before he could see the light himself; and must be removed from the minds of others before he could get them to see it too.

"The chief thing I do, or pretend to do, is only to remove the mist and veil of words. This it is that has occasioned ignorance and confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, the lawyers and divines. If men would lay aside words in thinking, 'tis impossible they should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact."

He then recognises with joy the mentally-transformed world that arose in his new philosophical consciousness.

"My speculations," he finds, "have had the same effect upon me as visiting foreign countries. In the end I return where I was before; get my heart at ease, and enjoy myself with more satisfaction. The philosophers lose their [abstract] matter; the mathematicians lose their [abstract] extension; the profane lose their extended deity. Pray what do the rest of mankind lose?"

All this wonderful intellectual transformation was, it seems, brought about simply by a recognition of the fact that things are ideas or phenomena, and that the truest way of looking at the world we see and touch, is when it is looked at as ideal or phenomenal only.

"The philosophers talk much of a distinction between absolute and relative things—*i.e.*, things considered in their own nature, and the same things considered in respect to us. I know not what they mean by [sensible] things considered in themselves. This is nonsense—jargon. *Thing* and *idea* are words of much about the same extent and meaning. By *idea* I mean any sensible or imaginable thing. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. *Existence* is not conceivable without perception and volition. I only declare the meaning of the word, as far as I can comprehend it. Existence is perceiving and willing, or else being perceived and willed. Existence is not intelligible without perception and volition—not distinguishable therefrom. All things are ideas."

Berkeley, charged with thoughts like these, issued from what he calls an "obscure corner" to become a leader in European philosophy. The governing conception of his philosophical life was unintelligible to his contemporaries and immediate successors; and he had only an imperfect consciousness of it himself. His place

in the history of thought should be better understood now, in the light of the intervening period. We should be more able than our predecessors to determine whether one who sought with characteristic ardour to restore spiritual beliefs and high ideals of life in a materialistic age, by new principles of philosophy, was really, against his own intention, opening a door for the most thorough-going scepticism and agnosticism ever offered to the world.

Within the last ten years materials for a just estimate of Berkeley and his philosophical conception of the universe have accumulated. They are of various kinds:— (1) The Berkeley Papers, in possession of the family of the late Archdeacon Rose. These include (a) Berkeley's "Commonplace Book;" (b) four small manuscript volumes containing a journal of his travels in Italy; (c) a mass of correspondence addressed to him, along with some letters written by him. All that is important in these Papers was published for the first time in 1871, in the Clarendon Press Edition of Berkeley's Works.¹ (2) About eighty letters from Berkeley to Sir John

¹ 'The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne, including many of his Writings hitherto unpublished. With Prefaces, Annotations, his Life and Letters, and an Account of his Philosophy.' By Alexander Campbell Fraser, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. 4 vols. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press: 1871.—Also, 'Selections from Berkeley.' By the Same. Second Edition. Oxford, 1879.

In the merely narrative parts of this volume, I have of course occasionally drawn upon my own Memoir of Berkeley, in the Clarendon Press Edition; but I have not thought it necessary to note the reference in each case. The reader is referred for full details of the external facts of the life, as then known to me, to that work, to which this is, in that respect, auxiliary and supplementary.

Percival, afterwards Earl of Egmont, from 1709 to 1730, not hitherto published. Some account of them is given in the Seventh Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (1879).¹ Through the kindness of Lord Egmont, I am happily able, in the following chapters, to avail myself of this valuable collection, and to present portions of hitherto unpublished letters of Berkeley that are of biographical and philosophical interest. (3) The numerous criticisms of Berkeley and his philosophy which have appeared in this country, and also in Germany, Holland, France, and America, since the publication of the Clarendon Press Edition of his works, by eminent contemporary thinkers — including among others, Mr J. S. Mill, Dean Mansel, Professor Huxley, Dr Hutcheson Stirling, Mr Arthur Balfour, Professor Green, Professor Caird, Professor Adamson, Mr Collyns Simon, Professor Ueberweg, Professor Van der Wyk, M. Penjon, Dr M'Cosh, and Professor Krauth of Philadelphia.

In this volume Berkeley's thought, newly interpreted, is used as a help towards the best thought available amidst our present philosophical or theological difficulties. The result may be found in the last chapter, read carefully in the light of the preceding ones.

¹ I am indebted for the reference to the Rev. Mark Pattison.

CHAPTER II.

LOCKE ON IDEAS AND THEIR CAUSES.

WE have something more distinct than the almost colourless picture of Berkeley's external life in his early years, when we turn to the spiritual world of his birth as a philosopher, and the early years of his mental growth in it. For we have then, for the most part, to look into Locke's 'Essay,' and at the same time to remember the Cartesian atmosphere in which Locke as well as Berkeley lived. Berkeley's immediate starting-point was, without doubt, in Locke. It is true that in one of the earliest of the hitherto unpublished letters to Sir John Percival, written at Trinity College in 1709, he refers with admiration to Plato, to the delight with which he read the "Phædo" and other dialogues years before, and to the harmony of the Platonic spirit with "the perfection and badge of Christianity, which is its generous contempt for the things of this sentient life."¹ Some of the

¹ In another letter to Percival, written soon after this from Dublin, he says: "I must own this corner furnishes scarce anything that deserves to be commemorated. We Irish are a nation in its nonage, put under the guardianship of a people that do everything for us, and leave us the liberty of transacting nothing material for ourselves, or having any part in the affairs of Europe."

spirit of Plato may be discovered even in Berkeley's early writings, more latent, however, than it became long afterwards. But external and internal evidence combine to show that it was Locke more than any other who put him into the mental attitude in which we find him when he was at Trinity College. It is true that he then showed more of a spirit of antagonism to the doctrines of the 'Essay' than of submissive discipleship. Still, to account for what he had become, we must rethink the chief thoughts of Locke, and see the ultimate problems at the point of view of the 'Essay on Human Understanding.'

The distinctive word with Locke is "idea." The 'Essay' is a philosophical treatise on ideas and their causes. But we must note the wide meaning that "idea" has when Locke uses it, as he does so often on almost every page of his book. It is not with him, as in ordinary English now, a synonym for the internal thoughts or fancies of the mind; nor, as in Platonic usage, for the objective archetypes or exemplars according to which the universe is constituted. Whatever we apprehend—whether it be a real phenomenon, mental or material, or a mere image in the phantasy, and whether we are conscious of it intuitively or symbolically—in all these phases, what is apprehended is generically called by Locke an idea. When I am conscious of a pleasant or of a disagreeable smell or sound—when I see the sun or touch a tree—when I remember any of these—when I form a mental picture of a centaur—when I understand scientifically the meaning of "circle," "planet," "wisdom," or any other common

or abstract term,—in all these cases Locke would say that I am having ideas. This is the meaning of the word *idea*, to which Descartes had given currency in the seventeenth century, and which Locke for a long time established in England.

Other terms have been used, before and since, to express this delicate and comprehensive meaning. Philosophy, as the theory of knowledge, always needs some distinctive word to express the essential dependence of what is known on the power of knowing. "*Idea*" was used for this purpose in the seventeenth century; sometimes with "*perception*," and afterwards, in Hume, with "*impression*," as, in whole or part, synonymous. Mind was supposed to be manifested in being conscious of ideas or perceptions or impressions; and the scientific study of mind was a study of the ideas or perceptions or impressions with which it is concerned. To investigate these was to investigate mind. It is nowadays more common to use the word "*phenomenon*" for this purpose, and to speak of the phenomena—that is, the appearances or aspects of existence of which we are conscious in the course of our lives—rather than of the ideas or perceptions or impressions which make the materials of this experience. The terms "*sensation*" or "*feeling*," though subjective, and more conveniently limited to a species of mental state, have been employed by some psychologists in the same comprehensive universality. At present a favourite term for the purpose is "*consciousness*"—"fact or state of consciousness." What Locke and his contemporaries called "*ideas*" or "*perceptions*," we, looking at them in their relation to the knowing mind, call "*conscious-*

nesses," "states," or "modes" of consciousness. But whatever the term chosen may be — "idea," "perception," "phenomenon," "impression," "sensation," "feeling," or "consciousness"—it must, in virtue of its function, be often met with in the writings of the philosopher by whom it is adopted. For all terms so used involve the fundamental assumption of philosophy—that real things, as well as imaginary things, whatever their absolute existence may involve, can exist for us only through becoming involved in what we mentally experience in the course of our self-conscious lives. They imply that it must be only in, and as, phenomena of which we are percipient, that the things of sense can become for us more than blank abstract negations.

The adoption of the mental attitude thus presupposed in all philosophy, which the term "idea" expresses for Locke, is the first and indispensable philosophical lesson. It is a hard lesson to learn, and most of us never learn it at all. Most men, living without reflection, take for granted that things would be exactly what they are now felt and perceived to be, although no persons in the universe existed to perceive or be conscious of them: they even call this assumption a dictate of common-sense. But philosophy is the discovery that a thing receives a part, if not all, of what it seems to be composed of—part, if not all, of all its phenomenal existence—in becoming the *object* of a sentient, percipient, imagining mind. So that a word is wanted to express this mental transformation of the things of sense—unreflectingly supposed to be independent of our feelings and thoughts—into the conscious experience of individual persons.

"Ideas," "perceptions," "feelings," "sensations,"

"impressions," "modes" or "states" of "consciousness"—in a word, "phenomena"—are none of them unexceptionable terms when so used. Idea is notoriously ambiguous, for it is apt to take its Platonic meaning in the mind of a philosopher, and its popular meaning in the ordinary unphilosophical mind. "Perception," not to speak of other objections, is now commonly confined to sense-consciousness. "Feeling" more readily connotes either the mere irrelative data of touch, or the senses generally—in distinction from developed perception, or else those complex states of consciousness called emotions. "Consciousness" is apt to suggest our private consciousness in its internal perceptions only. A "consciousness" of what is objective or external, is foreign to the ordinary signification of the word, and is thus apt to be dropt out of its meaning even in philosophical discussions.—On the whole, with Berkeley himself, in his later writings, I shall translate his *idea* of sense into *phenomenon* of sense, in explaining his theory of the material world.¹

So it came to pass that "idea," throughout the 'Essay on Human Understanding,' was a recurring memorandum of the truth that, till external things were looked at on the side at which they could be considered part of the presentative and representative experience of a conscious person, they did not enter at all into the proper problems of the philosopher. The "qualities" of all real, as well of all imaginary, things, must exist in a state of dependence on a sentient intelligence, in order that the words used about them may have any meaning. What are pains

¹ One should speak of the *phenomenalism* rather than of the *idealism* (idealism, one might call it) of Berkeley—in this meaning of "idea."

and pleasures, heat and cold, tastes and smells, sounds and colours, in a dead unconscious universe, empty of all rational and even sentient persons? As light virtually creates colour, so the sensations and thoughts of a person at least help to create the things that person feels and knows. "Help to create" was all that Locke implied; for he, at any rate, was not prepared to dissolve extension with the primary or mathematical qualities of matter, in sentiency and cognition, nor to look at atoms and their motions exclusively on the ideal or phenomenal side, as he looked at heat and cold, taste and smell, sound and colour.

The philosophical point of view suggested by the words "idea" or "phenomenon" is thus at the opposite extreme to that of materialism. It assumes that body can make no appearance apart from the conscious life of mind, in which alone things can be realised. The materialist, on the other hand, supposes that there can be no knowledge of mind apart from body; on the ground of the observed correspondence between what goes on in consciousness and what goes on in the brain and nerves; and infers that our ideas—the phenomena of which we are conscious—are ultimately and absolutely dependent on the qualities and molecular motions of nerve-tissues. This inference Locke disavows; but he professedly excludes questions about the dependence of our conscious acts and states on organism, in our embodied consciousness, in his desire to concentrate regard upon "ideas" or "phenomena."

This use of idea, phenomenon, or any other single term, to express at once objective sense-perceptions and the subjective thoughts or fancies which belong only to

the privacy of individual consciousness, is inconvenient, on account of the confusion it is apt to produce between our original presentative experience in the external senses, and the merely representative and often illusory mental states to which "idea" is popularly restricted. Locke overlooked this, in his wish to keep before his reader the part played by sentient if not also by rational consciousness, in giving actuality to what could otherwise be only abstract and negative. So he did not scruple sometimes to call real things ideas, thereby meaning real things viewed as mentally transformed in becoming perceptions, instead of abstract entities in nature. But we require in consequence always to remind ourselves, in reading his 'Essay,' of the distinction, which he only obscurely presents, between those ideas that are commonly called real sensible things, and those merely private or personal ideas that form the stream of inward thoughts and fancies, under laws of association, in each individual consciousness.

In thus expressing the necessary dependence of whatever is known on the sensations and thoughts of some person who knows, the term idea presents only one side of what Locke taught about human knowledge and belief. Looked at on the other side, ideas are manifestations or effects—Locke took for granted—of powers and permanent beings, *substantially different* from the persons who are percipient of the ideas. Thus they are at once phenomena of which persons are percipient, and they also represent qualities which exist external to our individual conscious life: they are "effects in us," produced by substantial powers that are independent

of us. Through the ideas or phenomena in which existence shows itself, we find ourselves, he reported, in conflict and collision with "something" that is foreign to us and our ideas.

Locke's 'Essay' is concerned, accordingly, with two problems. In one part of it, the ideal or phenomenal side of things is kept in view. There our ideas—the phenomena with which we are concerned—are described and arranged; their dependence on words, and the dependence of words on them, is enforced. In the other part, he unfolds and applies the relations under which real knowledge and probable beliefs as to what transcends our individual ideas, are constituted and unfolded. The Second and Third Books of the 'Essay' are mostly concerned with ideas or phenomena; the Fourth Book treats of the constitution and certainty of the "knowledge" and "beliefs" we form out of the ideas or phenomena of which we are conscious,—especially our knowledge of God, and of things and persons external to ourselves. He explains the reasonableness or reality of affirmations we make about the Supreme Power in the universe; and also about the forces of nature, and the wills of our fellow-men, that encompass and affect us continually in so many ways.

A far-reaching assumption runs through Locke's treatment of this second question. In dealing, in the Second Book of the 'Essay,' with the problem of knowledge, in its first aspect, he had taken for granted that things, whatever else they may be, must, so far as we are concerned with them, be at least ideas or phenomena of which we are conscious. In the Fourth Book, in explaining how the phenomena of which we are conscious

yield real knowledge, he quietly takes for granted the principle of causality, and its adequacy to carry us from the phenomenal to the unphenomenal or transcendent. He does not, like Kant, try to justify this principle by arguments, as a necessary constituent in a rational experience. He simply assumes it, as a truth that is proceeded upon by all sane men, whether they have ever reflected about it or not. His account of the external powers which we, and the phenomena we are conscious of, presuppose, is his logical application of the principle of causality as a metaphysical dogma.

By one application of the causal principle, Locke finds intellectual necessity for Eternal Mind, as the only intelligible cause of his own beginning to exist, as a self-conscious individual, nearly sixty years before the 'Essay' was given to the world. This implies that he believes in his own existence, which his ideas presuppose, and of which, like Descartes, he declares that he has thus an "intuitive knowledge."¹—By another

¹ See 'Essay,' B. IV. ch. ix., x. The tenth chapter attracted much attention in Locke's own generation. Curiously, in consequence, he was actually accused of Spinozism. Nowadays it is the fashion to contrast what is called his "individualism" with the "universalism" of the Dutch metaphysician. The charge of Spinozism was alleged in a forgotten 'Dissertation upon the First Chapter of the Fourth Book of Mr Locke's "Essay;" wherein the author's endeavours to establish Spinoza's atheistic hypothesis are discovered and confuted.' By William Carroll (London, 1706).—Locke is charged by Carroll with giving "the holy name of God to the eternal existence of cogitation and extended material substance, differently modified in the whole world—i.e., maintaining the eternal existence of the whole world itself, all by an ingenious abuse of words;" and this is argued at great length throughout the book. The first Lord Shaftesbury is said to have referred on his deathbed to the same chapter (then unpublished) as the source of his own theological heterodoxy.

application of the same principle of causality, he found himself under an intellectual necessity (or something like it) for believing that extended and solid substances are the immediate causes of the ideas or phenomena he was conscious of in touching, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, moving, and in experiencing the pleasures and pains involved in having bodily sensations. The existence of God he had argued for, on the ground of the mental need for a cause which we feel in view of the bare fact of the commencement of our own existence. Knowledge of the real existence of "other things or powers besides God, external to what we call ourselves," Locke did not find—as he did that of God—in the bare fact of our once having begun to be conscious of ideas. The external world of matter is discovered, he thinks, only in and through those particular sorts of mental experience in which "other things, by actual operation upon our senses, make themselves perceived by us." "The mere having an idea of any outward thing no more proves the real outwardness of that thing than the picture of a man proves his real existence, or than the visions of a dream make it a true history." It is only "the *actual receiving* of ideas of *sense* from without that gives us notice of the existence of external things, and makes us know that *something* doth exist, at that time without us, which causeth that idea in us, though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. It takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner in which they are produced."¹

Locke, in short, announced that he found himself,

¹ See 'Essay,' B. IV. ch. xi.

when receiving phenomena through the five senses, and then only, percipient of ideas or phenomena, which had this remarkable characteristic, that they appeared and disappeared independently of his own will, while they all presupposed his own conscious existence. The principle of causality, by him unexplained, yielded the conclusion, that as he himself existed, *Eternal* Mind must also exist. The dependent character of the phenomena whose appearance and disappearance he was conscious in his five senses, seemed to him, on the same causal dogma, to imply the present existence of *finite* substances and powers, extended and solid, the external causes of the (by us) uncontrollable phenomena of sense; and to be the basis of our habitual beliefs in their orderly, and therefore interpretable, connection with one another. The Ego, God, and Matter, are thus the three related realities of human knowledge, of which Locke's 'Essay on Human Understanding' was a professed explanation.

Throughout the 'Essay,' Locke is fonder of dealing with the question of how our ideas and knowledge have become what we now find them, than with the other question of what they now are, irrespectively of the processes through which they have become what they are. Yet it is surely as they are now, and not as they were in infancy, that we must reason from them. Indeed philosophers of all schools have to proceed in their reasonings from the point of view to which they have attained when they philosophise, and not from the point of view of the *primum cognitum* in the previously undeveloped infant.

Locke, moreover, supposes a human experience which begins in a consciousness of relationless ideas or phenomena, of various sorts, admitted through the five senses. He never dreams either of an original perception of individual things, like Reid, or of a necessary constitution of phenomenal experience, like Kant. He speaks as if all of us at first saw colours *per se*, heard sounds *per se*, were conscious of smells and odours *per se*, or had sensations of heat and of cold *per se*; and as if afterwards, by some unexplained mental process, we learned to combine those different sorts of isolated sense phenomena into the aggregates or "complex ideas" commonly called individual things or individual substances. The possibility of our perceptions of sense presenting necessarily, and therefore from the first, phenomena in complexity and in conjunction, as individual things, seems never to occur to him. A student of the 'Essay' is accustomed by it to suppose that human beings consciously advance from the phenomenally simple and isolated to the phenomenally complex and connected, in the growth of their real experience—that they were in the beginning conscious only irrelatively of the phenomena of which individual things now seem to consist;—instead of conversely proceeding by abstraction, from compound things already given, to separable qualities, of which sensible things are found, by analysis, to be made up. The question whether there may not be certain laws, in the very constitution of intellect and experience as such, which *require* complexity and connection in order to any intelligent consciousness at all,—that is, in order to any perception even of sense-given phenomena,—was foreign to Locke's

way of thinking. He wrote as if an idea or phenomenon *per se* was a possible perception; as if there was no occasion to inquire whether the "complexity" involved in a phenomenon being regarded as virtually the "quality" of a "thing," might not even be necessarily included in perception. Why phenomena are significant of one another, and thus interpretable, and how they become aggregated as qualities of individual things, were questions which afterwards occurred to Berkeley, Hume, and Kant.

The two problems of Locke—his classification of the ideas or phenomena of which we are conscious, and his account of the causes of this self-conscious experience—gave Berkeley his intellectual starting-point. He had been accustomed by Locke, in the first place, to regard all that exists on its phenomenal or ideal side; and, at least in the "secondary qualities" of matter, to regard *only* this ideal or phenomenal existence. In this connection, too, he had been taught to demand an idea for every term he made use of, and to reject as jargon terms whose meanings could not be realised phenomenally; and he had also been told that some ideas are "abstract"—science and philosophy being concerned only with those supposed "abstract ideas."—But he had been invited, in the second place, to assert, with Descartes, his intuitive knowledge of his own conscious existence. Then, proceeding, without question, upon the validity of the dogma of causality, he had been led to demonstrate from his own conscious existence that of Eternal Mind; and to infer from the present existence of the ideas or phenomena of his five senses, the present existence of extended and solid substances and powers. Locke, be-

sides, had throughout the 'Essay' taught Berkeley to refer all the phenomenal data of human knowledge about anything, to phenomena given in sensation and reflection. He had not taught him to inquire into the necessary constitution of reason; or into the nature of those judgments of common sense, or common consciousness, which he nevertheless used for the transformation of otherwise irrelative ideas or phenomena into the real knowledge and warrantable beliefs that make up our intelligible experience.

Taking this departure from Locke, Berkeley's own mental history till his death presents three stages of progress. Trinity College, Dublin, was the scene of the First—with its literary outcome in his juvenile, which are also his most celebrated, philosophical treatises. The Second was reached when he was for the most part out of Ireland, in England, France, Italy, and America; it closes with another instalment of works in philosophy. For the Third, we are carried back to Ireland; it too, like the preceding ones, makes its own characteristic contribution to metaphysical literature. Each period in the life is a stage in the development of the philosophy, which attains its most comprehensive form in the last period.

The four following chapters deal with the results of Berkeley's intellectual labour in the first of these periods, during which he lived at Trinity College, Dublin, in circumstances which have already been described.

The pervading teaching of the whole life was, we shall find,—that the things we see and touch are only superficial shows, which themselves disappear in re-

vealing the Eternal Spirit or Universal Reason wherein we live and have our being ; and that we become conscious of this, intellectually in philosophy, and practically through assimilation to God. The more negative part of this great lesson is what is prominent in the first period of Berkeley's history, and in his juvenile works ; his later thoughts and writings become fuller of the Spirit or Universal Reason within, in the presence of which the sensible world seems to dissolve, and earthly objects vanish away.

CHAPTER III.

VISUAL IMMATERIALISM.

BERKELEY soon began to make known to the world the intellectual secret about Matter to which an independent critical study of Locke's famous 'Essay' had helped to lead him. But he did not fully announce at once the startling change in the common way of thinking about the things of sense in which the secret consisted. He unfolded it by degrees. In 1709, when he was twenty-four years of age, he produced a part of it, in the form of an explanation of what is really meant by "seeing a thing," or an 'Essay towards a New Theory of Vision.' This 'Essay,' dedicated to Sir John Percival, was his first step. It is an argument for the phenomenal, and therefore mind-dependent, nature of the material world, as far as our power of *seeing* the things of which it consists can carry us into knowledge of its nature; but it does not prejudge the further question of what the things of sense may turn out to be in the sense perceptions of touch and locomotion. Its conclusion is—that all ordinary seeing is really foreseeing,—that the "sight" of tangible things is the expectation, produced by habit, of experiencing unperceived phenomena of touch and muscular

movement, on occasion of the ideas or phenomena of which alone we are actually conscious when we see, but which thus become signs of the former. By implication, indeed, it is an analysis of expectations in general into habits that are unconsciously rational.

Some sentences which Locke introduced into the second edition of his 'Essay,' on the suggestion of his friend Molyneux, probably helped to draw Berkeley into this path of approach to his own new philosophical account of the ultimate nature of the material world. The passage is worth study. It is meant to illustrate the unconscious presence of judgments of "suggestion" in what seem to be simple intuitions of sight.

"The ideas we receive by sensation," Locke says,¹ "are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour,—e.g., gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted on our minds [*i.e.*, the phenomenon of which we become immediately conscious] is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But we have, by use, been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the differences in the sensible figures of bodies; and the judgment presently—by an habitual custom—alters the appearances into their causes, so that, from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform colour, when the idea we receive from hence [the phenomenon of which we are thence visually conscious] is only a plane, variously coloured, as is evident in painting.

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¹ See 'Essay,' B. II. ch. ix. § 8.

To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr Molyneux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since, and it is this :—‘ Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nearly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he *felt* the one and the other, which is the cube and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and the sphere placed on a table, and the blind man made to *see*: *quære*, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube.’—To which the acute and judicious proposer answers, No. For though he has obtained experience of how a globe, how a cube, affects his touch, yet he has not yet obtained the experience that what affects his touch so and so, must affect his sight so and so; or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube. I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this problem; and am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them; though he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt. This I have set down and leave with my reader, as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least use for or help from them.”

Among Locke’s readers Berkeley at any rate was early led into the train of thought so naturally set agoing by this paragraph. His “Commonplace Book” is full of similar problems. Here are a few examples :—

“*Quære*: Whether a man born blind, made to see, would at first give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by

sight, since he would take distance that he had perceived by touch to be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothing seen was without his mind. . . . By extension a born blind man would mean either the perception caused in his mind by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; which power is without in the things extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in visible things till he had tried. . . . A blind man, at first, would not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same plane with coloured extension: therefore [coloured] extension would not seem to be without the mind. . . . *Quere*, whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs; or is it only the constant and long association of ideas in themselves entirely different that makes us judge them to be the same? What I see is only variety of colours and light. What I feel is hard and soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. What resemblance have these thoughts with those? A picture painted with great variety of colours yet affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because he sees two I shall feel two; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How, therefore, can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible legs are, because two, connected with the tangible ones; or the visible head, because one, connected with the tangible head? Writers in optics are often mistaken in their principle of judging of magnitudes and distances. . . . Length is perceivable by hearing; length and breadth by sight; length, breadth, and depth by touch."

Berkeley's 'Essay on Vision,' after showing the kind and amount of knowledge afforded by our eyes alone, without the assistance of the other senses, proceeds to verify by facts the striking hypothesis—that light becomes a visual language, expressive of those conceptions of solid and resisting things which one born blind would

derive from the experience of contact and bodily movement; and that it is so simply because, by custom, persons with sound eyes have learned rapidly to translate the visual language into what would be the tactual conceptions of the man born blind. Our adult visible world is the original sense phenomena of sight unconsciously translated; the fact of the translation is discovered by psychological analysis. When an adult person, possessed of good eyes, stands in the centre of an extensive landscape, he seems to unreflecting common-sense to apprehend by sight at a glance the fields, and trees, and houses, and hills, and animated beings around, with the concave vault of heaven over all; and he is apt to suppose that he has been always able to do this. What Berkeley does in his 'Essay' is to produce facts which oblige our supposed observer to modify this unreflecting supposition; since they prove to him that, instead of seeing the landscape and its contents "at a glance," he has really been mentally translating into phenomena of touch what alone he really saw, helped by his common-sense trust in the constant relations, and therefore intelligibility, of visible and tangible phenomena.

The facts produced by Berkeley for verifying this far-reaching hypothesis are of various sorts.

The consent of those who have studied the original phenomenal data of sight, since the days of Aristotle, is, in the first place, taken as sufficient evidence of the fact, that the only phenomena of which we are at first percipient in seeing are those of colour. We can simultaneously see only a greater or smaller number of coloured ends of lines of light. Now it is certain that what is

thus seen must be dependent on sentient mind. Their very nature makes it impossible that colours, as seen, could exist after the annihilation of all sentient mind. Colours, then, are only ideas or phenomena; so that ideas or phenomena are really all, properly speaking, that we can see. It is true, as we find when we examine the organic conditions under which we are thus sentient of the coloured ends of lines, that visible phenomena are accompanied by invisible muscular sensations in the organ of sight; but these sensations likewise are only ideas or phenomena. Sights and their organic accompaniments, in short, are essentially mind-dependent phenomena.

But this is not all. The sight of colour is the sight of simultaneous phenomena of finite length and breadth,—in other words, we see an extension that is characterised by visible length and breadth. We cannot, however, see depth or thickness—distance outwards in the line of sight—in seeing this sort of extension. The best optical authorities, including Molyneux, grant, Berkeley argues, that distance in a line straight out from the eye cannot be seen. For, sight presupposes rays of light proceeding in straight lines from the differently sized, shaped, and placed things of touch, which we seem to see in their respective places and sizes, at various distances from one another and from our bodies, in an ambient space. But all these lines of light fall endways and not sideways upon the retina; so that it can be only the end, and not the depth outwards, of each line that is seen. Distance, accordingly—that is to say, a visible interval between the visible end of the line and its other extremity—cannot be seen. The lines

themselves cannot be seen, only their inner extremities; and thus the "outness" of extension is invisible, and must be discovered by some other means than sight proper.

Further: No mathematical or *a priori* demonstration of the existence of this third dimension of space can be drawn from the coloured extension we see, and the organic phenomena that accompany vision proper, regarded as data and premises. For, the phenomena presented to sight, with which alone seeing *per se* has to do, have no necessary or rational connection with the depth or outness of space; nor, of course, with the sizes or quantities of the three-dimensioned space occupied by solid things; nor with the places in that space which one solid thing occupies relatively to another. We find all these relations only after we have had sufficient experience, in the senses of touch and bodily movement, and have compared that experience with our experiences of coloured expanse, which in the order of nature are steadily connected with the former.¹

37 The mental connection between the phenomenal data of touch and locomotion and the phenomenal data of sight is established, Berkeley concludes, by what he variously calls "custom," "experience," "suggestion." By these terms he implies that there is at work here a sort of unconscious induction. This visual induction, like the conscious and deliberate inductions of science, and on the same general principle of the intelligibility or consistent orderliness of nature, is explicable, he would

¹ See the late Professor Ferrier's brilliant expository criticism of the Theory of Vision in the second volume of his 'Philosophical Remains.'

probably say, in the way that all human foresight, including the foresight called sight, is explicable. Visual "perceptions" of solid things placed in an ambient space are really, on this supposition, unconscious inductions. They are expectations, generated somehow in us and for us, before we were able, by a conscious comparison of instances, to form them deliberately for ourselves. This suggestion or unconscious inference implies mind, and is produced by the rational action of a mind, if not of our individual mind. Reason is somehow latent in visible nature; and this explains how adults are able to see as they now see. Visible extension itself—whether it be the visible room in which I am now writing, and its visible contents, or the starry heaven with its celestial furniture—is only a number of simultaneous visible and visual phenomena; and these phenomena are capable of being inductively interpreted, because they are reasonable or orderly in their changes, and thus part of the intelligible natural system, of which science is the interpretation.

In the presence of verifying facts such as these, Berkeley argued that we must, as reasonable beings, acknowledge that what seemed a visible panorama, taken in by the eye at a glance, has really been formed by custom, through an unconscious inductive interpretation of what we have seen and touched. This enables us to foresee whenever we now see. Sight in its adult state has become habitual foresight: vision is now always prevision. So much is sight foresight, that no human being could now perform the experiment of seeing without also foreseeing. It is a question (though Berkeley does not make it one) whether an infant even has ever

performed it. If an adult could now perform it, the ambient space, with its supposed visible contents of solid things, at different distances from us, and variously sized and placed, would suddenly dissolve before our eyes, leaving only coloured extensions, along with certain ocular sensations of muscular resistance and movement which in ordinary experience receive no attention.

The conclusion of the whole is, that our supposed spectator was profoundly mistaken in asserting that he really saw at a glance the landscape around his body. The bare original vision of phenomena of colour, along with certain organic sensations in the eye, had really been mentally transformed into the wonderful panorama that roused his sense of beauty.

The ultimate or philosophical explanation of this transformation Berkeley hardly touches, or indeed recognises, in this juvenile 'Essay.' An attempt to reach it carries us into some deep philosophical problems. It involves the *rationale* of our conscious and unconscious expectations of natural events, and of scientific induction. One would have to inquire, for instance, whether the foresight, latent in ordinary adult seeing, is due (a) to unconscious psychical or cerebral processes; or (b) to very rapid and therefore unremembered conscious processes; or (c) to the divine agency going on in all nature, in which human nature somehow shares. To solve such problems we must also be able to settle what are the necessary intellectual constituents of inductive expectation—those without which "experience," in any fruitful meaning of that term, would be impossible.

These questions do not rise in Berkeley's early 'Essay

on Vision.' He is contented to argue that we learn by "experience" to see outward distances, the nearest as well as the most remote. He founds this experience on suggestions similar to those by which, with consent of all, we learn to estimate the distance of things that are far away from us; but he does not pursue the philosophy of suggestion itself. He is satisfied to refer it to custom. The argument, however, takes for granted that such suggestions involve elements adequate in reason to convert visual ideas or phenomena into visual signs, or a visual language. This visual language is a part of the interpretable language of external nature. The original visual phenomena become, under this conception, a grand procession of natural signs, which we have been learning to interpret ever since we were born, in the beautiful Book of Vision that is always open before us. We began to learn the lesson so early that all remembrances of the original process, and of the mental state in which we were before we learned it, have passed away. Our only possible visual experience *now* is a compound of the original ideas or phenomena of sight, interpreted, through help of habit, by our common-sense trust in the permanence of order in the connection between visual and other sorts of phenomena in nature. This has generated an assurance that we now find to be practically rational. We are all now led by habit to believe that the visible colours, and the accompanying muscular sensations of the eye, are reliable signs of approaching experiences of muscular resistance, as well as of bodily pains and pleasures; so that they can in this way practically regulate our actions.

*according
to Berkeley*

But, although Berkeley stops here, one may still ask, What means this universal sense-symbolism — this significance in the ideas or phenomena which we see? On what sort of connection does it depend? What causes the connection? A sufficient answer to these questions would carry us far, not only into the philosophy of sight but into the philosophy of the material world, and even into the highest philosophy of all.

One thing that Berkeley insists much upon is, that when we try the mental experiment, we always find that the connection between the visual signs and their meaning is not one of rational necessity—that there is no absurdity in our supposing that the “meaning” of the signs might have been different from what it now is. We find, when we try, that the meanings can be reversed in imagination. The present signs, for instance, of a thing being far away, might really have been made to mean that it is near. The signs and their meanings being connected in the way they now are, is, as far as we can discover, only the result of a constitution of nature that is arbitrary, that might have been different from what it is. What the actual connections are, can be found only by observation: future observation may conceivably show that the language of nature has been altered. That is to say, in our visual interpretations, as indeed in all interpretation of nature, we are dealing with “laws” which are the expressions of ever Active Mind, and not with the outcome of a blindly fated necessity. The laws of nature are, as it were, God’s habit of acting in regulating phenomena. Though the laws which make visible nature interpretable are steady enough for the purposes of human action, we find no

eternal rational necessity for their being what they are, more than we do for the spoken or written signs of Greek, English, or any other artificial human language being what they are. A different set of meanings from the established ones now attached to each sign would not create a contradiction in terms; nor indeed contradict reason in any way that we can find.

But if an inexorable necessity does not connect in nature ideas or phenomena, how do the visual phenomena become so connected in our minds that their meanings are "at a glance" suggested? How comes it that true judgments about their meaning now arise in our minds as soon as we open our eyes? Berkeley does not discuss this. He would grant that it is due to the faith, somehow induced, in the supremacy of rational agency in the universe. For this is implied in the intelligibility and trustworthiness of visual signs. This faith would give consistency to the tissue of the web we are unravelling whenever we are "seeing things." And to this result he approached in the end.

"Upon the whole," he concludes, even in this juvenile Essay, in summing up the results of this his first speculative adventure in the world of the senses¹—"upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of vision constitute a UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE of the AUTHOR OF NATURE, whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions, in order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and wellbeing of our bodies, and also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive to them. It is by their information that we are principally guided in all transactions and concerns of life. And the manner in which

¹ 'Essay on Vision,' §§ 147, 148.

they signify and mark unto us the objects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages and signs of human appointment, which do not suggest the things signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an habitual connection that experience has made us observe between them. Suppose one who had always continued blind to be told by his [seeing] guide, that after he had advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of a precipice, or be stopped by a wall—must not this to him seem very admirable and surprising? He cannot conceive how it is possible for mortals to form such predictions as these, which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable as prophecy doth to others. Even those who are blessed with the visive faculty find therein sufficient cause of admiration. The wonderful art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and purposes for which it was apparently designed—the vast extent, number, and variety of objects that are at once, with so much ease, and quickness, and pleasure, suggested by it—all these afford subject for much and pleasing speculation, and may, if anything, give us some glimmering analogous prenotion of things which are placed beyond the certain discovery and comprehension of our present state.”

85 A modern scientific observer asks whether this beautiful hypothesis is verified by external facts, as well as by facts of internal consciousness. Does it appear, when the experiment is tried, that the visual consciousness of persons born blind, when first made to see, is really in the state supposed by this theory of adult sight being an interpretation of visual signs? Is it true that before they have visual experience, their conceptions of external things are formed out of their blind experience of collision with otherwise unknown forces of resistance? The direct way, it may be thought, for finding out what sight per se is, would be to take a human instance of it

ne can be got) altogether isolated from the experience of the other senses. An experimental isolation of simple data of each sense, by the method of difference, is the logical method of science; and it may seem able to use it in cases of persons born blind, whose power to see has suddenly been communicated to them. It may therefore be asked, whether the facts which in such cases present themselves correspond to the hypothesis—that all actual seeing of things is really reading a prophetic book, which the reader has learned through custom to interpret by degrees.

Berkeley did not busy himself in experiments of this kind, although he expressed interest in them. He deduced his conclusions from data of the common consciousness, diligently reflected upon. He inferred from this evidence what the first mental experience of one rescued from born-blindness would be; he speculated, too, about the consciousness of “unbodied spirits,” as to see, but, from their birth, destitute of the sense of muscular resistance and the power of corporeal movement. In a note to the second edition of the ‘*Essay on Vision*,’ indeed, he referred with curiosity to some recorded instance of one born blind who had been made to see, and who thus might be “supposed a proper judge of far some tenets laid down in several places in the foregoing ‘*Essay*’ are agreeable to truth,”—adding, “if a curious person hath the opportunity of making proper interrogations, I should gladly see my notions either ended or confirmed by experience.” But his own striking facts were found in consciousness, and not in external experiments on other persons. An appeal to consciousness for verification of the antithesis be-

tween the original data of mere sight and the original data of mere touch and muscular movement,—with the evidence—virtually given by common-sense—contained in the fact that we spontaneously trust the significance of what we see and of the organic sensations that accompany seeing,—seemed to him to fulfil all the conditions of proof. And indeed, the many physiologists and mental philosophers since Berkeley, who have tried to settle how we learn to see by external experiments, have usually illustrated the truth of Diderot's remark, that to interrogate one born blind, in a way fitted to test psychological hypotheses about sight, is an occupation, from its difficulty, not unworthy of the united ingenuity of Newton and Descartes, Locke and Leibnitz.

Even more remote from Berkeley is the endeavour of some German *savants* of this generation to explain, by an examination of the functions of the visual organs, how we get our present perception of space, and how we are able to distinguish between the simultaneous sense phenomena of sight and of touch. Whatever physiological interest the relative scientific speculations of Lotze, Helmholtz, or Wundt may possess on other grounds, from Berkeley's point of view, at any rate, they are destitute of philosophical value. Facts and investigations of the sort are of interest in a physiological or merely physical study of mind, which aims at determining the terms of the dependence, under our present constitution, of states and acts of conscious life upon the constitution of nerve-tissues and organs. They may help us to read better the facts of consciousness in terms of the organic structure and functions. But they do not solve, nor even entertain, the philosophical questions

that are latent in the very presuppositions of physiological and all other natural science. The Book of Vision, whose existence Berkeley discovered, is one that might be possessed or used by any unembodied spirit whose phenomena were really significant of other phenomena. The one cardinal point with him was that, as a fact, we find visual sense impressions daily arising in our conscious experience, which we also find practically capable of being translated; and that they thus make the Book of Vision, which, even though many know it not, we are all continually reading. The profound philosophical lessons in self-knowledge and in divine knowledge involved in this were what he laboured in later life to unfold. But his first lesson in philosophy was, that when we seem at a single glance to be seeing the things of sense around us, in their places in an "ambient space," we are really interpreting our visual impressions, which thus make one of the Books of God, and a Book, too, which is in literal truth a Book of Prophecy.



CHAPTER IV.

UNIVERSAL IMMATERIALISM.

BERKELEY'S discovery of the Divine Book of Vision paved the way to his discovery of the Divine Book of Sense, of which the Book of Vision was only a part. "The bookseller who printed my 'Essay on Vision,'" he writes from Dublin, in March 1710, to Sir John Percival, then in London,¹ "imagining he had printed too few, retarded the publication of it on that side the water till he had printed this second edition. I have made some alterations and additions in the body of the treatise, and in the Appendix have endeavoured to answer the objections of the Archbishop of Dublin. There still remains one objection—with regard to the uselessness of that book of mine,—but in a little time I hope to make what is there laid down appear subservient to the ends of morality and religion, in a treatise I have now in the press, the design of which is to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God; the immortality of the soul; the realisation of God's pre-knowledge and the freedom of man; and by showing the emptiness and falsehood of several parts of the speculative sciences, to

¹ Percival MSS.

reduce men to the study of religion and things useful. How far my endeavours will prove successful, and whether I have been all this time in a dream or no, time will show. . . . I do not see," he adds, "how it is possible to demonstrate even the being of a God on the principle of the Archbishop—that strictly goodness and understanding can no more be assumed of God than that He has feet and hands; there being no argument that I know of for God's existence which does not prove Him at the same time to be an understanding, wise, and benevolent Being, in the strict, and literal, and proper meaning of these words." The book foreshadowed in this letter appeared in the summer of 1710, as the "First Part" of a 'Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, wherein the chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are inquired into.' In this still unfinished fragment of a larger work, Berkeley's new view of the meaning of reality, when reality is affirmed of the things of sense, is explained, defended, and applied. It contains the germ of a Theory of Knowledge, which indeed was never fully unfolded, perhaps, even in his own thoughts.

The 'Essay on Vision' dealt with an artificially isolated world of visual ideas and phenomena. The 'Treatise on Human Knowledge' was an endeavour to show that what was true of the isolated phenomena of sight was also true of the whole phenomenal world of sense. In his explanation of the way in which we learn to see things, Berkeley had tried to prove that what is at first a chaos of unintelligible visual impressions becomes transformed into an interpretable and partly interpreted

system of visual signs, dependent in their very nature on a sentient mind. The same sort of transformation of phenomena, he now argued, takes place in our perception of the whole material world. For, by analysis, all the solid things in space, and space itself, are found to dissolve into what he called sense ideas, but what we may call sense impressions, or phenomena of sense. These impressions or phenomena, through custom-induced "suggestions" of their actual but arbitrarily established relations of coexistence and succession, are gradually converted—when our sense experience is in process of making—into perceptions of what we now call the "qualities" of "sensible things." Thus, not "the manifold" (as Kantists say) of the visual sense, but the entire "manifold" of our sense impressions, becomes—through what Berkeley calls "suggestion,"—an intelligible phenomenal world, which, because intelligible, can be converted by us into natural science. Visual signs and visual symbolism accordingly expand, in the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' into sense signs generally, or natural symbolism. The successive and coexisting phenomena of colour, and visible size, shape, and position; of resistance and tangible size, shape, and position, involved in the consciousness of our bodily movements; of sound, taste, smell, heat and cold,—all go to make up the alphabet of our real perceptions of solid, extended, and movable things. The letters of this natural alphabet of the senses would have been meaningless if they had not been the mind-dependent phenomena of sense, presented by Mind, and interpreted by finite minds, which we find them to be. Were they not this, we could not have had any experience of what is real at all.

We begin to learn the letters of this natural alphabet when we first use our five senses. In continuing to use them, we gradually learn, through a rude and crude experience, the meaning implied in their orderly connections. The intelligence thus by degrees awakened in the "suggestions" which follow, is what we call our "sensuous perception" of the material world. It is throughout previsive. Developed sensuous perception is just expectation, and expectation is essentially prophetic.

Take any material object—large or small—a planet or a grain of sand; inorganic or organic—a mountain or a man's body. We find, when we reflect, Berkeley would argue, that our real knowledge of it is,—that it consists of significant sense phenomena, dependent on sentient minds, aggregated in the clusters we call individual things simply by the constant orderliness or significance of their phenomenal constituents. These clusters of phenomena are in turn isolated from one another, so as to make up the separate "things" we see, by help of our perception and imagination of visible space. The sense phenomena of which the individual and locally separate things of sense are made up, rise, we find, in the current of our personal consciousness, without effort on our part, and indeed without our being able to summon or to dismiss them at our pleasure. The laws which govern their appearance, disappearance, and re-appearance in our perceptions, are not laws made by us, or which we can change. But the daily employment of every human being is that of interpreting, well or ill, the sense phenomena of which he is thus the subject, and on which his happiness is found largely to depend. He is daily determining, by the sense phenomena of

which he is actually conscious, what others, which he is not yet conscious of, may be expected by him, and by other sentient beings. Progress in this work of interpretation is what we commonly call progress in knowledge of nature. In the very beginning of this process of interpreting sense phenomena, we find ourselves obliged to assign to the phenomenal clusters what we call their respective places, sizes, and distances from one another;¹ we are by this means helped to realise, with distinctness, the real and very practical "dream" in which we all share—of a world of phenomenal things, contained in a vast ambient phenomenal sphere,—a world, too, by which we find the pains and pleasures of our conscious lives are very much affected throughout their whole course.

Berkeley's theory of Knowledge, in this Treatise, is an attempt to explain by "suggestion," and ultimately by common sense or ineradicable faith, the practically real dream in which human life, amidst the transitory shows of sense, is found to consist. The explanation is given in his account of the construction of sense knowledge and physical science, out of phenomena or impressions, dependent on a being who is conscious of them. How, for instance, he has to ask, does my merely private or subjective "feeling of heat and colour" get translated into part of this universal or objective dream—if we may call that a dream which is so practically real—as it does in the judgment, "I see the sun." How

¹ This may be compared with Kant's account of the manner in which, through our *a priori* perception of space, the irrelative phenomena of sense are obliged to take on space and time relations, as the condition of their metamorphosis into "objects," from their original chaos.

• does my phenomenal sense of resistance, and colour, and odour become the perception of an orange? In these perceptions we know "things" in their "qualities," and do not merely feel transitory, uninterpreted sense impressions. If we did not rise above these last, we could have no sense experience of the "sun" or the "orange;" and therefore no experience at all in any intelligible meaning of the word. There must therefore be something more, a Berkeleyan may be supposed to argue, in external things than meaningless sense phenomena or sense impressions, incapable of suggesting expectations, and which *per se* can never translate themselves into perception or sense knowledge. What is this "something more," through which the impressions were converted into the sun or the orange — things which are now distinctly recognised as real by the eye or the hand?

This deep question never occurs to the unphilosophical, and so it does not perplex them.

The philosophers, in Berkeley's time and previously, had answered it in a way that seemed to him the chief cause of the triumphs of scepticism in its perennial struggle with faith. For they had, he thought, given a merely abstract answer, unrealisable in any human imagination; and that although an intelligible and easily realisable one lay ready to their hands. They had thus confused the minds of men, and put into circulation a number of meaningless words. "It might with reason be expected," he exclaims, in the opening sentences of his new book on 'Human Knowledge,' "that those who had spent most time and pains in philosophy should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge,

and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind, that walk the highroad of plain common sense and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable, or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a supreme principle—to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. . . . The cause of this is thought [*e.g.*, by Locke] to be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. . . . But perhaps we may be too partial to ourselves, in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we ourselves make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. . . . Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves—that we have first raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see."¹

Berkeley's aim, accordingly, was to recover men from misleading abstractions of metaphysicians; and to do this by an appeal to their own common sense or intuitive consciousness of certainty—after he had, in the

¹ Works, vol. i. pp. 137, 138.

first place, induced them to develop it by reflection. This was virtually to think back into the Eternal Reason, in which we all consciously or unconsciously share; and which the things of sense either conceal or reveal, in proportion as we have a superficial or a deep perception of their meaning. The empty answer of mere metaphysical abstraction to the question about the ultimate meaning of the word Matter was his crucial instance, as Bacon would say, of philosophically raised "dust," followed by the complaint that "we cannot see." Even Locke had taught that the very things of sense themselves were not actually present in perception, but only those effects of their power which we call "sensations"—pleasant and painful; and he had further taught that we are obliged, by our instinctive causal judgment, to refer sensations to independent extended bodies that are unperceived in sense, and whose existence we can only infer. He had distinguished bodies, in their primary qualities or mathematical essence, from bodies in their relative or secondary qualities; which last depend, he held, on the mathematical relations of the atoms of matter to a sentient organism. In the absence of all sentient organism, Locke's Matter had only the qualities which make its mathematical essence, and which were called primary. These last, as well as the former, he further taught, are the attributes of an unperceived substance; and of pure substance we have no other notion, he confessed, than that it is "a something we know not what." In all this, Berkeley insisted, there is nothing conceivable or that we can realise in imagination, except the sense phenomena of which persons are conscious. The supposed mathematical qualities

existing independently of the others, and the pure substance, too, are only empty metaphysical abstractions. They must be melted into sensuous phenomena, like the secondary qualities. With these last, indeed, when we look into the facts, we find the former are inseparably blended, and they must therefore share their fate.

It was this dark background, this misleading fiction of a metaphysical substance, Berkeley thought, that made the merely phenomenal realities we see and touch conceal the Eternal Spirit and Reason within. When once this fictitious power and substance of Matter, endowed with unsensuous qualities, was acknowledged, Matter became the convenient centre to which whatever happened in the universe of sense and of consciousness might be referred as its cause. The phenomena presented to our senses, and hitherto attributed to Matter, were, for the mass of mankind, the very type and standard of reality. This supposed independent Matter in the dark background was accordingly deified, and was offered as the last explanation not only of what is perceived, but also of the percipient act. Even Locke raised much "philosophical dust" about Matter, and then complained that he "could not see." Materialists since Locke, still adopting abstract and unintelligible dogmas, fancy that they find in dead, unconscious, material phenomena, "the promise and potency of all self-conscious life."

In the midst of the philosophical and popular prejudice that Matter could do this or that—could make minds perceive, and could even evolve from itself all the reason and rational life that exists—Berkeley loudly called for an answer to certain previous questions, the answers to which had been, and still were, too dogmati-

cally assumed. What, he asked, is the true philosophical meaning of the words Matter, Space, and Force? Does the principle of intuitive certainty, or common sense (in the philosophical meaning of "common sense"), afford any ground for attributing either an independent subsistence or independent powers to the sense-presented phenomena which compose the phenomenal things seen and touched? Let us inquire, he may be supposed to ask, what the actual office of sense phenomena and phenomenal things is, in a human conscious life. What am I justified, as a reasonable human being, in assuming, when I say that in my perception of a stone, for instance, I am not merely conscious of certain transient sense impressions of colour and hardness, but that I know something that is not transient, nor subject to causal metamorphoses, like the appearances given in the senses—that is not dependent on any one being percipient of it, but is on the contrary persistent, through all changes and interruptions of conscious state and act in all intelligent beings? Bravely press questions of this sort—one almost hears Berkeley saying throughout his book—and then any one who can truly read the revelations of the common consciousness *must* put a very different interpretation upon "reality" in the world of sense phenomena, from the absurd and contradictory interpretation put upon it by Locke, and indeed by the whole array of philosophers. For it can be demonstrated that the dark entities called Matter and Space, and the "powers" Matter is supposed to possess, are not only unnecessary—because expressive of no known office discharged by sense phenomena and phenomenal things in the economy of our experi-

ence—but that the very suppositions they proceed upon are meaningless, and even expressly self-contradictory. They are the “dust” raised by those who find in consequence that they “cannot see.”

In order to correct all this, Berkeley simply tried to be more thorough-going than Locke. The ‘Essay on Human Understanding’ had only done half its work, he thought, when its author had indulged in the presupposition involved in the use of his favourite term *idea*—that Matter, in its *secondary* qualities only, must consist “partly” of spirit, or rather of spirit-dependent phenomena. The truth was, he argued, there could be no such unphenomenal Matter, independent of all conscious experience, as the residuum, with its primary or mathematical qualities, supposed by Locke. The only substantial and powerful realities must be spirits: all other real things must be significant or orderly sense phenomena or impressions—presented in the form of individual phenomenal things to spirits by spirits. The phenomenal things which alone we see and touch, while very real, are, because phenomenal, unsubstantial and impotent: the counter-hypothesis of unphenomenal things, perceived or unperceived, is either a self-contradiction or meaningless.

On the other hand, we do find a persistence and power, involving neither inconsistency nor meaninglessness of verbal abstraction, implied in the fact of *our* being conscious or having experience. This is found in the inevitable use, for all purposes of experience, of the personal pronoun “I.” Here is a sufficient ground for the assertion, that if the universe is to be regarded

philosophically, it must, in the last analysis, be regarded as composed of spirits or self-conscious persons, with their respective sense phenomena, by which as signals they are brought into communion with one another. This conception of things and persons had appeared in the "Commonplace Book." "Nothing," he there wrote, — "nothing properly but persons — *i. e.*, conscious things — does exist. All other things are not so much existences themselves as manners of the existence of conscious persons." The universe, so conceived, seemed to him an intelligible universe, from which the dust of metaphysical abstractions had been cleared away. One knows what one means in using the personal pronouns "I" and "you." One's own continued personal existence, through all changes and interruptions of conscious state and act, is a fact of which all sane people are convinced. It is a datum of the common sense or common reason — a principle involved in the very constitution of a conscious experience. One understands, too, what one means by significant and therefore interpretable sense phenomena. But a pretended unperceived and unperceiving substance and power, which philosophers dogmatically affirm, when they speak of Matter and its forces; and which ordinary mortals, echoing their meaningless jargon, speak about too — this is empty verbalism, which is not, because it cannot be, experienced in sense, or imagined either, by any human or other conscious being. Accordingly we find ourselves obliged, when we verify the meanings of the words we use, to think of the Universe as consisting only of our own self-conscious spirits, persistent and powerful, and of other self-conscious spirits in like manner persistent

and powerful ;—each spirit percipient of its own interpretable sense phenomena. It is by interpreting these phenomena that each is able to form natural science ; also, by using the phenomena of sense as signals of communication with one another, we can discover in some degree the states and acts of the other conscious spirits that coexist with our own—all governed and sustained in this Cosmos by the supremacy of Spirit. In a habitual conception of the Universe as so constituted, Berkeley believed that the “dust” metaphysicians had raised by their meaningless abstractions would soon subside.

All this may be viewed as a dawning apprehension on his part of the higher truth—that visible and tangible things, as phenomenal of the deepest and truest reality, are only the shows of life, which dissolve into insignificance when reflection reveals the Eternal Spirit or Reason beyond, in which we all live and have our being. In true philosophy we become speculatively aware of all this : we realise it practically in the divine life of religion.

And all this, Berkeley would say, is at bottom intuitively seen to be true. It is too evident to admit of being proved by reasoning. The conception, he would have added, is found on trial to satisfy the essential facts of experience, and to resolve the difficulties of thought ; and if it can do this, it has the only sort of evidence that is available for any philosophical theory. The office of reasoning in philosophy is to call out the latent common sense, and also to raise it above the level at which it rests in the stupid gaze of the unreflecting multitude ; though Berkeley insists that even their confused conception turns out in the end to be nearer his reconciling truth than the abstractions of the schools, or the halting

metaphysics of Descartes and Locke. "It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing among men," he exclaims, "that houses, mountains, rivers, in a word, all sensible things, have an [abstract] existence, distinct from their being [actually] perceived [by any person]. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, find it to involve a manifest contradiction." That is to say, it would be a contradiction to suppose that we see what is at the same time unseen—that we are conscious phenomenally of that which is unphenomenal—that we are conceiving what is inconceivable. We cannot detach phenomena from perception, apart from which they must cease to be phenomenal. All this is self-evident. "Some truths there are," he proceeds, "so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important truth to be, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth—in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world—have not any substance without a mind; that their very being is to be perceived or known [*i.e.*, to be part of the significant and interpretable sense experience of a conscious person]; that, consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not actually exist in my mind or in that of any created spirit, they must either have no existence at all [which would be contrary to common sense], or they must exist in the mind [thought and will] of some Eternal Spirit."

Berkeley's "external world" thus, in its deepest meaning, consists of spirits external to his own spirit; con-

scious, in concert with himself, of intelligible and interpretable sense impressions, by which, as sense signals, they can communicate with one another. This externality of spirit to spirit is realisable in thought. One can understand what is meant in saying that one's own personal consciousness, with its successive states or acts, is numerically different from the conscious life of another person. The one conscious life might cease, and the other still go on; just as self-conscious lives, with their respective sense experiences, were going on long before one's own began. Powers of this sort, external to the individual spirit, can conceivably, and do actually, exist. It is really such external powers that our common sense — if we reflect on what it means — obliges us to acknowledge, when each of us finds himself obliged to acknowledge the existence of a world external to his own individual experience. But this externality of individual spirits to individual spirits, with their respective interpretable sense experiences, which is an intelligible sort of "externality," seemed enough for the demand of common sense. Even if the hypothesis of unperceived and unperceiving external substance were not absurd or contradictory, it was enough to say with Occam, *entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*.

"I assert, as well as you," Berkeley could say, "that, since we are all affected independently of our will and contrivance, we *must* grant the existence of forces without, referable to some being not ourselves, and for whose activity we are not responsible. The point of difference is as to *what* this powerful external being is. I will have it to be conscious spirit; you abstract independent matter, or I know not what third nature. I prove it to be spirit.

- For, from the effects I find produced in my senses, I conclude that there must be action going on independently of my personal power, and because action, volition; but if there are external volitions, there must be a Will external to my own, for my will is the centre only of my own personality and sphere of responsibility. Again, the things I see and touch, or else their archetypes, must exist out of me; but, the things being phenomenal only, neither they nor their archetypes *can* exist phenomenally otherwise than as perceived or perceivable. There is therefore an external Intellect. Now Will and Intellect constitute spirit. The powerful Cause of impotent and unsubstantial, but for us practically real, significant, and interpretable phenomena of sense, must therefore be Spirit."

Berkeley's belief in the existence of an external material world thus resolves into belief that the phenomena of sense coexist and undergo metamorphoses cosmically—not chaotically. This belief itself he virtually regards as, and indeed denominates, a conviction of the "common sense," developed by custom or experience. Accordingly, in dealing with sense-given phenomena, he proceeds on this common sense assumption, that they are intelligible, or that they make an experience which is interpretable; and that they are also the common medium through which the existence of other conscious persons, with some of *their* individual experiences, may be ascertained by each percipient. Belief in the existence of the material world, according to Berkeley's explanation of it, is belief in *this*; and the practical dissolution of this belief he would at once grant to be inconsistent with the saneness of the person in whose

mind it was dissolved. He was ready to retain the name "matter," provided that we all accustom ourselves to mean only this when we use it. Things being only ideal or phenomenal—that is, being only significant or interpretable appearances, whose actual reality consists in their orderly manifestation by and to a conscious mind—does not dissolve them in chaos or illusion. On the contrary, we find ourselves obliged by common sense, in every action we perform, to take for granted that sense phenomena (mixed up though they are with our own consciousness, and dependent for their phenomenal character upon a person being conscious of them, nevertheless) spring up independently of individual consciousness, in an orderly or intelligible, and therefore interpretable way; and we have all hitherto found that the assumption we are thus obliged to make has been verified by the event. The chaos of sense phenomena, which at first seems to burst upon our nascent being, becomes, through this common sense suggestion, converted in our thoughts into the cosmos which all physical research presupposes, and which the discoveries of science are making more and more familiar to each succeeding generation. The obligation to assume cosmos to be latent in what at first would seem to be a chaos of sense phenomena, is the firm platform on which we emerge from the obscure infantile consciousness of sensations. This common sense obligation, however produced, and not the irrational state of the sensuous infant, is surely our criterion of reality. Our developed and therefore intelligible experience is surely more real and trustworthy than our unintelligible sensations; and that whatever the process may be according to which the development takes place.

The individual things we perceive are thus, for Berkeley more than mere isolated sense phenomena. They are sense phenomena which, in the way now explained, connected in clusters or aggregates, and in their ordered aggregates form the system of nature—all rescued for us from the chaos of our infant sensations in custom-developed expectations of common sense. Knowledge of a planet, or of a grain of sand, is rescued, under this metaphysical analysis, into the intelligible common sense belief, that sense phenomena can exist in isolation—that, on the contrary, each is significant of other sense phenomena, of which at the time it is not actually conscious, and which therefore are at the time phenomenal in sense, but which, under ascertainable rules, may become phenomenal. There is this the all-pervading belief that phenomenal changes are not be capricious, but must proceed according to the observance of which our personal happiness depends. Faith in these rules is the "something more" than mere phenomena, which forms the very essence of belief in material things; for it is that without which phenomena could not be converted into "phenomenal objects," nor our experience be rationally constituted. This common sense conviction is at the bottom of Berkeley's explanation of our so-called "perception" of things of sense. He finds it in all men; but in individuals, during infancy, it is only imperfectly so. Although it is the animating soul of human nature—the very essence of reasonableness—it is, as such, capable of independent proof. The permanence of order in nature—the intelligibility or rationality of the system of phenomena in which we find ourselves—is

taken for granted, because we cannot help taking it for granted, if we are to have any experience of placed things.¹ These would dissolve in chaos if we ceased for a moment to take it for granted. It is this persistent conviction that is the pith and marrow of perceptions of sense, and of expectations about the things of sense; also of physical or natural science, which is only a further development of ordinary perception or expectation. It is the deepest reality, which, after reflective analysis of our beliefs, we can find latent in our ordinary and also in our scientific conceptions of the world. An apple, for instance, consists of sense phenomena which are the appointed signs of each other—their significance being its “consistence.” It is not true to say that I can see the apple which is placed before my eyes; for I can *see* only those phenomena, in the phenomenal apple, that are visible: many of the qualities of an apple are invisible; for they are tangible, gustable, odorous, &c. Still—through common sense trust in what the visible phenomena naturally signify—I have a rational assurance that, being conscious as I am of the visible phenomena, I might, if I pleased, *become* conscious of those other phenomena commonly called the taste, or the smell, or the hardness of the apple. In other language, the visible phenomena “suggest” the other phenomena, as naturally aggregated with them, in an objective order, thus creating and guaranteeing their practical objectivity to each suggesting mind.

As far as one can affirm, prior to experience, any sort

¹ So Berkeley held; for he regarded space and its relations as an arbitrary issue of natural law and arrangement, not, like Kant, as the necessary precondition of our converting relationless impressions into objects.

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of sense phenomenon might, in orderly coexistence or succession, be cosmically connected with any other sort of sense phenomenon. So far as that goes, the connections of phenomena in the real phenomenal world *may* be called "arbitrary."¹ We have, notwithstanding, a *working* trust that particular sorts of sense phenomena, which we find *now* connected under physical law with certain other phenomena, will *continue* connected with such, so that the one sort is permanently—*i.e.*, really—the sign of the other sort; and may, in all circumstances, be trusted to for being this, till we discover some deeper law to which the observed connection is subordinate, and by which it may be modified. This deeper law may in turn be the subordinate of one deeper and more comprehensive still, and so on indefinitely. But however far we go, we cannot outrun our faith in an *ultimate order, meaning, or rationality*—moral it may be at last, and not properly physical or sensible. That there is *an Eternal Order or Reasonableness in the universe is involved in our own rationality*:—*Eternal Order or Reasonableness, this at least is not arbitrary.* But the established order of sense-phenomenal nature *is* arbitrary, if it might have been, or may ever become, other than it now phenomenally is. And this, for all we can tell, it might have been, or may yet become, in consistence with the deepest and truest Order of All, which is God—

"Whose kingdom is where time and space are not."

It was thus that Berkeley transformed Locke's world of sense. Locke phenomenalised the *secondary* quali-

¹ As Berkeley calls them—reiterating this "arbitrariness" of the laws of nature.

ties of matter, while still holding to the dogma of independent material substances and powers. Berkeley phenomenalised all the qualities of matter—dismissed as superfluous Locke's unphenomenal substances or causes of secondary qualities—and explained reality in phenomenal things, by the activity of Locke's Eternal Mind, in and through whom phenomena, otherwise isolated and meaningless, become aggregated in a scientifically intelligible system. Common sense asserts that we know external things as they are; Berkeley explains that external things as they are are only phenomenal things, and thus tries to reconcile Philosophy with Common Sense.¹

¹ Berkeley's express aim was to show the harmony of the philosophical or rational intuition of the universe with common sense, rightly understood. I am glad to adduce in support of this the high authority of the late Dean Mansel, in his comparison of Berkeley with Reid: "The two systems [Reid's and Berkeley's] may be regarded as in truth sister streams, springing from the same source, and flowing, though by different channels, to the same ocean. The aim of both alike was to lay a sure foundation for human knowledge in principles, secure from the assaults of scepticism; the method of both alike was to appeal to the common consciousness of mankind, as a witness to the existence of certain primary and ineradicable convictions on which all others depend, and to disencumber these convictions from the rash hypotheses and unwarranted deductions with which they had been associated and obscured in previous systems of philosophy. Both, in short, though with very different results, were united in appealing from the theories of metaphysicians to the common sense of men."—Mansel on the "Idealism of Berkeley," in his 'Letters, Lectures, and Reviews,' p. 382 (1873).

With Berkeley the reality of the material world is rooted in faith in the phenomenal order, and faith in phenomenal orderliness is part of the common sense of men; while the supposition of unperceivable material substance is argued to be inconsistent with the common sense out of which science springs. Consciousness of our spiritual personality and agency, and faith in the principle of causality—the other pillar of Berkeley's system—are also regarded by him as part of our common sense.

CHAPTER V.

SIR JOHN PERCIVAL AND DR SAMUEL CLARKE.

ONE is curious to ascertain the first impression produced by Berkeley's new conception of the substance of Matter—as consisting not in an unknowable and inconceivable substratum, but in the rationally established and intelligible regulation of phenomena—and by his bold challenge to the philosophical world. We can now, for the first time, have this curiosity gratified. His hitherto unpublished correspondence with his friend Sir John Percival throws light on much that happened. He was himself eager, we find, to hear what people had to say about the philosophy promulgated in the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' but in those days there was no periodical criticism to inform him at once. "If when you receive my book," he wrote in July 1710 to Sir John,¹ then in London, "you can procure me the opinion of some of your acquaintances who are thinking men, addicted to the study of natural philosophy and mathematics, I shall be extremely obliged to you." In the month after he was assured that it was incredible what prejudice can work in the best geniuses—nay,

¹ Percival MSS.

Berkeley's reply to this, written at Trinity College, Dublin, in September 1710, is philosophically interesting.¹ "I am not surprised," he says, "that I should be ridiculed by those who won't take the pains to understand me. My comfort is, that they who have entered most into what I have written speak most advantageously of it. If the raillery and scorn of those who critique what they will not be at the pains to understand had been sufficient to deter men from making any attempts towards curing the ignorance and errors of mankind, we should not have been troubled with some very fair improvements in knowledge. The common cry's being against any opinion seems to me, so far from proving it false, that it may with as good reason pass for an argument of its truth. However, I imagine that whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled opinion had need be introduced with great caution into the world. For this reason it was that I omitted all mention of the non-existence of Matter in the title-page, dedication, preface, and introduction to my 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' that so the notion might steal unawares on the reader, who possibly would never have meddled with a book that he had known contained such paradoxes. If, therefore, it shall at any time be in your way to discourse your friends on the subject of my book, I entreat you not to take notice to them that I deny the being of Matter in it, but only that it is a treatise on the principles of human knowledge, designed to promote true knowledge and religion, particularly in opposition to those philosophers who vent dangerous notions with regard to the existence of God and the natural immor-

¹ Percival MSS.

talities of the soul, both which I have endeavoured to demonstrate, in a way not hitherto made use of."

With characteristic energy he disclaims "vanity and love of paradox" as motives of the book, and professes an earnest belief in the non-existence of unphenomenal and unperceiving Matter,—“a belief,” he adds, “which I have held for some years, the conceit being at first warm in my imagination, but since carefully examined, both by my own judgment and that of ingenious friends.” What he deprecated most of all was, “that men who have never considered my book should confound me with the sceptics who doubt the existence of sensible things, and are not positive as to any one truth, no, not so much as their own being, which I find by your letter is the case of some wild visionist now in London.¹ But whoever reads my book with attention will see that there is a direct opposition betwixt the principles contained in it and those of the sceptics, and that I question not the existence of anything that we perceive by our

¹ We see here how Berkeley disclaims, by anticipation, the metaphysical nihilism or pan-phenomenalism of Hume, according to whom “I” am only a congeries of “impressions and ideas,” out of whose union the notion of a self or subject is artificially formed in imagination—and also disclaims the indetermination of Kant as to whether “I” am a permanent substance or a transitory phenomenon. Yet in several passages of his “*Commonplace Book*,” he himself verbally approaches a similar view. Thus he says,—“The very existence of ideas constitutes the soul. Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perception, and you take away mind. Put the perceptions, and you put the mind.”—*Works*, vol. iv. p. 438. To the same effect he is perplexed by the probability of unconscious intervals during sleep, which on this view would mean non-existence: he argues that we cannot exist in an unconscious state, but suggests a theory of time which might solve the difficulty. “One of my earliest inquiries was about Time, which led me into several paradoxes that I did not think fit or necessary to publish.”

senses. As to your lady's objection," he continues, "I am extremely honoured by it. I must beg you to inform her ladyship I do not deny the existence of the sensible things which Moses says were created by God. They existed from all eternity in the Divine Intellect, and then became perceptible (*i.e.*, were created) in the same manner and order as is described in Genesis.¹ For I take creation to belong to things only as they respect finite spirits, there being nothing new to God. Hence it follows that the act of creation consists in God's willing that those things should become perceptible to other spirits which before were known only to Himself. Now both reason and Scripture assure us that there *are* other spirits besides men, who, 'tis possible, might have perceived this visible world as it was successively exhibited to their view before man's creation. Besides, for to agree with the Mosaic account of the creation, it's sufficient if we suppose that a man, in case he was created and existing at the time of the chaos of sensible things, might have perceived all things formed out of it in the very order set down in Scripture, all which is no way repugnant to my principles."²

Sir John in his next letter, written from London in

¹ Note this early expression of Platonic Idealism, blending with his phenomenalism (*i.e.*, with his idealism, in the Cartesian and Lockian meaning of "idea").

² This touches a difficulty often urged against the merely phenomenalist conception of the reality of sensible things—viz., its inconsistency with the real existence of the material world before there were human beings for whom there could be phenomena. *Phenomenalisation* not being possible in the absence of sense-conscious spirits, the world, it is argued, could not have existed before man (as we know it did), if its reality is only phenomenal. It does not seem that Berkeley's explanation of this difficulty is weakened by any pro-

October,¹ reports that the new book had fallen into the hands of the highest English authority in metaphysics then living, still a young man under forty. This was Dr Samuel Clarke, who had produced his 'Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God' four years before. Berkeley's 'Treatise' had also been seen by Whiston, Newton's successor at Cambridge. "Two clergymen have perused your book—Clarke and Whiston. Not having myself any acquaintance with these gentlemen, I can only report at second hand that they think you a fair arguer and a clear writer, but they say your first principles you lay down are false. They look upon you as an extraordinary genius, but say they wish you had employed your thoughts less upon metaphysics, ranking you with Father Malebranche, Norris, and another whose name I have forgot—all of whom they think extraordinary men, but of a particular turn, and their labours of little use to mankind on account of their abstruseness. This may arise from these gentlemen not caring to think after a new manner, which would oblige them to begin their studies anew, or else it may be the strength of prejudice."

Berkeley was vexed by the expressions of Clarke and Whiston. He sent to Sir John's care a letter to each of them, hoping, through him, "to obtain their reasons against his notions, as truth is his sole aim;" and there is nothing he more desires than being "helped forward in the search for truth by the concurring studies of thoughtful and impartial men. As to what is said

gress in modern science. Discoveries in science can still be described in terms of perception or phenomena.

¹ Percival MSS.

of ranking me with Father Malebranche and Mr Norris, whose writings are thought to be too fine-spun to be of any great use to mankind, I have this answer, that I think the notions I embrace are not in the least coincident or agreeing with theirs, but indeed plainly inconsistent with them in the main points, inasmuch as I know few writers I take myself at bottom to differ more from than from them. Fine-spun metaphysics are what I on all occasions declare against, and if any one shall show anything of that sort in my Treatise, I will willingly correct it."

"Your letters to Dr Clark and Mr Whiston," Sir John replied,¹ "I delivered to two friends of theirs. Dr Clarke told his friend in reply that he did not care to write you his thoughts, because he was afraid it might draw him into a dispute upon a matter which was already clear to him. He thought your first principles you go on are false; but he was a modest man, his friend said, and uninclined to shock any one whose opinions on things of this nature differed from his own."

This was a great disappointment to Berkeley's youthful ardour. "Dr Clarke's conduct seems a little surprising," he writes.² "That an ingenious and candid person (as I take him to be) should refuse to show me where my error lies, is something unaccountable. For my own part, as I shall not be backward to recede from the opinion I embrace when I see good reason against it, so, on the other hand, I hope to be excused if I am confirmed in it the more upon meeting with nothing but positive and general assertions to the contrary. I never

¹ Dec. 28, 1710—Percival MSS.

² Jan. 19, 1711—Percival MSS.

expected that a gentleman, otherwise so well employed as Dr Clarke, should think it worth his while to enter into a dispute with me concerning any notions of mine. But, seeing it was so clear to him that I went upon false principles, I hoped he would vouchsafe, in a line or two, to point them out to me, that so I may more closely review and examine them. If he but once did me this favour, he need not apprehend I should give him any further trouble, or offer any the least occasion for drawing him into a dispute with me. This was all my ambition, and I should be glad if you have opportunity that you would let his friend know this. There is nothing that I more desire than to know thoroughly all that can be said against what I take for truth."

The attempt failed. Clarke was not to be drawn into a statement of his objections in the complacent way in which, three years afterwards, he dealt with Joseph Butler, then a student at the Dissenters' Academy at Tewkesbury, in their famous correspondence about Clarke's 'Demonstration.' Berkeley's attempt to correspond with Clarke is, however, referred to by Whiston in his 'Memoirs of Clarke.' "Mr Berkeley," he there says, "published in 1710, at Dublin, the metaphysical notion that Matter was not a real thing; nay, that the common opinion of its reality was groundless, if not ridiculous. He was pleased to send Mr Clarke and myself each of us a book. After we had both perused it, I went to Mr Clarke to discourse with him about it to this effect, that I, being not a metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr Berkeley's subtle premises, though I did not believe his absurd conclusion. I therefore

desired that he, who was deep in such subtleties, but did not appear to believe Mr Berkeley's conclusion, would answer him. Which task he declined."

What Clarke's answer to Berkeley would have been, if he had chosen to commit himself, we may perhaps gather from a passage in his published writings. Seven years after this correspondence through Sir J. Percival, he wrote as follows, in his 'Remarks on Human Liberty:' "The case as to the proof of our free agency is exactly the same as in that notable question, Whether the World exists or no? There is no demonstration of it from experience. There always remains a bare possibility that the Supreme Being may have so framed my mind that I shall always be necessarily deceived in every one of my perceptions, as in a dream, though possibly there be no material world, nor any other creature existing besides myself. And yet no man in his senses argues from thence, that experience is no proof to us of the existence of things. The bare physical possibility, too, of our being so framed by the Author of Nature as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter [our free agency] by every experience of every action we perform, is no more any just ground to doubt the truth of our liberty, than the bare natural possibility of our being all our lifetime in a dream, deceived in our belief of the existence of the material world, is any just ground to doubt the reality of its existence."

The word "dream" is used in ordinary language for the illusory visions of sleep, so that it is apt to carry this connotation with it when employed to represent the phe-

nominal universe of Berkeley, with its steady order, and charged with its unfulfilled prophecies which regulate our actions.¹

¹ So Leibnitz contrasts the real dreams of sense reality with the capricious visions of the night: "Nullo argumento absolute demonstrari potest, dari corpora; nec quicquam prohibet somnia quædam *bene ordinata* menti nostræ objecta esse, quæ a nobis vera judicentur, et ob consensum inter se quoad usum veris æquivalent."—De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis (1707).

CHAPTER VI.

THE OBJECTIONS TO IMMATERIALISM.

THE objections to the immaterialist theory of an essentially spiritual universe, which reached Berkeley through Sir John Percival and others, annoyed him as expressions of misconception founded on prejudiced indifference. Not long after the publication of the First Part of the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' accordingly, he began to prepare a volume of dialogues, in which, after the manner of Plato, plausible objections to the new doctrine could be readily discussed. The little book was published in London in the summer of 1713, and entitled, 'Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, the Design of which is Plainly to Demonstrate the Reality and Perfection of Human Knowledge, the Incorporeal Nature of the Soul, and the Immediate Providence of a Deity, in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists.' Philonous tries to convince Hylas of the unsubstantiality and impotence of the things of sense, and to show that, as revealed in the five senses, the world is altogether phenomenal and evanescent; the permanence, independence, and powers attributed to things visible and tangible truly belonging to Eternal Mind, on whose

Will they depend, and of whose Ideas their constitution and laws are the manifestation.

English philosophical literature contains no work in which literary art and a pleasing fancy are more attractively blended with ingenious metaphysical thought than in these 'Dialogues.' Soon after they appeared, Sir John Percival wrote¹ to their author that he was "satisfied he had now made his meaning much easier to understand, dialogue being the proper method for meeting objections." "It is not common," he added, "for men possessed of a new opinion to raise so many arguments against it as you have done. Indeed I am much more of your opinion than I was before. The least I can say is, that your notion is as probable as the one you argue against. There is at least equal difficulty against both opinions."

It is always to be remembered that the ideas or phenomena of which things are composed, according to the Berkeleyan conception, are not, as with Fichte, modifications of the mind to which they are presented, but are, on the contrary, perception-dependent presentations, exhibited under "laws of nature," in individual minds. They exist "in mind," in Berkeley's words, "not by way of mental mode or attribute, but by way of idea;" and this is an altogether unique manner of existence. We are each of us, accordingly, related to the "real phenomenal dream," with all its innumerable practical consequences to us, simply as percipients and perceived—knowers and phenomenal things known—with whatever "otherness" this *sui generis* relation may be found to involve; but we are not so related as that we

¹ July 17, 1713—Percival MSS.

become what we perceive, or that what we perceive becomes part of us. Our conviction of our spiritual individuality and identity, and of our personal responsibility, opposes us to the phenomenal things of sense, which appear in consciousness without becoming consciousness. The phenomenal things and the self are both real, but of the one we are conscious as phenomenal, and of the other as a hyper-phenomenal reality.

Still more must it be remembered that phenomenal things need not be composed only of the phenomena presented in the "five senses" popularly attributed to man. Phenomena of innumerable sorts, which do not appear in human sense experience, may form part of the experience of other sentient spirits, and thus contribute to the composition of *their* things of sense, while those of which we are percipient may be wanting to them. Their world and our world would in that case have different qualities, and qualities of which we can form no imagination at all. In the ingenious philosophical romance of Voltaire, the inhabitants of the planet Saturn are credited with seventy-two senses, and are "every lay complaining of the smallness of the number." This was small indeed compared to the resources of "Micromegas, the inhabitant of one of the planets of the Dog-star," with his "one thousand senses" and millions of years of life, and withal his "listless inquietude and vague desires." His conceptions of phenomenal realities were indged enlarged, as compared with ours; but it was only phenomenal existence still—not the self-contradictory conception of phenomena and phenomenal things that were *not* phenomena and phenomenal things, against which Berkeley argued.

Professor Huxley, in the piano argument of his charming essay on Berkeley,¹ seems to overlook the point. He supposes a piano that is conscious of sound and nothing else. Having no conception of any other mode of existence, he makes it reason thus: "All my knowledge consists of sounds and the perception of the relation of sounds; now the being of sound is to be heard; and it is inconceivable that the existence of sounds I know should depend upon any other existence than that of the mind of a hearing being." That the sounds depend (as *we* know they do) on "the existence of a substance of brass, wood, and iron," would, he thinks, be voted unimaginable, and therefore impossible, by a Berkeleyan piano. The piano in that case must have been ill-trained in Berkeley's conception, which puts no limits on the sorts of phenomena with which sounds may be related as phenomenal signs. These may be more numerous than even in the world of Micro-megas. What Berkeley would say is, that we are at the end still within the world of only phenomenal matter, and no nearer the unphenomenal substance against which alone his argument was directed, than we were at the beginning. The Berkeleyan piano that reasoned according to Berkeley would at once admit the possibility of phenomenal brass and wood and iron, though their visible and tangible phenomena must be unimaginable by it; but it would reject unphenomenal substances—neither phenomenal matter nor the rational constitution called "mind"—as at best a synonym for Nothing.

It is further to be remembered, in dealing with objec-

¹ In 'Macmillan's Magazine,' June 1871.

tions to Immaterialism, that it assumes the possibility of our having phenomenal experience, and perceptions of phenomenal things, in a disembodied as well as in this embodied state of conscious life. There is no *a priori* connection between the dissolution of that phenomenal thing I call my body, and the extinction of my consciousness of phenomenal things, and of all besides. "It seems," Berkeley says, "very easy to conceive the soul to exist in a separate state, divested from the laws and limits of motion and perception with which she is embarrassed here, and to exercise herself on new ideas [*i.e.*, phenomena by us at present unimaginable], without the intervention of those tangible things we call our bodies. It is even very possible to conceive how the soul may have ideas of colour [*i.e.*, become percipient of phenomena of colour] without an eye, or of sound without an ear." This train of thought, it may be granted, is less satisfactory at a time when physiological science insists upon the organic unity of conscious life and the corporeal frame, as proved by a sufficient induction of facts—whatever may be the abstract possibility of supposing our consciousness of phenomenal things in sense to go on independently of our having phenomenal bodies of our own. The only conscious life we have any experience of, it would be argued, is one in organic union with the corporeal structure, in correlation with which it grows, so that speculations like this of Berkeley are at best unverified hypotheses.

The supposed need for the existence after death of a moral agent who is undergoing a divine education, one may still allege, however, is incapable of being disposed of in this way by scientific reasoning, which, within its

sphere of phenomenal things, is ignorant of the agency and moral government of persons. In the moral experience of the spiritual being I call *myself*, there may be evidence that the organic change called Death is not the end of me. The result of that change, it is said, lies within the veil where our present experience does not extend. But in another view, the rising of the sun to-morrow, and the conscious life after death of a person who has not yet died, are both "beyond experience," and each must remain so till it has actually happened. Again, neither is beyond it, if the former can be shown to be rationally involved in our present physical or phenomenal, and the latter in our present moral and religious experience.

The chief objections discussed in the 'Three Dialogues,' as well as others which have since been raised against immaterialism, resolve themselves, I think, into an allegation of its covert scepticism—partial or universal. Phenomenal matter, it is argued, cannot be concluded to be unsubstantial and impotent without absurd conclusions following in the train. For, immaterialism logically involves—so it is assumed—the subjectivity of physical and mathematical science; and, even according to its more moderate antagonists, it obliges him who holds it to consider himself solitary in the universe, without any fellow-creature, animate or inanimate. Then, according to its more uncompromising critics, it further involves the dissolution of all beliefs, and of all that exists, spirit as well as body.

These objections are in a degree recognised and argued against in the 'Dialogues.' I shall try to pre-

sent them in their strength, with Berkeley's replies, so far as they go at the stage in the development of his thought to which he had now attained.

A merely phenomenal material world, dependent on percipient mind for the permanence we all naturally attribute to things, must consist, it may be objected, of as many sensible things as there are percipient persons, or indeed as there are numerically different perceptions of individual things by each separate person. The things of sense can have no numerical identity; they and their laws must all be capricious mental phenomena. Even although I may so interpret the phenomena of which I am conscious in my senses, as to be able to predict phenomena of which I shall become percipient, and may thus form a subjective physical science of the sense portion of my mental experience; and though the very things seen and felt by me are thus the real phenomenal things that exist,—still such things, it has been argued,¹ cannot discharge the offices which Berkeley supposes his phenomenal material world able to discharge instrumentally, for the substantial and powerful world of spirits. He would have the final end of its intelligible and interpretable existence to be—that of awakening, in a person who is percipient of sense phenomena, a reasonable belief in the existence of other finite minds, and in the existence of Supreme Mind. But then the “phenomenal things” of Berkeley's world, from their dependence on perceptions, can have only an intermittent and fragmentary, and not a permanent and always complete existence. They exist only as presented to perception, and when actually perceived. Even

¹ *E.g.*, by Ueberweg.

their mathematical qualities and relations are not necessary, nor indeed other than they are perceived to be in the shifting perceptions of sense. On this conception of what Matter is, the tree that I see at a little distance from me exists only while I (or some other person, if there *be* any other person) am actually looking at it; and even then only in part of the aggregate of phenomena which we call its "qualities." For, as merely seen, it is untouched, so that its tangible qualities are in abeyance. If "things" mean only *actual* sensuous perceptions, all their visible qualities must relapse for the time into nonentity, when they are left in the dark unseen by any one; and their tangible ones too, unless a percipient is always in conscious contact with every part of them. The force of the objection is aggravated to the imagination (not created, however, as some seem to think) by the discoveries of modern science, for instance, in geology and astronomy. It is objected that the world we now see and touch could not have existed millions of years before man or other sentient beings began to perceive, as modern science proves that it did, if all that can be legitimately meant by its real existence is, that it is the sensuous experience of a person; nor can it have the continuity which is presupposed in the modern conception of its changes as equivalent metamorphoses.¹

¹ This has perhaps not been enough kept in view in the chapter on Berkeley in one of the acutest books of recent philosophical literature—Mr A. J. Balfour's 'Defence of Philosophic Doubt' (1879)—where the Berkeleyan conception of the material world is eviscerated, and transformed into a chaos of phenomena, viewed apart from supreme Intellect and Will as the constant constructive power. To the same effect Mr J. S. Mill's "permanent possibility of sensation," and so-called "psychological idealism," is identified with Berkeley, though it is Berkeley with his eyes put out.

This sort of objection to the new way of thinking about Matter was touched in Lady Percival's difficulty, already mentioned, and in Berkeley's explanation, that he understands by the “creation” of visible and tangible things—the development of successive perceptions, in a universal order, in sentient beings.

The want of numerical sameness in the things we perceive, if things are only phenomena dependent on the perceptions of persons, is one of the chief difficulties of Hylas. “The same idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours or in any other mind,” Hylas objects. “Doth it not therefore follow,” he concludes, “that no two persons can see the same thing?” And is not this highly absurd? To which Philonous ingeniously replies :—

“If the term ‘same’ be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different persons *may* perceive the same thing, and the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition ; and since men are used to apply the term ‘same’ where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, ‘several saw the same thing,’ so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language or the truth of things. But if the term ‘same’ be used in the acceptation of philosophers—who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity—then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall see fit to call a thing the same or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who

had yet never known the use of language, they would without question agree in their perceptions. Though, perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some, regarding only the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the *same* thing; others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of *different* things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term 'same' applied to it. Men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names."

Though Hylas was satisfied with this answer, other critics of the new thought may still feel that Philonous has not got to the bottom of the question, and that he has failed to distinguish numerical identity from complete similarity. The sameness which consists in similarity is the only sameness which he acknowledges for the things of sense. It follows that things, as exclusively phenomenal, can only have an interrupted existence in private minds. But this is to regard his theory only on one side. Philonous accepts the common-sense conviction, in fact ineradicable, that phenomenal things involve a continuance of existence when human beings are not percipient, even before human beings existed, and before the first sense experience of any sentient intelligence. He gives his own explanation, however, of what this common conviction really means. Without the explanation, the new thought would dissolve the aggregates of sense phenomena into isolated sense phenomena, void of meaning or reasonableness. The common conviction, he intends to say, really means the permanence of Mind or Reason, as the ground of the

constitution of the sensible world, for without this it could neither become nor continue to be a world. In theological language, the permanence of the things we see and touch presupposes the persistence of Divine Intellect and Action in the heart of things. It is through this that they are substantiated; and it is through this that the regular order of the perceptions in each finite mind—that is, the order of the phenomena of which the things consist, and of the phenomenal changes in the things—is determined.

The world of sense, according to this theory of it, has two sorts of reality—a phenomenal and a hyper-phenomenal. As phenomenal in sense, its reality must be conceived and spoken about only in terms of sensuous perception and of imagination. Hyper-phenomenally regarded, it has a continuous existence, in the ideal archetypes of the Divine Rational Will; but as such it cannot be seen or touched, nor even imagined. When Berkeley speaks about reality in sensible things, he usually refers only to what can be seen and touched, and represented in imagination; this, he says, is plainly only phenomenal, and therefore dependent on the sensuous perception or on the imagination. The ideal archetypes in the Divine Intellect and Will, as invisible, intangible, and unimaginable, do not belong to the world of sense—the material world, in its common meaning. But as for the sensuous manifestations, these must be only as and when they are seen, touched, or otherwise experienced in any of the senses.

As to the objection that I must acknowledge myself to be alone in existence, without any fellow-creatures, if Matter—as far as science is concerned with it—is only

phenomenal, Berkeley has not cleared up the difficulty. He nowhere tries to show how a perception-dependent material world is adequate to discharge the office of a reliable medium of intelligent and practical intercourse between one otherwise private and solitary spirit and another. The question how intercommunion is possible without a numerical identity—not a mere similarity—in the phenomenal signs perceived by each spirit, hardly occurs to him. He is already full of the conviction that other minds exist contemporaneously with his own; and the sensible world is for him an object of interest chiefly as the medium of social intercourse between men and men, and even of God with men. But he rather *assumes* its adequacy for this office—on grounds of ordinary common sense—than explains the consistency of the common sense assumption with the separate individuality of material worlds, conceived only in terms of the phenomena of which each person is individually percipient; and he erects no philosophical barrier against absolute, or at least theological, Egoism. The explanation would have carried him further into the relations of Reason and Sense than he went, in the earlier stages of his mental development. The immanence of Supreme Mind in nature and the human soul was then less in his thoughts than the dependence of what is seen and touched, and of the space in which we see and touch, upon sentient consciousness.

That the logical issue of the Berkeleyan paralysis of Matter and its powers is the impossibility of any scientific knowledge of nature, and also absolute Egoism, is only a part of its destructive issues, according to its bolder

- critics. The premises that unsubstantiate Matter, they would argue, unsubstantiate everything. If unphenomenal matter and force is impossible and absurd, because inconceivable, unconscious Spirit must be impossible and absurd too, because unrealisable in consciousness. Reason in us and in nature is illusion, if phenomenality and being imaginable is the final test of reality. Are not the arguments for the unsubstantial and impotent character of the phenomenal things of sense good also against the persistence and power of Spirit? If the material world can only be a system of phenomena dependent on mind for its continuous existence, can spirit or mind be more than a series of perceptions, without any persistent and powerful self of whom perceptions are only manifestations? Does not Berkeley's weapon against materialism and scepticism literally turn against himself, with suicidal effect? Was not the "visionist" who denied "his own" existence as well as that of Matter, only a more firm and consequent reasoner than Berkeley? If the "inconceivability" of an independent persistence of the material world was a sufficient reason for assuming that phenomenal things must be absolutely dependent on self-conscious Mind, must not Mind, too, for a like reason, be nothing, except as a succession of ever-perishing perceptions? Does not the personal pronoun "I" resolve itself into phenomenal perceptions, and all existence dissolve in unconnected impressions? Instead of the materialistic extreme, at which conscious states and acts are regarded as effects which mysteriously follow certain motions and collocations of atoms, — against which Berkeley revolted; and the spiritualistic

extreme, at which atoms and their motions are into the significant and interpretable sensuousness of a spirit—which Berkeley accepted,—but and spirits now disappear in a nihilism that puts an end alike to philosophy, and physical and common knowledge.

This objection, though not in all its strength, occur to Berkeley, suggested perhaps by a passage in Locke:—

“‘You admit,’ Hylas objects,¹ in sentences introduced in the third edition of the ‘Three Dialogues’ in 1734—‘I admit that there is a spiritual substance, although you have no idea of it, while you deny that there can be such a material substance, because you have no idea of it. It is not fair dealing? to act consistently you must admit of the existence of Spirit. What say you to this?’—‘I say, in this place,’ replies Philonous, ‘that I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no idea of it. Many things, for aught I know, may exist whereof neither I nor any other man hath, or can have any idea or notion whatever. But then those things may be possible—that is, nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that although we may suppose things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may believe that any particular thing exists without some perception for such belief. But I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter. Whereas the being of Myself I immediately know by reflection.’—‘Notwithstanding all this,’ said, Hylas still objects, ‘to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your principles, it should follow that “you” are only a collection of fleeting ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used, you say, without a meaning

¹ Works, vol. i. pp. 327-329.

And as there is no more meaning in spiritual substance than in material substance, the one ought to be exploded as well as the other.'—'How often,' retorts Philonous,—'how often must I repeat that I know and am conscious of my own being, and that I myself am not my own ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas? . . . But I am not, in like manner, conscious of the existence and essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter [*i.e.*, as distinct from the existence of intelligible and interpretable sensuous phenomena] implies an inconsistency [*i.e.*, the existence of unphenomenal phenomena]. Further, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas. . . . But I don't know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or [unperceiving and unperceived] archetypes of ideas. There is, therefore, on the whole, no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.'

This is, on the whole, to say that, though we have a consciousness of the material world as only phenomenally real, we are conscious in what we call "I" of more than a phenomenal reality—of what has ontological as well as phenomenal meaning—of what gives their only concrete meaning to the abstract words "substance" and "power," and its only complete meaning to the word "cause." The answer satisfied Hylas. It did not satisfy David Hume, who, soon after, in his 'Treatise of Human Nature,' read into Berkeley's Immaterialism a Universal Scepticism, in which the hyper-phenomenal reality of the Ego and of God was, along with Matter, suicidally dissolved in a confession of universal meaninglessness, and the unattainability of any reasonable experience.

"There are some philosophers," says Hume,¹ "who imagine that we are every moment conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence, and its continuance in existence. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 'myself,' I always stumble at some particular perception or other. I can never observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for a time, as in sound sleep, so long I am insensible myself, and may truly be said not to exist. . . . Setting aside some metaphysicians, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing,—a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one another with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."

The need for reason in that which gives rise to reason is also disclaimed by Hume as an unsupported dogma, apart from this suicidal scepticism. He denies our right to assume that a "cause"—that is, a caused or phenomenal cause, which is the only cause he and his disciples think about—must be "sufficient," according to any notion we can form of sufficiency, to produce certain effects; for "effects" are only invariable consequences, and these are to be found by experience, apart from *a priori* conceptions of what the antecedent phenomena are or are not "sufficient" to cause. Causation is only constant conjunction, according to the pure phenomenalism of Hume; we can never find an *a priori* reason why "anything may not produce anything;" and therefore why the phenomena or impressions we call Matter may not cause the phenomena or impressions we call Mind.

¹ 'Treatise of Human Nature,' B. I., Pt. i., sect. 6. But compare this with the relative remarks in the Appendix to Part III. (pp. 300-305, in vol. iii., ed. 1740)—a remarkable passage which posits Kant's problem.


If we see a constant conjunction between conscious life and organised matter, they reason hastily, he would say, who conclude—from a dogmatic assumption of “insufficiency” in the cause, about which we can affirm nothing—that it is impossible that motion can ever produce thought, or a different position of parts give rise to a different passion or reflection; while from experience “we may certainly conclude that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception.”

It was thus that Hume, years afterwards, carried Berkeley's war against metaphysical abstractions from the merely phenomenal world of the senses into the world of Spirit, and, dismissing “substances” and “powers,” dissolved all that exists into unsubstantial and impotent impressions, without Universal Mind, either external or immanent. If, as Hume did, and as the critics and the historians of philosophy have since done, the constructive or unphenomenal side of the Berkeleyan theory is left out of account, and the Eternal Reason which shines through the phenomena of sense and sensible things—even in his earlier, but chiefly in his later thought—is made no account of, it is easy to show that mere phenomena, without immanent reason, can be no world at all. They make only an uninterpretable chaos, perhaps occasionally coexistent and connected, but in which the personal pronouns “I” and “you” have no right to appear.

That Berkeley made Sense and Custom more prominent than Reason or Intellect, in the volumes which issued so impetuously from his musings at Trinity College; and that those writings, as more accommodated than his

later works to the course of thought in Europe in the last century, were treated as his only writings,—may excuse the one-sided representation of his theory of knowledge and existence which has long been accepted. But it is time that it should be conceived in its fulness, and that we should remember the sacrifices of his “later growth” as well as his “first-fruits” at “the altar of truth.”

Meantime we must follow him in romantic wanderings through many lands, amidst surroundings very different from those of Dublin and Trinity College.



PART II.—1713-34.

CHAPTER I.

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND ITALY.

EARLY in January 1713, Berkeley, still full of his new thought about the phenomenal nature of things and their necessary dependence on Eternal Governing Spirit, found his way from Dublin to London, thus emerging for the first time from his "obscure corner." The College leave of absence given to him says that it was on the ground of "health," which may have suffered from the impetuous ardour expended in the 'Essay on Vision,' the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' and the 'Three Dialogues.' In a letter from London, a few days after he got there, to Sir John Percival,¹ who was then in Dublin, he says that he had crossed the Channel "to print his new book of Dialogues, and to make acquaintance with men of merit, rather than to engage the interests of those in power." He describes the adventures of his journey, and gives his first impressions of the new country, enlarging, with a genuine feeling for

¹ January 26, 1713—Percival MSS.

nature in all its softer aspects, on the extraordinary beauty of rural England, even in winter, which he liked better than anything he saw in London.


His good-natured erratic countryman, Richard Steele, was among the first to welcome him on his arrival. In that same January letter, from the "Pall Mall Coffee-House in the Pall Mall," he mentions a meeting with Steele, and soon after he writes again that he dines often with him in Bloomsbury Square, "where he has a good house, table, servants, and coach. Somebody had given him my Treatise on Human Knowledge, and that was the ground of his inclination to my acquaintance. You will soon hear of him under the character of the 'Guardian:' he designs his paper should come out every day, as the 'Spectator.'" This was the house in Bloomsbury Square, "much finer, larger, and grander" than one Steele had already had in Jermyn Street, for which he could not pay; or than another at Hampton, on which he had borrowed money, and which poor Steele with his "dear Prue" had taken in 1712—where his unhappy landlord "got no better satisfaction than his friend in St James's, and where it is recorded that Dick, giving a grand entertainment, had half-a-dozen men in livery to wait upon his noble guests, and confessed that his servants were bailiffs to a man."¹

In this first summer in England, Berkeley wrote several essays in the 'Guardian,' mostly sarcastic squibs against materialistic free-thinkers, for whom Steele had a strong aversion. Although an immaterialist basis of religious thought is hardly perceptible in these papers, they show the direction in which he was disposed to apply his new conception of Matter, more evident twenty

¹ See Thackeray's 'English Humourists of the Eighteenth Century.'

years afterwards, when he engaged in controversy with the Free-thinkers in a more systematic way.

This disposition may have been produced partly by his recollection of the old Toland controversies in Dublin, but it was now strengthened by the appearance of Anthony Collins's 'Discourse of Free-Thinking,' shortly after his own arrival in London. We are less able than we should like to be to reproduce Collins as he lived and thought, for no sufficient biography of this remarkable man has been written. He was a barrister, born of a good Essex family, who in 1713 was talked about in town, especially in the ecclesiastical world, on account of this little book, most of which reads rather commonplace to-day. Ten years before, this Essex gentleman had been in affectionate correspondence and companionship with Locke, at Lady Masham's at Oates, in the last year of Locke's life. The great author of the 'Essay,' and of the 'Letters on Toleration,' found himself wonderfully in sympathy with his young friend. He praised his love of truth and moral courage as superior to almost any he had ever known, and by his will he made him one of his executors. Soon after Locke's death, Collins got involved in ecclesiastical disputes, which made him conceive a strong antipathy to the clergy. He supported Dodwell against Clarke, by clever reasonings which Swift has preserved for ridicule in *Martinus Scriblerus*. In 1709 he wrote against priestcraft, and assailed King, the Archbishop of Dublin, for his discourse on divine predestination and foreknowledge. Collins is remembered now by historians of philosophy for his controversy with Samuel Clarke about necessity and the moral agency of man, in which he states the arguments against



Berkeley.

human freedom with a logical force unsurpassed by any necessitarian. In the 'Discourse of Free-Thinking,' he denounced priests, and believers in church religion, as enemies of honest philosophical inquiry, and the paid advocates of a foregone conclusion. This exclusive claim to freedom of research and candour, made by Collins and others of his school on their own behalf, roused Berkeley's indignation. Now, and afterwards in the deistical and atheistical polemics of his middle life, he presents himself as the "free-thinking" antagonist of free-thinking materialists and necessitarians. There must be belief of some sort at the root of every human life, he means to say—for to live at all is to believe; and he could not, he professed, find more candour and true courage in a creed of theological disbelief than in the creed of religious faith.

His countryman, Swift, was one of Berkeley's patrons in these first weeks in London, as well as his countryman Steele. On an April Sunday in 1713, we find him at the Court of Queen Anne, in the company of Swift. "I went to Court to-day," Stella's journal of that Sunday records, "on purpose to present Mr Berkeley, one of our fellows of Trinity College, to Lord Berkeley of Stratton. That Mr Berkeley is a very ingenious man and great philosopher, and I have mentioned him to all the Ministers, and have given them some of his writings, and I will favour him as much as I can." After that his name appears often in the famous journal. Swift was as good as his word in helping him into the London world of letters, in the last year of the reign of Queen Anne, so that he became known as he deserved to "men of merit," and was brought into contact

with others on whom he would hardly have conferred this title. He told a friend long afterwards that he used to attend one of the free-thinking clubs, in the pretended character of a learner, and that he there heard Anthony Collins announce that he was able to demonstrate the impossibility of God's existence—whatever Collins may have meant by these words. The promised "demonstration," Berkeley added, was afterwards in part published, in Collins's 'Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty,' which appeared in 1717, where he argues that every action attributed to man, as well as all else in the universe, must be the issue of Fate or causal Necessity. This might be interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate atheism, unless "God" is considered only a synonym for Fate or Necessity.

Swift had now been living in London for more than four years, in his "lodging in Bury Street," absorbed in the political intrigues of the last years of Queen Anne, and sending the daily journal to Stella, in Dublin, which so faithfully preserves the incidents of those years. Mrs Vanhomrigh and her daughter, the famous and unhappy "Vanessa," were settled near him in their house in the same street, and there, as he writes to Stella, he "loitered hot and lazy after his morning's work," and often dined "out of mere listlessness." This Vanhomrigh connection, as we shall see, had its effect on Berkeley's fortunes long afterwards.

In this summer of 1713, Pope, then hardly twenty-five years of age, was at Binfield, among the glades of Windsor, but not seldom too with Addison in their favourite coffee-house kept by Button near Covent Garden. Addison himself was in St James's Place, for

a time withdrawn from politics, but giving literary breakfasts, preparing 'Cato,' and writing his refined essays in the 'Spectator' and the 'Guardian.' In a letter to Sir John Percival from "Pall Mall," written soon after his arrival in London,¹ Berkeley mentions that the night before, "a very ingenious new poem upon Windsor Forest" was given to him "by the author, Mr Pope, a Papist, but a man of excellent wit and learning. Mr Addison," he goes on to say, "has the same talents as Steele, in a high degree, and is likewise a great philosopher, having applied himself to the speculative studies more than any other of the wits here I know. I breakfasted with him at Dr Swift's lodgings in Bury Street. His coming when I was there, and the good temper he showed, I construed as a sign of an approaching coalition of parties. Dr Swift is admired by both Steele and Addison, and I think him one of the best-natured and most agreeable men in the world. Cato, a most noble play of his, and the only one he writ, is to be acted in Easter Week." From a subsequent letter, on the 18th of April, accordingly, we learn that, "on Tuesday last, Cato was acted for the first time. I was present with Mr Addison and two or three more friends, in a side box, where we had a table, and two or three flasks of Burgundy and champagne, with which the author (who is a sober man) thought it necessary to support his spirits, and indeed it was a pleasant refreshment between the acts. Some parts of the prologue, written by Mr Pope, a Tory and even a Papist, were hissed, being thought to savour of Whiggism, but the clap got much the better

¹ March 7, 1713—Percival MSS.

of the hiss. Lord Harley, who sat in the box next us, was observed to clap as loud as any in the house all the time of the play."—Swift and Pope have both given us their account of the first night of 'Cato:' here for the first time we have Berkeley's.

In the same week he mentions that he "dined at Dr Arbuthnot's lodgings in the Queen's Palace at Kensington," and that "he was the first proselyte he had made of the Treatise ['The Three Dialogues'] he had come over from Dublin to print, and which will soon be published." Arbuthnot, the Aberdonian physician at the Court of the Queen, was a well-known leader in the Scriblerus Club, the witty assailant of the verbal metaphysics of the schools, and no mean authority on questions of philosophy.

Percival writes from Dublin in May, that he hears the book of 'Dialogues' is printed, though not yet published; that immaterialism is daily gaining ground among the learned, as it becomes better understood; that Mr Addison is coming over to the new opinion; and that now what seemed shocking at first is become so familiar that others envy him the discovery of the secret of matter, and would fain make it their own. "You have now, too," he adds, "an opportunity of gratifying one piece of curiosity I have heard you very inquisitive about; I mean, the surprise of a person born blind when first made to see. One Grant, an oculist, has put forth an advertisement of his art in this way, with whom I believe you would find satisfaction in discoursing."¹

In the course of this summer, at the instance of Addison, it seems that a meeting was arranged between

¹ See 'Works,' vol. i. pp. 111, 112, and note (Clarendon Press ed.)

Berkeley and Dr Samuel Clarke, then the metaphysical rector of St James's in Piccadilly, whose objections he had in vain tried to draw forth three years before through Sir John Percival. Berkeley's indescribable fascination of manner and goodness of heart had charmed the world of London, and even Atterbury after an interview with him could say, "So much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman." Still, the new philosophical thought of the young Irishman was becoming a matter of ridicule to some of the wits, who translated it into the madman's paradox, that all we see and touch is only an idle fancy. Much was hoped from this meeting with Clarke, but it ended without any common understanding, and Berkeley had again to complain that though Clarke did not refute his arguments, or show what he had unduly assumed in his argument, he had not the candour to accept the conclusion.

Immaterialism, however, was springing up spontaneously in other quarters. In a letter to Percival, in June, Berkeley mentions a "clergyman in Wiltshire, who has produced a book in which he advances something published three years ago in my treatise concerning Human Knowledge." The allusion is to Arthur Collier's 'Clavis Universalis, or New Inquiry after Truth; being a Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility of an External World.' This curious little volume appeared in London early in the summer of 1713, full of acute arguments cogitated by its retired and studious author, in the peaceful seclusion of a rural English parsonage not far from Salisbury. It was overlooked in

Britain (but not in Germany) till Dr Reid called attention to it in his "Essays," seventy years after it was published.¹ Long extremely scarce, it is now generally accessible, in two editions, published in 1836 and 1837. Collier, with much argumentative subtlety, is wanting in imaginative sentiment, and in that sense of the relation of immaterialism to the philosophy of religion, and the many sides of human life, which, along with his artistic beauty of conception and expression, have enabled Berkeley to affect the main current of modern thought. Their intellectual points of view, too, were very different. Berkeley started from that love of experience, and aversion to the "vermiculate questions of the schools," in which he had been trained by Locke. Collier argued, from the abstract assumptions of the cloister, in the spirit of a schoolman who was at the same time infected with the mysticism of Malebranche and Norris. The coincidence is, nevertheless, curious. Berkeley at least cannot have borrowed from Collier, who alludes in the 'Clavis' to the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' but also tells us that as early as 1703 he had reached an immaterialist conclusion for himself. The coincidence shows the existence of something in the intellectual atmosphere at the time favourable to immaterialist ways of thinking about the world of which we are percipient in the senses. Collier, like Berkeley, sought the judgment of Samuel Clarke about his reasonings, and was able to draw from him "a learned and civil answer," which unfortunately has been lost.²

¹ See Hamilton's 'Reid,' p. 287, and note.

² See Benson's 'Memoirs of the Rev. Arthur Collier' (1837), pp. 13-41.

The Percival correspondence informs us for the first time that Berkeley spent two months of this summer in Oxford, and that he found it "a most delightful place." "Grand performances," he writes to Percival, "have been going on at the Sheldonian Theatre, and a great concourse were at the Act, from London and the country, amongst whom were several foreigners, particularly about thirty Frenchmen of the ambassador's company, who, it is reported, were all robbed by a single highwayman." It is interesting to find that Oxford had thus early taken possession of his imagination; for this was his first visit to the place which, forty years after, in a fit of academical idealism, became the chosen retreat of his old age. His new philosophy was not forgotten by him at Oxford. "As to what you write of Dr Arbuthnot not being of my opinion," he writes thence to Percival in August, "it is true there has been some difference between us concerning some notions relating to the necessity of the laws of nature; but this does not touch the main point of the non-existence of what philosophers call material substance, against which he has acknowledged he can assert nothing." Though it "does not touch the main point," one would gladly have heard more about what seems to have touched Berkeley's favourite conclusion of the "arbitrariness" of the laws of nature, as opposed to that self-existence and "necessity" of the laws and properties of the material world, which men of science are so ready to take for granted.¹

¹ On this subject, as recently treated on lines somewhat similar to Berkeley, see Sir Edmund Beckett, 'On the Origin of the Laws of Nature' (London, 1879).

So Berkeley's first spring and summer in England passed away. He spent the following winter in France and Italy.

In October he wrote to Percival that he was "on the eve of leaving London, and going to Sicily as chaplain to Lord Peterborough, who is going ambassador-extraordinary on the coronation of the king." He was thus, on the recommendation of Swift, associated with the most brilliant wit amongst the political personages of that generation, who, as it happened, had a quarter of a century before been the intimate of Locke when they were both exiles in Holland, and afterwards one of his correspondents and visitors at Oates. He was now the friend of Swift and Pope. Ten months in France and Italy, in this connection, was a fresh experience of life to the fervid and ingenious reasoner, who had been viewed with curious interest by the wits of London. It was one of the turns opening into the long course of restless movement, with occasional relapses into studious seclusion, which marked this middle period of Berkeley's life, in contrast with its first and its last stages. He left his new thought about things to work its way at home among any who were inclined to think, and turned an eager inquiring eye to nature and art on the continent of Europe. Through his letters to Sir John Percival we can follow him on his journey. Writing to him from Paris in November, he describes his adventures from London, and his companions on the road—among others, "a Scotch gentleman named Martin, who wrote about *St Kilda*."¹ He adds, "The Abbé D'Aubigné is to intro-

¹ This was Murdoch Martin, a native of Skye, author of a '*Voyage*

duce me to-morrow to Father Malebranche." Berkeley was a month in Paris; but we hear no more about Malebranche. On New Year's Day he crossed Mont Cenis, in a storm of snow, and made Leghorn his headquarters till May, while Peterborough was in Sicily. In July he was again in Paris, on his way home. In August he returned to London. It was the month in which the whole outlook of English politics had been changed by the death of Queen Anne.

The two next years were spent in London, with congenial retreats now and then into the soft scenes of the midland and southern counties. His Percival correspondence at this time refers much to the rising in Scotland under Mar, which was the outcome of a course of intrigues and secret steps, intended to dethrone George I., and to set aside the Protestant succession. Another subject was the efforts of Berkeley's friends to find some preferment for him in the Irish Church. A groundless suspicion of Jacobitism, caused by some misinterpreted expressions in his discourses on "Passive Obedience," delivered in 1712 in Trinity College Chapel, and perhaps strengthened by the Cavalier traditions of his name, was not overcome even by the interest of Caroline, the philosophical Princess of Wales, the friend of Clarke and Butler, and the correspondent of Leibnitz. In June 1716, Charles Dering, Percival's cousin, wrote from Dublin that, after all that had been done by his friends, his prospects were bad, as "the Lords Justices had made a strong representation

to St Kilda' (1698), and a 'Description of the Western Islands of Scotland' (1703).

against him." He had no encouragement to return to Ireland.

In November 1716, accordingly, we find him again on his way to Italy, where he spent the four following years. Ashe, the Bishop of Clogher, Swift's friend, by whom Berkeley had been admitted to holy orders nine years before, had, it seems, persuaded him to accompany his son on a tour as his travelling tutor.

It was about this time that the two most famous metaphysicians then living passed away. Malebranche died at Paris in October 1715, and Leibnitz died at Hanover in November 1716. Berkeley was thus left in the front place—with Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins in England, Buffier and Huet in France, Leclerc in Holland, and Vico in Italy, as his most distinguished contemporaries. Butler, Hutcheson, and Wolf were as yet unknown, and Shaftesbury was dead.

The historians of philosophy have associated Berkeley with the death of Malebranche in a tragical way. "It forms an interesting circumstance in the history of these two memorable persons," according to Dugald Stewart, "that they had once, and only once, the pleasure of a short interview. The conversation, we are told, turned on the non-existence of matter. Malebranche, who had an inflammation in his lungs, and whom Berkeley found preparing a medicine in his cell, and cooking it in a small pipkin, exerted his voice so violently in the heat of their dispute, that he increased his disorder, which carried him off a few days after. It is impossible not to regret," Stewart adds, "that of this interview there is no other record; or rather, that Berkeley had not made it

the groundwork of one of his own Dialogues. Fine as his imagination was, it could scarcely have added to the picturesque effect of the real scene."¹ I fear that facts must henceforward make this celebrated story take its place among myths, for I find from the Percival Correspondence that Berkeley was in England throughout 1715, the year in which Malebranche died. The only evidence that he ever saw the eloquent French idealist is the allusion to the promised introduction through the Abbé D'Aubigné, two years before.

The philosophical doctrines of Malebranche and Berkeley about Matter have so much superficial resemblance that the story of their tragical interview not unnaturally grew out of it. Berkeley, as we have already seen, disavowed all community with the French Father in his own new thought about the world, and maintained that no two sets of principles about real knowledge were more opposed than those of Malebranche and his own. The theory of Malebranche about matter was simply a development of the Cartesian theory of causation and power in the universe. For, according to Descartes, our sensations are not produced by an active and external material substance, but by the constant agency of God; who makes us conscious of the appropriate perceptions, on occasion of correlative extra-organic changes, which, also by divine agency, affect our organism. This, no doubt, presupposes the existence of extra-organic matter,

¹ Stewart's "Dissertation" ('Works,' vol. i. p. 161, Hamilton's Edition). See also Stock's Life of Berkeley (prefixed to the old editions of Berkeley's Works); 'Biog. Brit.,' art. "Berkeley;" and Advocat's 'Dict. Hist.' There is a version of the story by De Quincey, in his essay on "Murder considered as one of the Fine Arts."

and its divinely communicated power of affecting the human body; but it also presupposes that perceptions corresponding to the organic affections could be caused only by Supreme Mind, and not by the derived power of matter. Such was the famed Cartesian theory of occasional causation through divine assistance. Malebranche merely relieved it of an excrescence. Instead of sense perceptions produced in human minds by the constant divine agency inherent in extended things, he seems to have believed that we are, in a measure at least, conscious, in the Universal Reason, of the very archetypal Ideas of the sensible world, ever present in the mind of God, in whom all finite spirits live and have their being. We all exist in God, thought Malebranche, and in this way we all become actually conscious of His Ideas that are involved in the constitution of sensible things. Instead of supposing numerically different sensible phenomena, existing in each finite sentient spirit, as Berkeley was logically obliged to do, Malebranche found the same divine archetypal Ideas revealed in the common perceptions of men, who, on occasion of sense, rise into an apprehension of the Intelligible World, which the sensible one only dimly adumbrates. In this theory, as in Berkeley's, though for different reasons, independent Matter, if not contradictory in its very conception, is at least useless. Berkeley, perhaps, exaggerated their differences. In both there is the tendency to view the world of the senses as a superficial show, which dissolves into phenomena, and reveals the Eternal Mind as the true reality. But in Malebranche's view, finite voluntary agents are more lost in God. He thus approaches

Spinozism, from which Berkeley was kept back by his conviction of the spiritual individuality in man that is involved in our moral and immoral agency. Berkeley phenomenalises finite things, but not finite persons.

Berkeley's 'Italian Journal,' first published in 1871,¹ and his correspondence with Lord Percival, only now discovered, enable us to follow his movements in 1717 more continuously and distinctly than in any other year of his life. We see him at Rome in January and February, at Naples throughout April and May, and in the fairyland of Ischia in autumn. In 1718, most of the letters are dated at Rome, where medals and statues, pictures and architecture, filled his fancy. In architecture he thought "the old Romans inferior to the Greeks, and the moderns infinitely short of both, in grandeur, and simplicity, and taste." His strong sense of natural beauty, and even of community with external nature, favoured by his philosophic thought of the immanence of divine power in the world of phenomenal reality, appears in his descriptions of Italy, and especially of his favourite isle of Ischia. His philosophy naturally leads to the recognition in the world of the senses of something "far more deeply interfused, whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, and the round ocean, and the living air." The taste for scenery so perceptible in his 'Dialogues,' and in his letters to Pope from the land of Theocritus and Virgil, was little felt in England till it appeared in Gray and Shenstone, and still more in Cowper, and Scott, and Wordsworth.

In 1719 Berkeley almost disappears from view. An

¹ See 'Works,' vol. iv. pp. 512-594 (Clarendon Press edition).

allusion in one of his letters shows that it was the year in which he made a pedestrian tour through Calabria and Sicily. He was particularly interested in Sicily, and collected materials for a natural history of the island, which were lost along with other manuscripts on the passage to Naples. In the summer of the following year we find him on his way back to England. "I hope we shall be in London before the cold weather comes on," he wrote from Florence in July to Lord Percival. "I have indeed been detained so long, against my expectations and wishes, on this side of the Alps, that I have lost all patience. Every month these six months we have designed to begin our journey home, and have been as often disappointed." Later in the year he was with his pupil at Lyons. About the end of 1720 he reached London.

Berkeley had now been away from Ireland for eight years, and in circumstances less favourable to continued meditation than when he was at Trinity College. But the charms of nature and art, and intercourse with "men of merit," had not withdrawn from his mind the thought about the phenomenal nature of the things of sense, which had so early transformed his habitual way of looking at life and the external world. The 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' as already mentioned, was avowedly an unfinished book when it appeared in 1710. A Second Part was then promised, but it never came, and the 'Three Dialogues' closed his first and most productive period of authorship. He seemed to have abandoned the original design of that treatise, and his readers and critics have forgotten that

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it professed to be only a fragment. A lately discovered letter of his, written in Rhode Island ten years after his return from Italy, proves that there was no abandonment; and indeed we may infer from what he says there that the Second Part of the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge' was the first-fruit of his studies after he left his native island in 1713.¹ This letter is besides instructive, as an expression of his own view of the three little books which were the fruit of his early philosophical studies in Ireland, before he was thirty years of age.

"What you have seen of mine," he writes, "was published when I was very young, and without doubt hath many defects. For, though the notions should be true (as I verily think they are), yet it is difficult to express them clearly and consistently, language being framed to common use and received prejudices. I do not therefore pretend that my books can teach truth. All I hope for is that they may be an occasion to inquisitive men of discovering truth, by consulting their own minds, and looking into their own thoughts. As to the Second Part of my Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, the fact is that I had made a considerable progress in it, but the manuscript was lost during my travels in Italy; and I never had leisure since to do so disagreeable a thing as writing twice on the same subject."

What that "subject" was we are left to conjecture. But we do know that Berkeley did not pass through France, on his way home in 1720, without showing that his mind was still given to the favourite thought of his early years in Ireland. A prize essay on the "Cause of Motion" had been proposed by the French Royal

¹ See Dr Beardsley's 'Life and Correspondence of Samuel Johnson, D.D.' (New York, 1874), pp. 71, 72.

Academy. The subject was exactly in the line of Berkeley's early speculations, which had converged on the alternative of the unsubstantiality and impotence either of Spirit or of Matter. He accordingly prepared a Latin dissertation, *De Motu*, which was finished at Lyons on his way from Italy to England, and published after his return to London. Whether it was ever presented to the Academy seems uncertain. The prize at any rate was conferred on Crousaz, the well-known logician and professor at Lausanne. Berkeley's dissertation shows the bent of his thoughts about this time. The unsubstantiality of Matter is left more in the background. Its impotence is what he insists on, and on the intellectual need for the unphenomenal and free causation, found only in Spirit or active Reason. *Mens agit at molem* might be the motto of the whole. He argues—with more dependence, too, on authorities, ancient and medieval, than in his former books—that the rational and voluntary activity of Supreme Mind, and subordinately of free finite agents, must be the uncaused cause of all changes in sensible phenomena. Natural law or physical causation is therefore not real causality, but only the arbitrarily constituted effect of the constant acting of the true and unphenomenal Cause. To represent science in this way, as only the interpretation of the (voluntarily ordered) laws of sensible or phenomenal change; and to conclude that even mathematical space, so far as the term space has any positive meaning, is only an established coexistence of sense impressions, having no existence as a huge quantitative Infinite, was too foreign to the prejudices of natural philosophers and mathematicians to find favour

in the French Academy. The ordinary good sense of the unspeculative Crousaz was more likely to be accepted.

This Latin tractate on the ultimate cause of Motion was Berkeley's last essay in philosophy for many years. Events in England after his arrival turned his enthusiasm for a time in a new direction—as a devotee in the service of Humanity.

CHAPTER II.

SOCIAL IDEALISM AND AMERICA.

ON his return from Italy, Berkeley found the nation plunged into the agitation and misery that followed the failure of the South Sea scheme. He now threw himself with his usual impetuosity, but with a direct practical purpose, into the social and economical difficulties of the time, and the condition of England became his dominant interest. He was shocked by the prevailing tone of social morals. He seemed to see himself living in a generation averse to all lofty ideals, with whom the extreme of prudential secularism had superseded the fanatical spiritualism of the preceding age. He was in collision, in short, with the bad elements of the eighteenth century. A commercial crisis had brought them out, and this was then a novelty. His ever-active imagination and eager temperament exaggerated the symptoms. They found vent in a fervid 'Essay towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain,' published in 1721.

The 'Essay' was a lamentation over the corrupt civilisation of England, by an ardent social idealist, who could now compare what he saw at home with life in

other lands. We are undone, he seems to say, and lost to all sense of our true interest. If we are to escape at all, it can only be by the persons who compose the nation becoming individually industrious, frugal, public-spirited, and religious. This, and not any royal road, is the way to the salvation of the country. Sumptuary laws might perhaps do something; masquerades might be prohibited; the theatre, which had been a school for taste and morals and experience of life to the ancients, and to England as well a century earlier, might perhaps be reformed; art might be made, as in other countries and ages, to inspire society with great thoughts and unworldly feelings. But till selfishness and sensuality were superseded in individuals by public spirit, and atheistic free-thought by religious trust and reverence, the case seemed hopeless. In the South Sea disaster he saw not the root of the social disorder, but only one of many symptoms, all foreshadowing social dissolution.

Though the few pages of this tract reveal no new thought in philosophy, they are important as a revelation of their author. This was the first distinct symptom of that longing for the realisation of a state of society nearer his own pure and lofty ideal, which thereafter mixed so much with what he wrote and did. We now hear for the first time the Cassandra wail of a sorrowful prophet, who soon after turned his eye of hope to other regions, in which a nearer approach to Utopia might be found.

In passing from Italy to Ireland, he spent some months in London in 1721. Addison had passed away two years before, Swift was in Dublin, and Steele,

broken in health and fortune, was in retirement in the country. But Pope invited him to Twickenham. Arbutnot was to be found in London, and Atterbury at his deanery in Westminster, or in his country retreat at Bromley. Clarke was still preaching sermons on philosophical theology in St James's. Sherlock was Master of the Temple, and Butler was delivering his sombre moral dissertations in the Chapel at the Rolls.

In autumn Berkeley returned, after an absence of more than eight years from Ireland, to his old academic home in Trinity College. The architectural Earl of Burlington had recommended him to the Duke of Grafton, the newly-appointed Lord-Lieutenant. It was in his thirty-seventh year that he thus revisited the scenes of his youth,¹ to resume work for a little as a tutor in his college, and perhaps to find some preferment in the Irish Church. This was not for the sake of the preferment, but only as a means to the design of learned leisure, combined with philanthropy, in which he was now beginning to indulge. "I had no sooner set foot on shore," he wrote to Lord Percival from Dublin in October, "than I heard that the deanery of Dromore was vacant, with £500 a-year and a sinecure—a circumstance that recommends it to me beyond any preferment in the kingdom, though there are some deaneries of twice that value." Lord Percival used his interest with the Duke. In February his patent passed the great seal. A lawsuit interposed. The bishop of the

¹ He tells Lord Percival soon after his arrival that he "wrote the Latin inscription on the king's equestrian statue," which had been uncovered a few days before.

diocese claimed the nomination. With characteristic eagerness Berkeley employed "eight lawyers," being assured that "the expense will be several hundreds, and that against one in possession of the deanery, who has been practised in lawsuits for twenty-five years." Twelve months after this he was again in London for weeks, "to see friends and to inform himself on some points of law which are not so well known in Ireland." He was nearly lost on this occasion in crossing to Holyhead.

The new enterprise which had gradually fired his imagination became now the chief spring of action. It was thus disclosed in March 1723, in a letter from London to Lord Percival, who was then at Bath:—

"It is now about ten months since I have determined to spend the residue of my days in Bermuda, where I trust in Providence I may be the mean instrument of doing great good to mankind. . . . The reformation of manners among the English in our Western plantations, and the propagation of the Gospel among the American savages, are two points of high moment. The natural way of doing this is by founding a college or seminary in some convenient part of the West Indies, where the English youth of our plantations may be educated in such sort as to supply their churches with pastors of good morals and good learning—a thing (God knows) much wanted. In the same seminary a number of young American savages may also be educated till they have taken the degree of Master of Arts. And being by that time well instructed in the Christian religion, practical mathematics, and other liberal arts and sciences, and early imbued with public-spirited principles and inclinations, they may become the fittest instruments for

spreading religion, morals, and civil life among their countrymen, who can entertain no suspicion or jealousy of men of their own blood and language, as they might do of English missionaries, who can never be well qualified for that work." He then goes on to describe the plans of education for American youth which he had conceived, gives his reasons for preferring the Bermuda or Summer Islands for the college, and presents the bright vision of an academic home in those fair lands of the West, whose idyllic bliss poets had sung, and from which Christian civilisation might now be made to radiate over the vast continent of America, with its magnificent possibilities in the future history of the race of man. He sees before him, in these Summer Islands, under a halo of romance, an Arcadia with its constant spring, nature in its gentlest moods, verdant fields and groves of palms, and cool ocean breezes; a people of simple manners, and without the enriching commodities which turn men away from academic pursuits; and all so placed geographically as to be fitted to spread religion and learning, in a spiritual commerce, over the western regions of the world.

We are left to conjecture the origin in Berkeley's imagination of this bright vision which so suddenly arose. According to his own account, it had occurred to him ten months before he wrote this letter,—our earliest intimation of it. That carries us back to his first months at Trinity College, after his long absence in Italy and England, when his thoughts were still full of the social revelations that followed the South Sea disaster. That despair about Great Britain led him to look westward for the future course of empire, one cannot

confidently affirm; but we know at least that his thoughts in the present year had been much diverted from Matter, Space, Time, and Motion, to the problems of human life in society. America was then, for the philanthropic imagination, what India, China, and Japan are now. The growth of American empire since—and of Britain, too, whose latent powers Berkeley so underrated in his 'Essay'—might well have then filled the prophetic fancy of a seer to whose vision was disclosed a future history of mankind largely under the guidance of the English race. Berkeley seemed to see a better Republic than Plato's, and a grander Utopia than More's, as the issue of his ideal university in those Summer Isles of which Waller had sung.

The social vision did not divert him from his lawsuit, which indeed was undertaken only to help the realisation of the vision. In May 1724 it was still undecided, but, through the good offices of Lady Percival, a more valuable preferment was then conferred upon him. "Yesterday," he writes, "I received my Patent for the best deanery in this kingdom, that of Derry. It is said to be worth £1500 per annum, but I do not consider it with a view to enriching myself. I shall be perfectly contented if it facilitates and recommends my scheme of Bermuda."

In the meantime curious fortune had favoured him in an unexpected way. Swift's unhappy Vanessa, last encountered by us in Bury Street, was settled on her property at Marley Abbey, ten miles from Dublin, after the death of her mother, Mrs Vanhomrigh, in 1717. Swift in the meantime had privately married Stella, as she confessed to Vanessa, who thereupon revoked the bequest of her fortune to Swift, and left her estate to

be divided between Berkeley (whom she knew only by report), and Mr Marshall, afterwards an Irish judge. The unhappy lady died broken-hearted in May 1723. A few days afterwards Berkeley wrote to Lord Percival: "Here is something that will surprise your lordship, as it doth me. Mrs Hester Vanhomrigh, a lady to whom I was a perfect stranger, having never in the whole course of my life exchanged a word with her, died on Sunday night. Yesterday her will was opened, by which it appears that I am constituted executor, the advantage whereof is computed by those who understand her affairs to be worth £3000;—if a suit she had be carried, it will be considerably more. . . . I know not what your thoughts are on the long account I sent you from London to Bath of my Bermuda scheme, which is now stronger on my mind than ever, this providential event having made many things easy in my private affairs which were otherwise before." Lord Percival in his reply concluded that he would "now persist more than ever in the thoughts of settling in Bermuda, and prosecute that noble scheme, which, if favoured by our Court, may," he added, "in some time exalt your name beyond that of St Xavier or the most famous missionaries abroad." He warned him, however, that "without the protection of Government" he would have to encounter insurmountable difficulties in the West.

The Vanessa legacy—with the obstructions to a settlement—was the theme of many letters about this time to his friend, Tom Prior. Most of the extant letters to Prior were written in 1724 and the three following years.¹ Though they illustrate some points in his character, they

¹ See 'Works,' vol. iv. pp. 110-152.

have no philosophical interest. The debts of Vanessa absorbed much of the fortune. "I am still likely to make £2000 clear," he writes,¹ "not reckoning on the lawsuit depending between the executors and Mrs Partington. As to the deanery of Dromore, I despair of seeing it end to my advantage. The truth is, my first purpose of going to Bermuda sets me above soliciting anything with earnestness in this part of the world. It can be of no use to me, but as it may enable me the better to prosecute that design; and it must be owned that the present possession of something in the Church would make my application for an establishment in those islands more considered. I mean the charter for a college there, which of all things I desire, as being what would reconcile duty and inclination, making my life at once more useful to the public, and more agreeable to myself, than I can possibly expect elsewhere."

He got the wished-for deanery at last, and was thus advanced a step towards Bermuda. "Yesterday," he writes in May 1724, "I received my patent for the best deanery in this kingdom, that of Derry." Next month he went to visit his new possession. He was charmed with Londonderry. "The walls with walks round, planted with trees, are like those of Padua. I have hardly seen a more agreeable situation, much *gusto grande* in the laying out this whole country, which recalls to my mind many prospects of Naples and Sicily. I may chance not to be twopence richer for the preferment; for by the time I have paid for the house and first-fruits, I hope I shall have brought the Bermuda project to an

¹ September 19, 1723—Percival MSS.

issue, which, God willing, is to be my employment this winter in London.”¹

To London, accordingly, he went in September, to raise funds and obtain a charter from the king, fortified by a letter from Swift, then in Dublin, recommending him to Lord Carteret at Bath, who was coming over to succeed the Duke of Grafton as Lord Lieutenant. Swift was as cordial as ever, and bore him no ill-will on account of the Vanessa affair. In this remarkable letter he thus describes Berkeley's previous career and present mission :—

“Going to England very young, about thirteen years ago, the bearer of this became founder of a sect called the Immaterialists, by the force of a very curious book upon that subject. . . . He is an absolute philosopher with regard to money, titles, and power; and for three years past has been struck with a notion of founding a university at Bermudas, by a charter from the Crown. He has seduced several of the hopefulest young clergymen and others here, many of them well provided for, and all in the fairest way for preferment; but in England his conquests are greater, and I doubt will spread very far this winter. He showed me a little tract which he designs to publish, and there your Excellency will see his whole scheme of a life academico-philosophical, of a college founded for Indian scholars and missionaries; where he most exorbitantly proposes a whole hundred pounds a-year for himself. . . . His heart will break if his deanery be not taken from him, and left to your Excellency's disposal. I discouraged him by the coldness of Courts and Ministers, who will interpret all this as impossible and a vision; but nothing will do.”²

¹ June 8, 1724—Percival MSS. In the same letter he says, “I have farmed out my lands for £1250 a-year, but am assured they are worth £200 more.”

² ‘Works,’ vol. iv. p. 102.

As Swift had predicted, his conquests spread far and fast in England. Nothing shows more the magic of Berkeley's presence and influence than the history of this reception in London. The scheme met with encouragement from all sorts of people, in a generation represented by Sir Robert Walpole. The subscriptions soon reached £5000, and the list included Sir Robert Walpole himself. The members of the Scriblerus Club being met at Lord Bathurst's house at dinner, they agreed to rally Berkeley, who was also his guest, on his Bermuda scheme. Having listened to the many lively things the party had to say, he begged to be heard in his turn, and "displayed his plan with such an astonishing and amazing force of eloquence and enthusiasm that they were struck dumb, and after some pause, rose all up together, with earnestness exclaiming, 'Let us set out with him immediately.'"¹ Bermuda was the fashion among the wits of London, and Bolingbroke wrote to Swift that he would "gladly exchange Europe for its charms, only not in a missionary capacity."

Berkeley was not satisfied with subscriptions, and remembered what Lord Percival had said about the protection and aid of Government. He interceded with George the First, and obtained royal encouragement to hope for a grant of £20,000, to endow the Bermuda College, out of the purchase money of St Christopher, given to England by the Treaty of Utrecht. He canvassed every member of both Houses. The vote was carried in the House of Commons with only two dissentient voices, in May 1726. Walpole, while he did not oppose, hoped that the bill would be thrown out,

¹ Warton's 'Essay on Pope,' vol. ii. p. 254.

and secretly resolved that it should come to nothing in the end. For the four years which followed September 1724, Berkeley lived in London, negotiating and otherwise forwarding this enterprise of social idealism. London was his home now for the third time. It was in these years that he used to attend the Court of Caroline, at Leicester Fields, when she was Princess of Wales; and afterwards at St James's, or at Kensington, when in 1727 she became the Queen-Consort of George the Second—not, he says, because he loved Courts, but because he loved America. Clarke was still in London, but Butler had gone into the seclusion of his Stanhope rectory. Voltaire, then unknown to fame, was on a visit to England, and mentions that he met "the discoverer of the true theory of vision," when he was in London in 1726. The Queen, as all know, was fond of theological and philosophical discussion. Ten years before, when Princess of Wales, she had been a royal go-between in the famous philosophical correspondence between Clarke and Leibnitz. And now, with Berkeley in London, she was glad to include him along with Clarke, Sherlock, and Hoadley at her weekly reunions, and to hear Hoadley supporting Clarke, and Sherlock arguing for Berkeley. "He was idolised in England before he set off for America. He used to go to St James's two days a-week to dispute with Dr Samuel Clarke before Queen Caroline, then Princess of Wales, and had a magnificent gold medal presented to him by George the Second; but he complained of the drudgery of taking part in these useless disputes."¹

¹ Preface to the 'Literary Relics of George Monck Berkeley' (1789).

At last his patience was rewarded. In September 1728 we all of a sudden find him at Greenwich, newly married too, and about to sail for Rhode Island, on his "mission of godlike benevolence." "To-morrow," he writes on the 3d of September to Lord Percival, "we sail down the river. Mr James and Mr Dalton go with me; so doth my wife, a daughter of the late Chief-Justice Forster, whom I married since I saw your lordship. I chose her for her qualities of mind, and her unaffected inclination to books. She goes with great thankfulness, to live a plain farmer's life, and wear stuff of her own spinning. I have presented her with a spinning-wheel. Her fortune was £2000 originally, but travelling and exchange have reduced it to less than £1500 English money. I have placed that, and about £600 of my own, in South Sea annuities." We are told that the young wife was disposed to mystical quietism, and that Fénelon and Madame Guyon were her favourite characters.

Berkeley was in his forty-fourth year, when, in deep devotion to his Ideal, and full of glowing visions of a Fifth Empire in the West, he sailed for Rhode Island as the pioneer of the enterprise, with the promise of Sir Robert Walpole that the parliamentary grant should be paid as soon as he had made the necessary investments. He bought land in America, and lived there for nearly three years, but he never saw the Islands that had touched his imagination.

CHAPTER III.

RECLUSE LIFE IN RHODE ISLAND.

TOWARDS the end of January in 1729, the "hired ship of 250 tons," in which Berkeley and his party sailed from the Thames, appeared in the Narragansett waters, on the western shore of Rhode Island, and landed them in the harbour at Newport. They had touched at Virginia on their way, where he "received many honours from the governor and the principal inhabitants," after they had been, he writes,¹ "a long time blundering about the ocean."

The 'New England Courier' of the day gives this picture of the disembarkation at Newport: "Yesterday arrived here Dean Berkeley of Londonderry. He is a gentleman of middle stature, of an agreeable, pleasant, and erect aspect. He was ushered into the town with a great number of gentlemen, to whom he behaved himself after a very complaisant manner." Writing to Percival a few days after his arrival, he says he was "never more agreeably surprised than at the sight of the town and harbour of Newport. There is a more probable prospect of doing good here than in any other part of the world; were it in my power I should not

¹ February 7, 1729—Percival MSS.

demur about situating our college here. But no step can be taken herein without the consent of the Crown." Around him at Newport was some of the softest rural and grandest ocean scenery in the world, which had fresh charms even for one whose childhood was spent in the vale of the Nore, who was familiar with rural England, had lingered at Naples and at Ischia, and wandered among the mountains of Sicily.

The island in which Berkeley found himself on that January day is about fifteen miles long and four or five broad. It was his home during three years of waiting for the fulfilment of the promise on the faith of which he left England. It is about seventy miles from Boston, and also about seventy miles from Newhaven and Yale College. The Indians called it the Isle of Peace. A ridge of hills crosses the centre, from which pleasant meadows slope to a rocky shore. The air is balmy, with gorgeous sunsets in summer and autumn, and the Gulf Stream tempers the surrounding seas. It contained about 15,000 inhabitants, including about 1500 negro slaves. The climate attracted visitors from the mainland and from the West Indies; while the toleration which reigned within the little society made it then in America what Holland had long been in Europe. The people, he writes,¹ "are industrious, and though less orthodox have not less virtue, and I am sure they have more regularity than those I left in Europe. They are indeed a strange medley of different persuasions, which nevertheless do all agree in one point,—that the Church of England is the second best." The Rhode Island gentry of that day preserved the customs of the squires

¹ March 28, 1729—Percival MSS.

in the old country, from whom they were descended ; for tradition speaks of a cheerful society. The fox-chase with hounds and horns, as well as fishing and fowling, were favourite sports in Narragansett.

In the summer after his arrival, Berkeley and his wife moved from Newport to a sequestered valley in the interior of the island, where he bought a farm and built a house. He named this island-home Whitehall, in loyal remembrance of the palace of the monarchs of England. Here he began domestic life, and became the father of a family. The house may still be seen near a hill which commands a wide view of land and ocean. The neighbouring groves, and the rocks that skirt the coast, offered the shade and silence and solitude that soothed him in his recluse life. The friends with whom he had crossed the ocean went to stay in Boston, but no solicitations could withdraw him from the quiet of his island-home. "After my long fatigue of business," he wrote to Lord Percival,¹ "this retirement is very agreeable to me ; and my wife loves a country life and books, as well as to pass her time continually and cheerfully without any other conversation than her husband and the dead." Till now he had lived in Trinity College, or in hired apartments in London and in Italy. At Whitehall he was better placed for meditative work than since he first left Dublin in 1713, and he had one to share his life whose sympathy was with mystic quietism and Fénelon.

Though Berkeley loved the peace of this rural home, and the "still air of delightful studies," he mixed in the society of Newport, with its lawyers, physicians, and enterprising merchants, some of whom had been trained

¹ March 29, 1730—Percival MSS.

in the universities of Europe. He helped to form a philosophical reunion there, and found persons who could understand how his new conception of outward things implied no distrust of the eyes and hands, nor disregard of common-sense in the conduct of life.

He appears in Rhode Island as an ingenious student more than as the aggressive leader, resolved upon the success of an apostolic mission. We find him much among his books, often at a favourite retreat below a projecting rock which commanded a view of the beach and the ocean—seldom out of the island-home, to no extent a traveller on the continent of America, gathering experience and organising plans. The “eloquence and enthusiasm” which years before carried away Lord Bathurst and his friends, seem diverted now from outward action to meditation on the philosophical foundations of theology, but always with moral and human ends in view. This sort of life was probably, after all, more according to his disposition.

From the first he had so planned his enterprise that it was at the mercy of Sir Robert Walpole. The prospects, which were doubtful when he left England, darkened even to his sanguine eyes after he reached Rhode Island, which he soon began to prefer even to Bermuda for his college. “The truth is,” he told Lord Percival in the June after he landed,¹ “I am not in my own power, not being at liberty to act without the concurrence as well of the Ministry as of my associates. I cannot therefore place the college where I please; and though on some accounts I did, and do still think, it would more probably be attended with success if placed

¹ Percival MSS.

here rather than in Bermuda, yet if the Government and those engaged with me should persist in the old scheme, I am ready to go thither, and will do so as soon as I hear the money is received and my associates arrived. Before I left England I was reduced to a difficult situation. Had I continued there, the report would have obtained (which I had found beginning to spread) that I had dropped the design, after it had cost me and my friends so much trouble and expense. On the other hand, if I had taken leave of my friends, even those who assisted and approved my undertaking would have condemned my living abroad before the king's bounty was received. This obliged me to come away in the private manner that I did, and to run the risk of a tedious winter voyage. Nothing less could have convinced the world that I was in earnest." "I wait here," he writes to him a year later, "with all the anxiety that attends suspense, until I know what I can depend upon, and what course I am to take. I must own the disappointments I have met with have really touched me, not without much affecting my health and spirits. If the founding of a college for the spread of religion and learning in America had been a foolish project, it cannot be supposed the Court, the Ministers, and the Parliament could have given such encouragement to it; and if, after all that encouragement, they also engaged to endow and protect it lest it drop, the disappointment indeed may be to me, but the censure, I think, will light elsewhere."

He had embarked to realise a beautiful vision, but by means which hardly commend themselves to ordinary men of the world, who could see only "a foolish pro-

ject" in making, on the one hand, islands like the Bermudas, six hundred miles out in the Atlantic, or, on the other hand, Rhode Island, far from the chief Indian population, the basis of operations for the Christian civilisation of America. The crisis of the enterprise at last came. Sir Robert Walpole had never entered into it. What must have seemed to him knight-errantry was not embraced in his scheme of policy. The presence in London of the enthusiastic leader of the expedition, four years before, had carried the grant through the House of Commons. But the ardent missionary, with his action misconceived, was now a studious recluse at Whitehall. "If you put the question to me as a Minister," Walpole at last said, early in 1730, "I must and can assure you that the money shall most undoubtedly be paid—as soon as suits with public convenience; but if you ask me as a friend whether Dean Berkeley should continue in America, expecting the payment of £20,000, I advise him by all means to return to Europe, and to give up his present expectations." "I do not wonder at your disappointment," Lord Percival said,¹ in making this known to him. "The design was too great and good to be accomplished in an age when men love darkness better than the light, and where nothing is considered but with a political view. A very great lord asked me the other day whether I thought the Indians could not be saved as well as we; and whether I had considered that learning tended to make the plantations independent of their mother country; adding that the ignorance of the Indians, and the variety of sects, was our best security. He was even

¹ December 23, 1730—Percival MSS.

sorry that we had a university in Dublin; and yet this Lord is the ornament of the nobility for learning and sobriety, but he reduced all to policy."

Berkeley's life in Rhode Island was the beginning of his return to study and philosophy. Those of his remaining letters which are of most philosophic interest were written there; and his 'Alciphron,' was prepared in the library at Whitehall, or in a natural alcove under the Hanging Rocks near the shore.

Soon after the arrival at Newport, he was visited by Samuel Johnson, the Episcopal missionary at Stratford, one of the most acute and learned men then to be found in America.¹ Johnson had already made some acquaintance with Berkeley's writings on vision and on the material world, and was well-disposed to the theory that sight is foresight, and even that *esse* is *percipi*. Intercourse with their author by visits and correspondence confirmed this disposition. Explanations and vindications of the new philosophical theory were proposed in letters to him from Whitehall. Johnson became an ardent convert, who illustrated and applied to theology, in his own 'Elementa Philosophica,' twenty years afterwards, the lessons he then learned. This intercourse with one whom he describes as "a man of parts and a philosophic genius," was one of Berkeley's chief pleasures in his studious seclusion.

¹ Johnson was afterwards president of King's College in New York. He died in 1772. A short account of him, by Dr Chandler, was published in 1824. We have now the large volume of his 'Life and Correspondence,' by the Rev. Dr Beardsley (New York, 1874), which contains an interesting chapter on Berkeley, and some additional letters from his correspondence with Johnson.

These Whitehall letters contain some interesting elucidations of what Berkeley thought about the hyper-phenomenal realities symbolised in the phenomenal things of sense; also about space and time, abstract ideas, and the true meaning of causation. The following sentences in one of them point towards objective idealism:—

“I have no objections against calling the Ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours. But I object against those archetypes by philosophers supposed to be real things, and to have an absolute rational or intelligible existence distinct from their being perceived (or conceived) by any mind whatsoever; it being the opinion of all materialists that an ideal existence in the divine mind is one thing, and the real existence of material things another.”

His view of what space and time mean is presented in some new lights in the sentences which follow:—

“As to space, I have no notion of any but that which is relative. . . . Sir Isaac Newton supposeth an absolute space distinct from relative, and consequent thereto absolute motion distinct from relative motion; and with all other mathematicians he supposeth the infinite divisibility of the finite parts of this absolute space: he also supposeth material bodies to drift therein. . . . I cannot agree with him in these particulars. I make no scruple to use the word space as well as all other words in common use; but I do not mean thereby a distinct absolute being. . . . By *το νυν* I suppose to be implied that all things past and to come are present to the mind of God, and that there is in Him no change, variation, or succession of time. A succession of ideas I take to *constitute* time, and not to be only the *sensible measure* thereof, as Mr Locke and others think. But in these matters every one is to think for himself, and speak as he finds. One of my earliest inquiries was about Time, which led me into several paradoxes that I did not think fit

or necessary to publish, particularly into the notion that the resurrection follows next moment to death. We are confounded and perplexed about time (*a*) supposing a succession in God, (*b*) conceiving that we have an abstract idea of time, (*c*) supposing that time in one mind is to be measured by succession of ideas in another, (*d*) not considering the true end and use of words, which as often terminate in the will as in the understanding, being employed rather to excite influence and divert action than to produce clear and distinct ideas."

Here are some sentences on abstractions :—

"Abstract general ideas was a notion that Mr Locke held in common with the schoolmen, and, I think, all other philosophers. It runs through his whole book of Human Understanding. He holds an abstract idea of existence, exclusive of perceiving and being perceived. I cannot find I have any such idea, and this is my reason against it. . . . I think it might prevent a good deal of obscurity and confusion to examine well what I have said about abstraction, and about the true use and significance of words, in several parts of these things that I have published, though much remains to be said on that subject. You say you agree with me that there is nothing within your mind [*i.e.*, knowable] but God and other spirits, with the attributes or properties belonging to them; and the ideas contained in them [*i.e.*, the phenomenal things present to them]. This is a principle from which, and from what I have laid down about abstract ideas, much may be deduced."

What follows on causality is important :—

"Mechanical philosophy does not assign any one natural efficient cause, in the proper sense of causality; nor is it, as to its use, concerned at all about [substantial or hyper-phenomenal] Matter. . . . Cause is taken in different senses. A proper, active, efficient cause I can conceive none but Spirit; nor action but where there is Will. But this doth not hinder the allowing occasional causes [caused or pheno-

menal causes], which are in truth but *signs*; and more is not requisite in the best physics. Neither doth it hinder the admitting other [free or uncaused and unphenomenal] causes besides God; such as [finite] spirits of different orders, which may be termed active causes, as acting indeed, though by limited and derivative powers. As for an unthinking agent, no point of physics is explained by it, nor is it conceivable. That the divine conservation of sensible things is the same thing with a continued creation was a common opinion of the schoolmen and others. . . . The very poets teach a doctrine not unlike the schools—*mens agitat molem*. The Stoics and Platonists are full of the same notion. I am not therefore singular in this point itself so much as in my way of proving it. . . . As to guilt, it is the same thing whether I kill a man with my hands or by an instrument. The imputation, therefore, upon the sanctity of God, is equally, whether we suppose our sensations [*i.e.*, phenomenal things] to be produced immediately by God, or by the mediation of subordinate [*i.e.*, phenomenal] causes, which are all His creatures and moved by His laws. This theological consideration is beside the question; for such I hold all points to be which bear equally hard on both sides of it. Difficulties about the principle of moral actions will cease if we consider that all guilt is in the [causal—*i.e.*, free] will, and that our ideas [*i.e.*, the phenomena of which we are percipient in the senses], from whatever cause they are produced [*i.e.*, whether it be God or unphenomenal Matter], are alike inert.”¹

New England at this time possessed, in Jonathan Edwards, the most subtle metaphysical reasoner that

¹ This consists with the faith that *unphenomenal* or *free* causation is given to us in our moral consciousness of our own spiritual individuality and responsible agency. As nothing analogous to this is found in sense, or representable in imagination, phenomenal causation only (which properly is not causation at all) is discoverable in the world of sense.

America has ever produced. Edwards represents the genius of Puritan religion in the highest sphere of abstract thought, as Bunyan and Milton represent it in the world of creative imagination. Though he does not name Berkeley, his writings show that he adopted his conception of the material world and its laws. This famous Calvinistic thinker was one of Johnson's pupils at Yale College, or living a life of devout meditation on the bank of the Hudson river, when Berkeley was in Rhode Island. Edwards's 'Freedom of the Will' did not appear till 1754. It is in earlier writings that his metaphysical conclusions about matter are to be found. The "universal necessity" of Edwards was foreign to the thought of Berkeley, whose recognition of moral, and therefore independent, agency and power in finite spirits, saved him from conclusions avowed by Spinoza, and logically implied by Malebranche and by the American Puritan. Edwards, however, defended the conclusion that the objects of our sensuous perceptions can have no actual and intelligible existence abstracted from the sense-experience of a spirit. He also argued that, although the phenomena of which things consist, and the laws that regulate these phenomena, are not originated by men, but by a power external to all human minds—that power cannot be a mindless substance, but must be the reason and will of God. The phenomena of sense are thus signs of thoughts, which are communicated to finite minds by God's will, in whom things move and have their being and consist. The world is a phenomenal one; but the laws of the coexistence and the succession of its phenomena are steady and rational. To suppose the universe exist-

ing in this way does not, Edwards sees, in the least affect the stability of physical science. The vulgar objection of the want of persistence in sensible things, on the immaterialist hypothesis as to what is meant by their "reality," he answers in an ingenious manner, showing his belief in their want of independent substance and power. The "substance" of bodies, when the word is so applied at all, with him only means "the infinitely exact and precise divine Idea, together with an unwaverable, perfectly exact, precise, and stable Will, with respect to corresponding communications to created minds, and effects on their minds." The objection that all this contradicts "common-sense" he encounters by showing the absurdity of the common opinion, that we can perceive distant things, and by contrasting our visual with our tactual perceptions. Withdraw from anything its colour, and other secondary, which, by consent of all, are sense-dependent qualities; think of them as a person born blind must do. All we can then be conscious of is a blind feeling of resistance. Every one who reflects must therefore allow that bodies are at any rate very different from what they are supposed to be, in the assumptions of ordinary unreflecting common-sense. It is thus that Edwards paves the way to his general conclusions—that the only substance in the universe is and must be spiritual, in which he coincides with Berkeley; and that the only causes in existence, "bodily or spiritual," must themselves be effects or caused causes, in which he fundamentally differs from Berkeley. Whether Edwards drew his thoughts from Berkeley's early writings at first hand, or through Johnson, is uncertain; but it is a fact

worthy of remembrance, that Berkeley's new thought about things—though not about persons and personal freedom—was also the thought of the most metaphysical mind in America.¹

Berkeley, with his wife and their infant son, bade farewell to America in the autumn of 1731.² They sailed from Boston in October, and reached London in January.

Thus ended the romantic episode of Rhode Island, which warms the heart and affects the imagination more perhaps than any other incident even in Berkeley's life. Of all who have ever landed on the American shore, none was animated by a more unworldly spirit. The country in which and for which he lived now acknowledges that in his visit it was touched by the halo of an illustrious reputation. His dream of future American Empire has not been without its influence in promoting its own fulfilment in these latter times.

“Westward the course of Empire takes its way;
The four first Acts already past :
A fifth shall close the Drama with the day ;
Time's noblest offspring is the last.”

¹ I am glad to be able to refer, in confirmation of the statement in the text, that Edwards was a Berkeleian—hazarded also in my edition of Berkeley's Works—to the authority of the learned Professor Fisher of Yale College, in his ‘Discussions in History and Theology’ (New York, 1880). This volume contains a valuable essay on “The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards,” pp. 227-252.

² An infant daughter died at Whitehall a few days before they left it.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTROVERSIAL AUTHORSHIP.

BERKELEY lived for more than two years in London after his return from America. This fifth and last time in which he made London his home was marked by his reappearance as a philosophical author, after the ineffectual endeavour to realise a grand social ideal which had consumed the ten best years of his life. So it happened that his restless middle age closed with contributions to the literature of philosophy, as his early life in Ireland had done twenty years before. This fresh issue of books bore traces of his surroundings at the time.

Indisposition to society and indifferent health were now apparent. Even before he left Rhode Island there were signs of a less buoyant spirit, and already, at the age of forty-seven, of approaching old age. His constitution was never very robust, burdened as it was by the eager impetuous temperament.

The London to which he returned contained almost none of those with whom he had been brought into connection at the brilliant social gatherings of former years. Samuel Clarke and his antagonist Anthony Collins both died in the year in which Berkeley sailed from

the Thames. Swift had left London for ever, and Steele had followed Addison to the grave. Gay, the friend of Berkeley and Pope, died about the time of the return from America, and Arbuthnot was approaching his end at Hampstead. Butler was buried in the deep seclusion of his northern rectory at Stanhope, pondering the thoughts which four years later found expression in the 'Analogy.' But Pope was still at Twickenham, busy with his 'Essay on Man,' receiving visits from Bolingbroke, or visiting Lord Bathurst at Cirencester Park. Berkeley's instruction to his American correspondent Samuel Johnson, to direct his letters "to Lord Percival's, at his house in Pall Mall," shows continued intimacy with his early patron, who had been his correspondent for a quarter of a century. Once or twice, "in obedience to the Queen's command," he attended as of old at Court, "to discourse with her Majesty on what he had observed worthy of notice in America."

The immediate occasion of this return to philosophical authorship was the increase of scepticism about religion. To vanquish the free-thinkers was, according to J. S. Mill, "the leading purpose of Berkeley's career as a philosopher." It would be nearer the truth to say that it was the purpose of his authorship in middle life. The pervading intellectual and moral outcome of his life as a whole was—to awaken our common consciousness of the Eternal Spirit or Reason, concealed yet revealed in the sensuous phantasmagoria—the true and deep reality, symbolised by the phenomenal things of sense in their very constitution. Instead of Eternal Spirit or Reason, unintelligible Matter and Force—blind or non-rational, and there-

fore untrustworthy—was the only “God” he found in the teaching of Toland and Collins, who arrogated to themselves the honourable title of free-thinkers. Without explaining indeed what he means by atheism, he assured himself that Collins was an “atheist;” and also that the selfish and sensuous utilitarianism of Mandeville, and even the sentimental ethics of Shaftesbury, to both of which he had a strong dislike, were consequences of concealed atheism. That the main current of thought among the self-styled “free-thinkers” of the time was a sort of materialistic fatalism, inconsistent with the supremacy of Reason and Goodness in the universe, he took for granted in the controversial writings which belong to this period of his life. He connected it, too, with the contemptuous outcry against theology, as based on faith in mere mysteries, which was countenanced by some contemporary mathematicians and natural philosophers.

The fervid impatience natural to Berkeley was apt to blind him in some degree to the wide scope of the questions underlying the argumentative criticism of contemporary free-thinkers, though, in a great measure unconsciously to themselves. For they gave currency, in a popular fashion, to consequences of principles contained in the then obscure and forgotten books of Spinoza;¹ and to others that were afterwards involved in the searching scepticism of Hume, and even in the later rationalism of Germany. With his subject in clear outline, in a transparent atmosphere of thought, at his own point of view, there may be found in Berkeley’s confident polemic, by

¹ See Mr Frederick Pollock’s masterly treatise on ‘Spinoza: his Life and Philosophy’ (1880), pp. 381-384.

those familiar with Spinoza and Hume, a want of that large intellectual grasp which adequately comprehends the speculative difficulties of an intellectual system of the universe. There is along with this perhaps an insufficient sense of its sublime and awful mystery; and it must be confessed that he now and then approaches too near the tone of sectarian controversy.

He had been reading in Rhode Island what free-thinkers in England were writing, and his repeated residences in London had made him personally familiar with theological sceptics. The result of the reading and the personal intercourse, and of meditation upon both, appeared in ‘Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher,’ written in Rhode Island, and published soon after his arrival in London. This is the largest, and was at the time of its first appearance the most popular, of all Berkeley’s books. It is a philosophical argument for religion, offered about the time when, according to Bishop Butler, it had “come to be taken for granted that Christianity is not so much as a subject for inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious; and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world.”¹ Berkeley’s polemic is in the form of dialogues that are more fitted than any in our language to enable the English reader to understand the charm of Cicero and Plato. The “minute philosophers” are the English free-thinkers; the argument is directed to restore theological beliefs, and, on grounds of reason, to sustain faith in the divinity of that order of which nature and physical law are the embodiment.

¹ Butler’s ‘Analogy’—Advertisement.

There is more appearance of learning in 'Alciphron' than in any of Berkeley's earlier works. Authorities, ancient and modern, are frequently cited, with allusions which imply greater familiarity than formerly with literature, and a more extensive observation of life. The appeals to the imagination in the way of rural pictures are characteristic, and in some parts the dialogue has all the charm and sentiment of a pastoral poem. Its artistic features are due to its author's stay in Rhode Island, for the pictures were suggested by scenes around Whitehall; and the reader is thus often carried back to the green vales and ocean shores, with which the writer was familiar in that Arcadia.

'Alciphron' consists of seven dialogues. The first opens the discussion; in the second and third, questions of ethics are debated; the fourth argues the perpetual providence and supremacy of constantly creating Mind in the very constitution of visible things, and the existence of divine law in nature; in the three last, the spiritual and civilising advantages of religion, as well as objections to it on account of its ultimate mysteriousness, are considered. Subtle intellect is employed in defending a more generous morality against selfish ethical theories, founded on organic pleasure and pain, like Mandeville's; or on enthusiastic sentiment like Shaftesbury's; while the new thought about the sort of reality that belongs to sensible things is applied in vindication of theism, and to meet objections to the practical quickening of theistic beliefs by the historical facts of Christianity. The utility—in the wide meaning of utility—of virtue, and of faith in the continued life of moral agents after the dissolution of the organism of the body;

the sufficiency of the evidence of religion for the demands of practical reason; with the inevitableness and utility of the mysterious terms which symbolise religious thought—are some of the questions raised for settlement.

Among the interlocutors Alciphron and Lysicles represent “minute philosophy,”—the former in its more intellectual and generous aspect; the latter as adopted by shallow men of the world, who live for transitory pleasures. Euphranor and Crito advocate morality and religion; Dion is mostly a spectator.

In the first dialogue the party try to find some common principles applicable to disputed questions in morality and religion; and in the end Alciphron is made to confess that all beliefs that are indispensable to the common weal are natural, and therefore true, rules for human action. He had before tried to show that the only real constituents of human nature, in which all men are practically agreed, are the pleasures and pains of the body; and that faith in a morality transcending sensuous phenomena and their pleasures—faith in God or the supremacy of moral government—and faith in the continued life of moral agents after the death of the body,—have been artificially produced and sustained, not being always and originally acknowledged by men. Yet he has in the end to allow that beliefs which may make no appearance in early life, or which are not reached at all in the experience of many men, may still be latent in the constitution of man. It may in this way belong to our original constitution that each of us should be obliged to consider his own individuality as included in a social whole—to the common good of which he is bound to contribute, if he would live according to the genuine,

though it may be often the latent, nature of humanity. So the question in the remaining dialogues resolves into this: Have beliefs in the supremacy of the divine order or physical Providence, and in the future life of moral agents—which free-thinkers abandon—a tendency to promote the highest good of men? Are they in this respect in harmony with, and required for, the satisfaction of human nature?

Mandeville's 'Fable of the Bees,' with its ambiguous generalisation—"private vices, public benefits"—is the particular object of criticism in the second dialogue; and it is argued that there are ascertainable differences in kind among the pleasures of which men are capable. The moral theory of Shaftesbury is taken up by the interlocutors in their next discussion, with its analogy between conscience and taste, and its disparagement of a faith in the future that is grounded on the present inequality of rewards and punishments, as a faith apt to minister to selfishness, and to foster an ignoble spirit. The opposed argument is, that this enthusiastic morality is unsuited to human nature, which needs a firmer motive than romantic sentiment, and has to be sustained by an appeal to the complex elements of our constitution.

But Alciphron is not satisfied with evidence that belief in God, and in divine realities deeper than sense, is advantageous to society. That a belief is consolatory, and that its decay introduces despair and misery, does not show that it is true. The question that has really to be met is this: Are we obliged, on grounds of reason, to believe that God exists; or do we even know what we mean, when we affirm God's existence, and use this mysterious name? The visual immaterialism of Berke-

ley is introduced to help the answer to this question. Euphranor and Crito maintain that, as the visible world can have no independent existence, being merely the phenomenal expression of Intelligence and Will, we have in its constitution or intelligibility the same *kind* of proof that God exists that we have of the existence of a fellow-man, when we watch phenomenal expressions of his existence, in his calculated actions and reasonable speech. This sort of theological knowledge, the argument further urges, is not merely negative and analogical, as Archbishop King and Bishop Browne, as well as the free-thinkers, had maintained that all theological knowledge must be. We are not obliged to worship an unknown and unknowable God; for we see in visible phenomena and phenomenal things the acting of intelligent Spirit, similar to what we are conscious of in ourselves, and to what we recognise through the mediation of sight in our fellow-men.

The theological way of thinking about the universe would thus be true free-thought, and a life corresponding to it the ideal of human nature. Religious faith would be the perfection of man—intellectual or philosophical; a corresponding practice would be the perfection of man—seeking to realise his ideal of duty.

If Berkeley did not fully fathom the deep and complex questions involved in this conclusion, his own argument in these dialogues was a mystery to the free-thinkers of his time. “‘Alciphron’ is hard to be understood,” Bolingbroke writes. “I propose, however, to reconcile you to metaphysics by showing how they may be employed against metaphysicians; and that whenever you

do not understand them nobody else does,—no, not even those who wrote them.” The book encountered a number of ephemeral attacks in pamphlets in the course of 1732; and its introduction of visual immaterialism into theological dialectic was a stumbling-block to many.

In September of that year the ‘Daily Post-Boy’ contained a letter full of objections to visual immaterialism. Berkeley in consequence, a few months after, produced ‘The Theory of Visual Language Vindicated and Explained.’ In this important tract he unfolds more fully the grounds for faith in supremé Reason and intending Will, as the only ultimate explanation of the changes in phenomena and phenomenal things, through which the hierarchy of finite spirits, all dependent on the Supreme, maintain communion with one another, and with the Spirit in whom they all live and have their being.

Though Berkeley’s explanation of the knowledge of which we are conscious in sense had been published to the world for more than twenty years, this short letter of objections in the ‘Post-Boy,’ was the only published criticism it had drawn forth. More imposing hostile criticisms were now beginning to appear. “As to the Bishop of Cork’s book, and the other book you allude to, the author whereof is Mr Baxter,” he says in a letter written about this time to his American friend Johnson, “they are both very little read and considered here, for which reason I have taken no public notice of them. To answer objections already answered, and repeat the same things, is a needless as well as a disagreeable task. Nor should I have taken notice of that letter about Vision, had it not been printed in a newspaper, which

gave it course, and spread it through the kingdom.”—The “Bishop of Cork” referred to was Browne, provost of Trinity College in Berkeley’s undergraduate days, whose ‘Divine Analogy’ had appeared early in 1733. It contains a dissertation on the nature and extent of our knowledge of God. This is chiefly in answer to the objections in ‘Alciphron’ to human knowledge in matters of theology being only analogical, there interpreted to mean negative. Browne had formerly enlarged on the incomprehensible difference between a human and the divine mind. This seemed to make it impossible to apply the term “mind” in the same meaning to both. He concluded, accordingly, that it was as absurd to attribute consciousness, intelligence, or goodness, in the ordinary meaning, to Deity, as to suppose God possessed of hands or feet. This appeared to Berkeley to differ little, except in words, from atheism, and to imply logically that Deity, like Matter, is a meaningless word. He argued that the only ground we have for believing that God exists at all, also shows Him to be intelligent, wise, and benevolent, in the ordinary meaning of those words. Otherwise the name God is merely an equivalent for *z*, and its empty meaning may be left out of account in dealing with human affairs.—The “Baxter” mentioned in the letter to Johnson was a Scotchman,¹ who had published a year or two before an ‘Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul,’ which contained a chapter on “Dean Berkeley’s scheme against the existence of a material world,” and professed to prove its inconclusiveness. Baxter treats Immaterialism as

¹ Baxter was born in Old Aberdeen, about 1687, and died at West Whittinghame, in East Lothian, in 1750.

scepticism, its advocate as one logically obliged to be a sceptic, and his new theory as "a complication of all the varieties of scepticism that had ever been broached." To make this out he has to play on the ambiguous word "idea;" to overlook the interpretable significance through which alone Berkeley's sensuous phenomena become phenomenal things, and sensations perceptions or expectations. Then, after confounding the "real ideas of sense" with the subjective illusions of fancy, he is easily able to show that a world of this sort cannot be a world or cosmos at all, and that the new conception of matter does not afford even the practical knowledge needed for the regulation of life; while it implies that the Supreme Power must be either non-rational, or conscious of an intention to deceive. Baxter's criticism is interesting now as evidence that the Berkeleyan conception of an unsubstantial, impotent, and only phenomenal material world, was beginning to attract Scotch metaphysical intellect; which soon after, in the person of David Hume, became, through the incitement of the negative part of Berkeley's views, the moving force of the modern revolution in European thought.

In 1734 Berkeley got involved in what seemed a mathematical controversy only. It was really one form of the collision between faith and finite science. His "Commonplace Book" shows that the metaphysical principles which underlie mathematical reasoning had interested him at College. Throughout the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' the tract on the 'Cause of Motion,' and the 'Minute Philosopher,' he

maintained that the words "space" and "time" have a positive and intelligible meaning only so far as their meanings can be traced to phenomena, and that absolute space is the mere negation of sense consciousness. So Baxter argued that, to be consistent with himself, Berkeley was logically bound "to suspect that even mathematics may not be very sound knowledge at the bottom." It happened that during these London years of renewed philosophical authorship, his attention was drawn to a ground for scepticism about religion which some mathematicians thought they had found in theological mysteries, and in the want of a logical justification for the principles of theology. We find him telling his friend Tom Prior, in January, that though his "health then hindered reading," he could "think as well as ever;" and that "for amusement" he "passed his early hours in certain mathematical matters which might possibly produce something." The issue was the 'Analyst,' which appeared early in 1734. This little book caused a controversy in which Jurin, Pemberton, Benjamin Robins, Colin M'Laurin, Walton, and other distinguished mathematicians took part, and which left its mark in English mathematics and theology in last century.

The 'Analyst,' in its philosophical design, was an ingenious example of the *argumentum ad hominem*. Its argument is that even boasted mathematical science cannot logically justify its own fundamental axioms; and that its covert assumptions and conclusions are as inexplicable as those of the theologian. Hence religious thought is really in no worse position than this most exact and certain of the external sciences. Some of the reasoning resembles that brought forward in the

seventh dialogue of 'Alciphron,' where it is argued that some words have another office than that of suggesting phenomena in the imagination, and that they are connected with unimaginable meanings. Yet these words may legitimately influence our feelings and actions. As a Kantist might say, they belong to the sphere of the practical reason, operative in the region of transcendent truth. For Berkeley here implies that, at the root of our positive or phenomenal knowledge of the universe, there are practical principles which cannot be resolved into imaginable meaning, and which it is unreasonable to insist on translating into impressions of sense, or corresponding pictures of imagination. Here, too, religion and science would be on the same footing. "Force," for instance, is as incomprehensible a word in natural philosophy as "grace" is in theology; yet each is useful, for each has a practical, though not an imaginable meaning. The case is similar with the mathematical infinite. Mathematicians cannot translate into consistent imaginable meanings some of their own conclusions about fluxions. If religion is rooted in mysteries and apparent contradictions, so, too, is the venerable science of number and space. Modern analysts, in their vaunted discoveries, proceed upon what is unrealisable in imagination; and they have therefore no right to reject theology, merely because reasoners about religion make a demand on faith similar to what they do themselves. The argument ultimately comes to this, that all human knowledge—mathematical or theological—whether about nature and its quantitative relations in space, or about God—must merge at last into mysterious common convictions, which have a bearing

indeed on life and action, but which cannot be translated into ideas of the imagination, or freed from an appearance of self-contradiction.

This is, perhaps, the drift of Berkeley's argument, but without a full recognition of it on his own part. His inclination to push thought to the verge of paradox led him, moreover, into less defensible positions than the preceding, in the 'Analyst' controversy. He was not satisfied to show the incomprehensibility of the principles and reasonings of mathematicians about a quantitative infinite in space and time; he speaks as if their science of fluxions involved what is absolutely self-contradictory, and not merely what is relatively mysterious. That the highest philosophy might solve such difficulties, by resolving "contradiction" into a higher unity, was a thought foreign to Berkeley.

CHAPTER V.

WHETHER GOD CAN BE SEEN, AND WHAT GOD IS.

THE works produced by Berkeley in this period of controversial authorship showed a certain amount of change, if not in his philosophical point of view, at any rate in the questions for which he was trying to find a philosophical answer. The writings of his youth, which issued from Trinity College, were meant to demonstrate the unsubstantiality and impotence of the phenomenal things of Sense, and the meaninglessness of the words "matter" and "force," abstracted from phenomena and their implied perceptions. What he now wanted to explain was — what is meant by God, to whose persistence and power the persistence and power attributed to the things we see and touch had been referred by him. He was now more bent on proving that the Supreme Power is Spirit, and that the "shows of sense" are truly the revelation of Spirit, than even in arguing that the things of sense themselves depend on perception. His little tract on the 'Cause of Motion' showed this tendency years before.

But a grave difficulty lay in his way. It is one apt to perplex those who meditate deeply in philosophical

theology, though I am not sure that Berkeley yet saw, or ever fully saw, its magnitude. It had been seen by Spinoza; it was afterwards seen, from very different points, by Hume and by Kant. It rises in the form of questions like these: Is the name "God," after all, more intelligible than the unperceived and unperceiving "matter" and "force," that Berkeley had dislodged on account of their unintelligibleness? If the one can be resolved into the residual x , must not the other? We cannot see or touch unphenomenal matter; but have we evidence, in sense or otherwise, for an unphenomenal Supreme Being? If both words are meaningless, what gain, or satisfaction to reason, is there in substituting one meaningless word for another meaningless word, which, on account of its meaninglessness, had been already dismissed? Are we not inviting materialists to worship an unknown and unknowable God? We may apply the names "mind" and "spirit" to the Being to which all is thus at last referred; but this is presumptuously attributing to Supreme Being attributes like those we find in our own self-conscious personality. As Spinoza had said, "A triangle, if it could speak, must in like manner say that its God is triangular, or a circle that the divine nature is circular." Even the pious and practical Locke, in one of the last sentences he ever wrote, to be found in a letter sent from his deathbed to his young friend Anthony Collins, confessed that he could not, "because of the common name, equal the *mind* that he found in himself to the infinite and incomprehensible Being, which, for want of right and distinct conceptions, is called *mind* also, or the Eternal Mind."

With an inadequate view of this difficulty, yet with some apprehension that it must be met, Berkeley exchanged the question of his youth—How we find, and what we are entitled to mean by, the material or sense-given world?—into this question of his middle age—How we find, and what we are entitled to mean by, the Supreme Power, whose constant presence is signified by the shows of sense?

The reader has already found that the juvenile reversal of materialism, in the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' has a side on which it looks like universal scepticism, or at least agnosticism. Sceptics, and agnostics in theology, like Hume, have been very ready to detect this. The argument which leads to the merely phenomenal constitution of things has accordingly been employed to prove the merely phenomenal constitution of self, and the delusiveness of the personal pronouns "I" and "you." Deny the persistence and independence of the phenomena we see and touch, and we must, it then seems, also deny persistence and independence altogether—which is to deny that anything exists, or that the word existence has any meaning.

This universal denial was of course very far from Berkeley's thought and intention. Like every other believer in reality, he supposed persistence and power to centre somewhere; he had no thought of treating as transitory phenomena the individual persons, as well as the sensible things, in the universe. He thought that reason obliged him to banish permanence and power only from the phenomena he saw and touched. In the "common sense," as some philosophers call it, in which we all consciously or unconsciously share

(for in many this common sense or common faith remains largely latent), he found evidence that the phenomenal and ever-fluctuating world of the senses has for one of its functions—if not for its chief end—to make conscious beings aware of one another's existence; and for another of its functions, to educate intellect through the work of forming physical science. For the world of phenomenal things, transitory, and dependent on the perceptions of a mind, has plainly this very remarkable characteristic somehow attached to it,—that it is the medium for intelligent communion among individual or separate conscious beings. It enables them, as it were, to make signals to one another. One phenomenon, too, is trusted as the sign of others. Thus the data of sight suggest data of touch; phenomena presented in any of our senses may be interpreted into phenomena presentable only in another; and all may be read in the language of vision. The phenomena of our five human senses might, if our senses were as many as those of the Micro-megas of Voltaire, become significant of numberless aspects of existence that are now unimaginable by men. But all this would be only a discovery of phenomenal or caused causes. These so-called causes, Berkeley would say, are not properly causes. Their very connection, under what we call laws of nature, is itself the effect of the rational Cause or Power which the merely phenomenal connections of natural science either conceal or reveal. The remarkable characteristic of sensuous phenomena and phenomenal things is, not merely that they "suggest" other phenomena and other phenomenal things, but that they, in a faith that is reasonable, enable us to communicate with other finite persons, and

with the Universal Mind. Faith is latent in sense; reason is latent in faith. The faith on which we rest, when we presuppose significance and interpretability in the phenomena of sense, is nothing else than latent reason; and it is a further outcome of the same latent reason that carries us on, through sense, above nature, to the invisible reality. Is it consistent to trust the lower faith—reason implied in suggestion, on which scientific interpretations of nature as coexistent and successive rest—and then to reject, because destitute of logical proof, the deeper faith, still more begotten of reason, on which theology reposes? We all "live by faith," even when we live in sense.

These noteworthy characteristics of what we see, touch, hear, taste, or smell, are brought more fully into light in the works that belong to this middle period of Berkeley's life. But here, too, a want may be found, which perhaps unconsciously led him on, a stage nearer to intellectual Transcendentalism, as appeared when he next gave his philosophic thought to the world, ten years later. In the meantime, he made much of free or uncaused causation, as the rational origin of the phenomenal or caused causes which seem to precede one another in time, in an endless orderly regress; and insisted that the former only are entitled to be called causes. As yet he used only the analogical argument of empiricism to escape from disbelief in the Supreme Cause or Reason; and from the meaninglessness, too, which he had argued was fatal to unphenomenal Matter.

The contrast in the following sentences between "objects," or phenomenal things—which can only be signs,

not real causes — and causation proper, which with Berkeley transcends the successions of phenomena in nature, illustrates the point to which his thought was now approaching:—

“The *objects* [*i.e.*, phenomena or impressions, either severally, or as aggregated in phenomenal things] of sense, being things immediately perceived, are called ideas. The *cause* of these ideas, or the power of producing them [*i.e.*, the origin of our sense impressions, and of external nature, of which they are a part], is not the object of sense, not being itself perceived [*i.e.*, not being phenomenal], but only inferred by reason from its effects—viz., from the objects or ideas which *are* perceived by sense [*i.e.*, which *are* phenomenal]. Hence it follows that the Power or Cause of ideas [*i.e.*, of sense phenomena, and their aggregates, which we call individual things of sense] is not an object of Sense, but of Reason. Whenever, therefore, the appellation of *sensible object*, is used in a determined, intelligible sense [*i.e.*, one which can be realised in imagination], it is not employed to signify the absolutely existing outward Cause or Power, but the ideas [sensuous phenomena or impressions, and expectations of such] produced thereby. Ideas [sensuous phenomena] which are observed to be connected together, are vulgarly considered under the relation of cause and effect, whereas in strict philosophic truth they are only related as sign and the thing signified.”¹

Physical sciences are all, of course, confined to the phenomena and phenomenal things of sense, under the arbitrary relation—not category—of “sign and thing signified.” They have nothing to do with the power in which phenomenal things, and their established laws, originate, and through which they receive rational explanation. The “power” that thus exists without us, to

¹ ‘Works,’ vol. i. pp. 377, 378.

which the ever-passing, but practically useful, phantasmagoria of the sensible world are to be referred, is concerned with mind in its highest faculty — above the operation involved in the expectations of sense, and above the inductive generalisations of sciences which deal with events in time. The sphere of merely physical causation (if we are to call it causation), while not inconsistent with, is exclusive of the sphere of true causation, which is efficient and final.

“As to the outward [not immanent] Cause of these ideas [*i.e.*, of those sensuous phenomena or impressions, and the phenomenal things which they compose, through their significant and interpretable but arbitrary connections of coexistence and succession], whether it be one and the same, or various and manifold; whether it be thinking or unthinking, spirit or body, or whatever else we conceive about it,—the visible appearances [phenomenal things and their laws which alone concern physical science] do not alter their nature. Though I may have an erroneous notion of the [unphenomenal and uncaused, final or efficient] Cause, and though I may be utterly ignorant of its nature, yet this does not hinder my making true and certain judgments about my ideas [*i.e.*, the phenomena given in the perceptions and anticipations of sense and science];—my knowing which of them are [phenomenally] the same, and which different; wherein they agree, and wherein they disagree [phenomenally]; which are [phenomenally] connected together, and wherein this connection consists; whether it be founded in a likeness of nature, in a geometrical necessity, or merely in experience and custom.”¹

Theological inferences, in short, are irrelevant to natural science, which grows up out of “suggestions” due—psychologically regarded, at least—to custom or

¹ ‘Works,’ vol. i. pp. 380, 381.

past experience. Science, as concerned with what is phenomenal only—that is to say, with orderly effects—has nothing to do with the uncaused and unphenomenal Power, on which the phenomenal order depends; for our perceptions by the senses, and our merely scientific inferences from them, will be the very same, however we determine about their transcendent Cause or Reason. “Perhaps”—for “perhaps” is all Berkeley ventures to say now — “I think that the same Being which causes our ideas of sight [*i.e.*, the things we see], doth not only cause our ideas of touch likewise [*i.e.*, the things we touch], but also all our ideas of [*i.e.*, phenomena given in] all the other senses, with all the varieties thereof” [*i.e.*, phenomenal nature and its whole constitution].¹

So Berkeley’s real world—in the deepest meaning of “real”—was not found in the world of merely phenomenal things perceived in sense, or anticipated in sense. The sensible world was for him only symbolic of a truer reality, and that even though the phenomena of which phenomena of sense are significant were to be as varied in kind as those presented to “the little man of Saturn,” or to Micromegas himself. The true reality is the unphenomenal Power to which the whole is at last to be referred.

Now, what can we say, or can we say anything, about this Power? It is in treating this question that Berkeley’s analogical argument appears.

His way of putting it might be something like this: We all acknowledge that we can, through the data of the five senses, find human spirits, consciously living

¹ ‘Works,’ vol. i. p. 383.

and working outside of our own stream of conscious life—the uncaused causes or creators of effects for which they are responsible; as we are ourselves responsible for effects of which we therefore allow that we are the free or responsible causes. By analogy, we can equally find Spirit (objective reason, some might call it) expressed in the interpretable phenomena of vision, and indeed of perception generally, as well as in all the discoveries of physical science. It is true that we are dull,—imperfectly awake to the perpetual presence of this pervading Spirit—and apt to refer what is due to this to the secondary causes presented to the senses—which are not causes at all, but only signs of the coexistences and successions divinely established within the physical cosmos. What is needed is that, through reflection, we should get our otherwise dormant common sense, or common consciousness, awakened to perceive the analogy. We are all practically alive to our intellectual obligation to interpret the words and acts of other men, as signifying the existence and operation of human spirits, with their individual shares of real knowledge. The analogous intellectual obligation to recognise Supreme Spirit, in the sense symbolism or intelligibility of nature, is apt, through obvious influences, not to be so much felt; this deeper constituent of the common sense needs, therefore, to be drawn forth by much philosophical and religious exercise. But when it is drawn forth, we find the intuitive obligation to recognise that we daily “see God”—in the same sense, at least, as we may be said daily to see our fellow-men; for even they, in strictness, cannot be seen, although their bodies can.

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Nor, he might say, is this sight of God which we have daily, the sight of an unknowable "something." We find through inner experience what conscious life is, though we have no sense-phenomenal knowledge of the "I" or the "You." We can attribute *this*, can we not, to God as well as to our fellow-men? Unphenomenal Matter, on the contrary, is *x* or Abracadabra. So "God" is more than a meaningless name—more than the Unknowable behind the sense symbolism of nature. God means the eternally sustaining Spirit—the active conscious Reason of the universe. Of God's existence we have the same sort of proof as we have of the existence of other conscious agents like ourselves, when we say we "see" *them*. Of course we never see, and never can see, another human spirit, even when his body, as a phenomenal thing, is present to our senses; we can only perceive the visible and tangible appearances, behind which reason obliges us to recognise an invisible individual spirit, numerically different from our own. We implicitly trust the phenomena of sense, when discharging their function of thus making us aware of the existence, and of some of the mental states, of other human spirits like ourselves. We are apt to distrust their exercise of an analogous office, in revealing to us the thoughts of the Supreme Spirit that are embodied in physical laws; yet His presence is universal, and always active, while finite spirits only act within a circumscribed sphere, and at intervals.

Berkeley insists that it is the duty of the philosopher to overcome this unreasonable distrust, and argues that faith in God is even more a necessity of reason than the faith which is our rational assurance

of the real existence of the human sp^{irit} signified by what we see. The spiritual w^{orld} through the visible, in the very fact of of things, when read according to a theory materialism. Reason, begotten of faith, i^s to be indeed latent in sense.

obj- "Nothing," said the sceptical Alciphron,¹ "vince^s me of the existence of another person : to me. It is my hearing you talk that, in strict phical truth, is to me the best argument for. And this is a peculiar argument, inapplicable purpose ; for you will not, I suppose, pretend to speak to man in the same clear and sensible one man doth to another ?"—"That," Euphranor really, in truth, my opinion ; and it should be you are consistent with yourself, and abide by the definition of language. . . . In consequence of sentiments and concessions, you have as much as think the Universal Agent or God speaks to you can have for thinking any particular person speaks. You stare to find that God is not far from us, and that in Him we live, and move, and have You who in the beginning of this our conference strange that God [if He exists] should leave Himself a witness, do now think it strange that the witness so full and clear."—"I must own I do," Alciphron acknowledge. "I never imagined it could be possible we saw God with our fleshly eyes as plain as a human person whatsoever, and that He daily addresses in a manifest and clear dialect."—"This vision," Criton interposes, "has a necessary connection with knowledge, wisdom, and goodness. It is equivalent to constant creation, betokening an immediate act of providence. The instantaneous production and

¹ 'Works,' vol. ii. pp. 146, &c.

of so many phenomenal signs, combined, dissolved, transposed, diversified, and adapted to such an endless variety of purposes, ever shifting with the occasions suited to them, doth set forth and testify the immediate [external or immanent?] operation of a Spirit or thinking Being.”

But without a previous assumption of the perfection or infinity of God, this analogical reasoning, which Berkeley so beautifully unfolds, can carry us only to an inadequate conclusion. It suggests that we are now in the presence of a Power that operates according to rules; but it contains no proof that the ordered phenomenal changes will continue, in similar orderly co-existences and successions; still less that the Power is trustworthy and perfect. Why may not our whole experience be due to the operation of a malignant contriver, who finds pleasure in our temporary delusions, and through whose influence our common sense, or irresistible faith in things, is only inherited deception? The argument presupposes the trustworthiness of the Power that is continually addressing us in the language of the senses. This universal language itself can afford no evidence of the continued veracity of the unknown speaker, which is the main thing for us. Eternity, omnipotence, perfect trustworthiness, and goodness, all presuppose other grounds, either in faith or in reason, than those expressed in the empirical argument from analogy. Putting aside the evidence of spiritual consciousness or moral experience, and regarding the question with the eye of natural science,¹ the assumption

¹ Natural and biological science, *per se*, is philosophically agnostic—phenomena of sense, and *faith* in their necessary phenomenal order, being its only data, while *faith* in what transcends this is put

involved in Berkeley's answer is a bold one. How do we know that it is true? We have proved, by this analogy of the universal language of natural law with the languages of men, that—at present, and through long past time—men have been in intercourse through their senses with a calculating Being, aged therefore, but destined, for all we can tell, soon to die, powerful now, who has customary ways of acting, and is perhaps kindly disposed;—but what of his absolute trustworthiness? As far as this merely empirical analogy goes, Hume was warranted in thinking that the theory of “the universal energy and operation” of a divine or perfect Being was “too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man fully apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments which conducts to it was ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion that it has carried us beyond the reach of our faculties. We are got into fairyland; and *there* we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses.”

An apprehension of this sort was at the bottom of the fallacious attempt of Descartes to prove by argument the validity of the faith which assures us of reality, and that we awoke in a universe that is dependent on a reliable Power. It was an expression of felt need for evidence that we are not the sport of a malignant Being, who finds pleasure in our illusions,

aside, as unscientific, which indeed it is, according to this conception of science. See also H. Spencer & Thompson's *Religious Sentiments of the Human Mind*.

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—the need for evidence that conscious life may not, instead of a “well ordered,” turn out to be in the end a deceptive dream. Berkeley had to go deeper than mere empirical analogies could carry him, in order to show the reasonableness of consoling trust in the Power that it had been the governing thought of his life to realise, as “not far from any one of us,” for “in Him we live, and move, and have our being.” His later thought, too, expressed more of the sense of infinity being involved in the case: “Who by searching can find out God? who can find out the Almighty unto perfection?” We find him more in this mental attitude, in the next and last appearance of his philosophical thought about things. But we must first follow him into a new scene.

PART III.—1734-53.

CHAPTER I.

MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY AT CLOYNE.

IN May 1734, Berkeley returned to Ireland. Except occasional visits, he had been a wanderer for more than twenty years. He returned to take possession of the bishopric of Cloyne. That remote region was henceforward to be his home. The interest of the philosophic Queen, and some regard to what was due to him after the Bermuda disappointment, probably explains the mystery of the unworldly idealist appearing in high office in the Irish Church of the eighteenth century. He thus resumed life in his native island, able to devote his benevolent sympathies to the service of his countrymen, and his mind to contemplation and search for truth.

Berkeley spent eighteen years of almost unbroken seclusion at Cloyne. The place itself suited an increasing inclination for a meditative domestic life, which had been fostered by his circumstances in America. The eastern and northern part of the county of Cork formed his diocese. It was bounded on the west by Cork har-

hour and the river Lee, and on the east by the beautiful Blackwater and the mountains of Waterford ; the hills of Limerick protected it on the north ; and the sea, which was its southern boundary, approached within two miles of his new home in the village of Cloyne. This is a compact territory, apart from the great currents of life, about twenty miles in length, and extending inwards about twelve miles from the coast. The interior consists of two nearly parallel limestone valleys, cultivated and fertile, but bare of trees. In one of these stood the cathedral, with the village, its round tower, and its 1500 inhabitants. What was then the bishop's residence may still be seen, screened from the road by shrubs and trees, whilst its other sides look towards a large garden, in which is a broad walk, Berkeley's favourite resort for meditative purposes, once lined by hedges of myrtles planted by his own hand. The name was significant, as well as the place—for Cloyne, in its original meaning, is a cave or place of retirement.

Here, before the summer of 1734 was ended, Berkeley was settled, "continuing his studies with unabated attention." Plato and Hooker, we find, were among his constant companions. The Cloyne life seems soon to have become a sedentary one, and with increasing ill-health. Idealising his new home, he saw charms around it not so obvious to the ordinary eye. Travelling was now irksome to him, and he was as much removed as he had been at Rhode Island from any who remained of the men of thought and letters of his more social days. Cork took the place of Newport, but Cork was twenty miles from Cloyne, while Newport was only three from Whitehall. His episcopal neighbour at Cork at first

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was Dr Peter Browne, Provost at Trinity College a quarter of a century before, and lately involved with him in controversies of theological philosophy. The county squires and their families, as we see in the allusions of letters and diaries, supplied most of the society. Among the neighbouring clergy, Isaac Gervais, one of the prebendaries of Lismore, and afterwards Dean of Tuam, was a frequent correspondent and visitor, who often enlivened the episcopal residence by his wit. The annual visits of Thomas Prior, and his steady correspondence, maintained that early friendship to the end. Secker, the common friend of Berkeley and Butler, now Bishop of Bristol, and Benson, the Bishop of Gloucester, whom he had known in Italy, often exchanged letters with him.¹ Cloyne was far from the life of courts, or colleges, or the coffee-houses of London, and with the sound of the melancholy ocean to interrupt its silence. Swift was wearing out an unhappy old age, and Pope was almost the sole survivor of the men of letters among whom he had moved in other days. There are no remains of Cloyne correspondence with Pope. We are told, indeed, that its beauty was represented to the bard of Twickenham by the imagination that in former days had represented Ischia, so that Pope had "almost determined to make a visit to Ireland to see a place which his friend had painted out to him with all the brilliancy of colour-

¹ In a letter from Secker, for instance, in February 1735, we read: "Your friend Mr Pope is publishing small poems every now and then, full of much wit, and not a little keenness. Our common friend Dr Butler hath almost completed a set of speculations upon the credibility of religion from its analogy to the constitution and course of nature, which I believe in due time you will read with pleasure." Butler's 'Analogy' appeared in the year after.

ing, though to common eyes it presents nothing that is very worthy of attention."

One finds almost no trace of impressions made by Berkeley at Cloyne. An episcopal successor writes, that "of Berkeley little is remembered." His ways were too quiet to strike, and his thoughts were too subtle to be appreciated by the squires and peasants of Imokilly. The recluse thinker, of cosmopolitan aspirations, whose thoughts were habitually in regions towards which it was difficult to follow him, left no deep local mark.

The only interruption to this secluded domestic life was in the autumn of 1737, when he went to Dublin for some months to attend the Irish House of Lords. This seems to have been the last year in which he went beyond the limits of the county of Cork till he left it to return no more. Suffering in health, he lived year after year happy in his home, devoted to books and to his thoughts. The letters disclose pleasant pictures of the family life, and his share in the education of his children. Of his only daughter he writes: "So bright a little gem! were it only to prevent her doing mischief among the illiterate squires, I am resolved to treat her like a boy, and make her study eight hours a-day." The love of art, as well as the love of truth, which was so much shown in his youth, followed him into his contemplative old age, and was encouraged among his children. He had no ear for music himself, but music was an enthusiasm in the family, and he retained the well-known Signor Pasquilino for years to teach his children. It was then that the Signor, who had been learning English from a dictionary, exclaimed in an outbreak of gratitude, "May God *pickle* your lordship!" The

county neighbours were often invited into the palace for concerts of music, or to enjoy pictures of the best French and Italian masters.

The perennial "condition of Ireland" question attracted him almost as soon as he was settled in Clerkenwell. The South Sea disaster had first distinctly shown the want of sympathy in social progress which was so much at the bottom of his American mission. In the remote parts of Ireland he found a large population of native Irish—a religious people, with strong ideas of race—settled among them a small society of English colonists—aliens in race and religion. The aborigines, long neglected in the interest of the stranger, had become unable to take care of themselves. The self-reliance which, fifteen years before, he had preached as the only "means for preventing the ruin of Great Britain," was even more needed in Ireland where the gospel of self-supporting work was unknown and where the simplest maxims of economy were not practised. The Protestant bishops were not then the leaders in enterprises which aimed at the good of the whole Irish nation, but Berkeley was never hindered by ecclesiastical conventionality. Musing on the misfortunes of Ireland, he rose from the special case to general scientific principles, and worked his way to much that is true in economic science, forty years before Adam Smith published the 'Wealth of Nations,' and ten years before David Hume produced his political essays.

The result, characteristically enough, appeared in the form of a series of queries. The First Part of Berkeley's 'Querist' was published in Dublin, 1735. It was followed by other two Parts in the two following years.

The 'Querist' shows characteristic humour and sagacity, and is still interesting, though some of its lessons would now be rejected as economically fallacious. He dreaded imports and luxurious expenditure, as a cause of loss, and acted as well as wrote for the encouragement of home-made productions of every kind; his own dress and that of his family being made at the village of Cloyne. He strongly supported a paper money, and maintained that industry was the only source of wealth, the true idea of money being that of "a ticket or counter." The 'Querist' abounds in maxims of large and generous regard for the whole Irish population. "Berkeley," says Sir James Mackintosh, "was the first eminent Protestant, after the unhappy contest at the Revolution, who avowed his love for all his countrymen. His patriotism was not, like Swift's, confined to a colony of English. The 'Querist' perhaps contains more hints, then original, still unapplied in legislation and political economy, than are to be found in any equal space." Here are a few examples of the queries, taken at random out of nearly six hundred :—

"Whether the creating of wants be not the likeliest way to produce industry in a people? Whether a scheme for the welfare of this nation should not take in the whole inhabitants? Whether it is not a vain attempt to project the flourishing of our Protestant gentry, exclusive of the bulk of the natives? Whether, in imitation of the Jesuits in Paris, who admit Protestants to study in their colleges, it may not be right for us also to admit Roman Catholics into our college, without obliging them to attend chapel duties, or catechisms, or divinity lectures? Whether the fable of Hercules and the carter ever suited any nation like this nation of Ireland? Whether there ever was, is, or will be, an industrious na-

tion poor, or an idle rich? Whether it were not wrong to suppose land, or gold and silver either, to be wealth? Whether we can propose to thrive so long as we entertain a wrong-headed distrust of England?"

Some years after Berkeley settled in Cloyne, the neighbourhood was ravaged by famine and fever. Numbers of the poor perished. Dark months of suffering, in the winter of 1739, had consequences of lasting interest in his mental history. They gave rise to a modified development of his early philosophic thought. The deaths among his neighbours led him to search for a remedy for disease. He had been proposing medicine for the body social; he now wanted to find a medicine for the bodily organism, on which the happiness and vigour of the embodied human spirit so much depends. Some American experience reminded him of wonderful medicinal properties of tar, especially tar dissolved in water. The American Indians believed in it as a panacea for the ills of flesh. Some of his own experiments seemed to verify a large conception of its possible uses. It so happened that he was about the same time much immersed in Platonic and Neoplatonic studies, and was learning to recognise the Universal Reason, shared in by men, as the Universal Principle or Agent—adumbrated in the phenomenal things of sense, and in their established laws. An eccentric ingenuity united these two subjects in the train of his thoughts,—the law of the medicinal agency of tar-water, and the universalising Reason or Intellect. He made experiments with tar-water for years. Its success in some diseases encouraged him to try it in others, and with a result that seemed to correspond to his expectations. He mused

over the question why tar-water should be so universally beneficial. The hypothesis occurred that tar must be charged to an extraordinary degree with "pure invisible fire, the most subtle and elastic of bodies," and the vital element of the universe; and also that water might be the means by which this contribution of life was to be drawn off from tar, and communicated to vegetable and animal organisms. Still, the vital fire, however interesting from the point of view of natural science and medical art, and however wide its medicinal applications, could, after all, at the philosophical point of view, be only a phenomenal or instrumental cause. Its own true cause, and the cause of its so-called effects, must be the Universal Agent or Infinite Mind.

This speculation aroused in Berkeley the imaginative enthusiasm of which he had so large a store, which, with a certain excess in each instance, had been drawn in different directions by ideals successively presented throughout his life. It was now kindled by a supposed discovery which seemed to mitigate, if not in the end completely to remove, the physical suffering of disease, and thus to open a new vista of happiness for mankind in their present state of embodied conscious life. The enthusiasm was natural to one so susceptible and benevolent. The corporeal organism and the conscious spirit in man are so connected—at least in this mortal life—that what invigorates a human body also supplies new resources of intellect and spiritual life for the common good. Human beings with bodies more largely charged with the vital fire might make unprecedented advances in the struggle with prejudice and vice, and the future history of mankind might thus become a happy con-

trast to its past. Berkeley had himself suffered for years from a complication of maladies, by which his old intellectual and social energy had been reduced. He might now be restored. The whole conception awakened a fervid admiration for tar-water, and a missionary zeal in the proclamation of its virtues hardly inferior to that with which, twenty years before, he had projected the Christian civilisation of North America. It became the ruling passion of the closing years of his life. He set up an apparatus for manufacturing tar-water at Cloyne. It was the one medicine in his household; and he tried, by offering it in new and more palatable forms, or surrounding it with a halo of philosophical speculation, to make the nauseous drug the one great medicine for his neighbours and for all the world.

In 1744 this tar-water enthusiasm brought him out once more as an author in metaphysical philosophy, as it happened for the last time in his life, and for the first time since his settlement in his "serene corner" at Cloyne. The most lasting consequence of the famine and fever of 1739 has been the curious volume of aphorisms, in which Berkeley made the effects of the supposed panacea an occasion for a chain of meditative thoughts upon the Power at work in or behind phenomenal things, and upon the principle of causality in the universe. The more empirical phenomenalism of his youth now enlarged itself into an intellectual phenomenalism, as it went on to unfold principles of rational connection, which, in making phenomenal knowledge possible, enable us to rise from physical science into philosophical theology. The phenomenal shadows seemed to vanish more than ever, in the blaze of this

new revelation of the Eternal Spirit, or universalising Intellect and Will, through which they receive a reflected reality.

In the spring of 1744, accordingly, a considerable volume made its appearance, entitled 'A Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries concerning Tar-Water, and divers other subjects connected together and arising out of one another.' The book had a great run for some years. No former work of Berkeley so soon or so widely engaged general attention. A second edition, under the name of 'Siris,' or the 'Chain,'¹ appeared a few weeks after the first. Tar-water, here proclaimed to be "of a nature so mild and benign, and proportioned to the human constitution, as to warm without heating, and to cheer but not inebriate,"² became the fashion everywhere. Manufactories of the professed panacea were established in Dublin and London, as well as in different places on the Continent and in America. Professional physicians were roused against the philosophical and ecclesiastical intruder into their province. Pamphlets were published to discredit the new medicine, and these provoked replies. A tar-water controversy ensued,—not less prolific than 'Alciphron' and the 'Analyst' had been in the controversy with the free-thinkers ten years before. The contagion spread to other countries. 'Siris' was translated into French, German, Dutch, and Portuguese. The subject was often alluded

¹ *Σειρά*, a chain—*i.e.*, of philosophical reflections about the universe.

² *Siris*, § 217. So Cowper—

"The cups

That cheer, but not inebriate, wait on each."

—The Task, B. iv. 39.

to in the correspondence and literature of the times. "A panacea," Fielding wrote ten years afterwards, "one of the greatest of scholars and best of men did lately apprehend that he had discovered. It is true he was no physician; and yet perhaps no other modern hath contributed so much to make his physical skill useful to the public. I mean the late Bishop of Cloyne, and the discovery is that of the virtues of tar water."

The popularity of 'Siris' during Berkeley's life was due not to the metaphysics so curiously engrained in it, but to its supposed discovery of a fact in physics which was to produce a revolution in medicine. The physical hypothesis passed into oblivion when experience failed to verify it, and when the promised panacea was reduced to the comparatively humble position assigned to tar and creosote in the modern pharmacopœia. With his characteristic impetuosity, Berkeley had forgotten Bacon's contrast of the two ways of searching for physical truth. "The one flies from the senses and particulars to the highest generalisations, which it too readily takes for granted, and proceeds at once to apply for the discovery of middle axioms. The other draws its principles cautiously from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it reaches the highest generalisations last of all."¹ On the other hand, the metaphysics of the supersensible which Berkeley mixed up with his medical physics, important as it is, as an even extravagant expression of the great culminating thought of his life—the Universal Agent and Intellect, the one true reality, concealed and yet revealed in Sense—was too foreign to the prevailing modes

¹ 'Novum Organum.'

of thought to engage sympathy at the time. It left no mark in the history of philosophy. And so the teaching of which 'Siris' was the final expression has descended, shorn of those very elements for the sake of which its analysis—destructive of abstractions in sense—was carried on in its early stage. It has come to be interpreted as universal immaterialism, but without its (still crude) reconstructive spiritual consciousness and intellectualism.

The tone of 'Siris' is in a marked way different from what we find in the productions of the second, and still more the first, part of Berkeley's life. With some of the old disposition to exaggerate one element in the complex constitution of our experience, there is an increase of tolerance, and a philosophical eclecticism hitherto latent. There is also less determination to see the final solution of all the difficulties of philosophy in his early conception of material things, as in themselves unsubstantial, impotent, and merely phenomenal. He recognises that there is more in the universe for the philosopher to think about than that *esse* must be *percipi*. This favourite conclusion of former years is now insinuated more modestly, as the beginning rather than the outcome of the philosopher's insight into things. Greek experience and Greek reading had taught him that the world in which we participate when we become conscious is not so easily divested of its ultimate mysteriousness as it seemed in long past days in Dublin. This feeling of its mysteriousness had indeed been growing upon him; we can trace it through 'Alciphron' and in the 'Analyst.' The attempt in 'Siris' to fly in the empyrean of pure intellect divorced from sense seems

accompanied by a feeling of intellectual collapse. It was as with "the buoyant dove" of Kant's illustration, "which, when with free wing it traverses the air of which it feels the resistance, is apt to imagine it might fly still better in the vacuum beyond." "So Plato," Kant goes on to say, "forgets and looks slightly on the sensible world, because it imposes on his reason such narrow limitations, and ventures on the wings of Ideas into the empty space of pure intellect. He has not remarked that in spite of his efforts he makes no progress, for he has no point of support on which to uphold him in his attempt to bear the understanding out of its natural place." It was so with the Berkeleyan Platonism of 'Siris.' This inability to move in the region to which he had now betaken himself, compared with his easy argumentative career when demonstrating the phenomenal nature of sensible things, disposed him more to theological and philosophical eclecticism. He welcomed religious faith in any form of thought consistent with the supremacy of Mind, immanently or externally, in the world. Altogether, in whatever way the mental change may have occurred, he looks larger and more liberal, if also more grave and mystical, in this new book, with its indistinct and undigested conceptions from the writings of ancients and moderns. He leaves us at the end with the parting thought that "in this mortal state we must be satisfied to make the best of those glimpses of truth within our reach;"—yet encouraged by his own experience to add that "the eye by long use comes to see even in the darkest cavern," and that there is "no subject so obscure but we may discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it." He has found, indeed,

that "truth is the cry of all, but the game of only a few. Certainly where it is the chief passion, it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views; nor is it contented with a little ardour in the early time of life, active perhaps to pursue, but not so fit to weigh and revise. He that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth, the later growth as well as first-fruits, at the altar of truth." Such was the spirit in which Berkeley lived at Cloyne. Instead of the vehement argumentative pursuit of one thought into logical consequences which were to resolve all philosophical differences and difficulties—as in the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge,' we have in 'Siris' an unfinished weighing and revision of the whole, in years given to much reading and contemplative thought.

A vein of melancholy becomes more discernible in the years after 'Siris' appeared. Attempts were made in vain to induce him to exchange the extreme seclusion and supposed gloom of Cloyne for episcopal preferment that would involve him more in society. But he still showed himself the same "absolute philosopher with regard to money, titles, and power," that Swift had described him more than twenty years before. "A greater income would not tempt me to remove from Cloyne," he writes to Tom Prior in 1746, "or to set aside my Oxford scheme, which was delayed by the illness of my son; yet I am as intent upon it and as much resolved as ever. The truth is, I have a scheme of my own for this long time past in which I propose more satisfaction and enjoyment to myself than I could in that high station."¹ He was "no man's rival" in

¹ The Primacy.

these matters. "I am not in love with feasts, and crowds, and visits, and late hours, and strange faces, and a hurry of affairs often insignificant. For my private satisfaction, I had rather be master of my own time than wear a diadem. As for the argument from the opportunity of doing good, I observe that duty obliges men in high stations to decline occasions of doing good, but duty doth not oblige men to solicit such high stations."

In 1751 a deep sorrow visited the beautiful home-life, in the death of the second son, William, at the age of sixteen. The loss was thought to have struck too close to his father's heart. "I was a man," so he writes,¹ "retired from the amusement of politics, visits, and what the world calls pleasure. I had a little friend, educated under mine own eye, whose painting delighted me, whose music ravished me, and whose lively gay spirit was a continual feast. It has pleased God to take him hence. God, I say, in mercy hath deprived me of this pretty gay plaything. His parts and person, his innocence and piety, his particularly uncommon affection for me, had gained too much upon me. Not content to be fond of him, I was vain of him. I had set my heart too much upon him—more, perhaps, than I ought to have done upon anything in this world."

The last of his letters which remains was addressed to Dean Gervais. It expresses the sombre sentiments with which, in April 1752, he was looking to the close of his recluse life in the "serene corner" in which he spent eighteen years. "We have often wanted your enlivening company to dissipate the gloom of Cloyne.

¹ March 8, 1751.

This I look on as enjoying France at second hand. I wish anything but the gout could fix you among us. For my own part, I submit to years and infirmities. My views in this world are mean and narrow ; it is a thing in which I have small share, and which ought to give me small concern. I abhor business, and especially to have to do with great persons and great affairs, which I leave to such as you, who delight in them and are fit for them. The evening of life I choose to pass in a quiet retreat. Ambitious projects, intrigues and quarrels of statesmen, are things I have been formerly amused with, but now they seem to be a vain, fugitive dream."

About four months after these words were written, Berkeley saw Cloyne for the last time. He had formed a new project, of which hints have already appeared in his letters. The "life academico-philosophical," which he once sought to realise in Bermuda, he now hoped to find at Oxford.

CHAPTER II.

OXFORD.

IN August 1752 Berkeley set out in quest of a retreat whose charm he had experienced during his first summer in England. He had visited Oxford forty years before. It had now for some time occupied his imagination as the ideal home of his old age. He found the desired opportunity in having sent his son George there instead of to Dublin. This confirmed the desire to spend his remaining days in indulging that passion for learned retirement which had so strong a hold of him, and was really one of the motives of his American mission. In 1724 he wanted to resign a deanery, if it should interfere with what he longed for in Bermuda: he wanted now to resign a bishopric, that he might realise the beautiful vision in Oxford. He first tried to exchange Cloyne for an Oxford headship or canonry. Failing in this, he put an unconditional resignation in the hands of the Secretary of State. The oddness of the proposal excited the curiosity of George the Second. When the king discovered by whom it was made, he said that Berkeley should die a bishop in spite of himself, but that he might live where he pleased. And now in this month of

August, in 1752, we find him with his wife and daughter on their way to the city of colleges, in the fair vale of the Isis and Cherwell, so dear to sensibilities like his, with gathered memories of a thousand years.

He made his Will a few days before he left Cloyne, bequeathing any property he might have to his wife, with the characteristic injunction that "the expense of his funeral should not exceed twenty pounds."¹ As it happened, any property he left was the scanty residue possible at the end of a life of large-hearted munificence, with its favourite motto—*non sibi sed toti*. One curious provision, requiring his body to be kept five days above ground, or longer, before it is buried, "even till it grow offensive by the cadaverous smell," shows that he had somehow conceived the possibility of being buried alive.² When he left Cork in the ship which carried his wife, his daughter, and himself to Bristol, he was prostrated by weakness, and had to be taken from the landing-place to Oxford on a horse-litter.³ It was on the 25th August that the little party from Cloyne saw the domes and church towers around their new home, amidst the soft repose of the rural English scenery which he loved.

Our picture of Berkeley at Oxford is dim. According

¹ See 'Works,' vol. iv. p. 345.

² Perhaps on the suggestion of a curious little book I have lately stumbled upon, which had appeared in Dublin a few years before he died, entitled,—'The Uncertainty of the Signs of Death, and the Danger of Precipitate Interments Demonstrated' (Dublin, 1748). It contains a number of cases of persons thus buried alive, "and directions for preventing such accidents," almost in the words of Berkeley's Will.

³ His friend Bishop Butler died at Bath, as it happened, a few weeks before this landing at Bristol.

to tradition, he lived with his family in a house in Holywell Street, near the gardens of New College, and not far from the cloisters of Magdalen. Oxford itself, in the middle of the eighteenth century, was living on the inherited glories of the past. Among the residents in 1752 hardly any name suggests more than mediocrity. His friend Dr Conybeare was Dean of Christ Church, and to him he had intrusted his son. Secker had now been bishop of Oxford for many years, and spent his summers at Cuddesden and his winters in London. A few years earlier Adam Smith had gone to study at Oxford; and in the spring of this year Edward Gibbon entered Magdalen to spend fourteen months,—according to his own account, “the most idle and unprofitable in his whole life.” The torpor of the place was beginning to be moved by Wesley, whose sermons in St Mary’s had denounced with evangelical fervour the frivolous life of the University. Through him and others Oxford became the source of the revival of one of the three schools of religious life, which it is the glory of the Church of Hooker and Andrewes and Cudworth to unite within its ample fold; and the life of the other two was afterwards restored from the same academic centre by Newman and Arnold.

Berkeley resumed study at Oxford in improved health. In October a ‘Miscellany containing several Tracts,’ by the Bishop of Cloyne, appeared in London and Dublin. Except one, ‘Farther Thoughts on Tar-Water,’ it consisted of reprints of the ‘De Motu’ and other short pieces. A third edition of ‘Alciphron’ was published about the same time. This edition is remarkable for omitting the sections in the seventh dialogue which con-

tain a defence of the early phenomenalist Nominalism, now out of harmony with the Platonic Realism and supersensible philosophy of 'Siris.'

Nothing remains to show how far his domestic seclusion in Holywell Street realised the dream of an academic retreat. At any rate the realisation did not last long: he suddenly realised instead the mystery of death. On the evening of Sunday the 14th of January 1753 he passed away without any warning. His son told Dr Johnson,¹ in the most authentic account we have of the event, that,—“as he was sitting with my mother, sister, and myself, suddenly, and without the least previous notice or pain, he was removed to the enjoyment of eternal rewards; and although all possible means were instantly used, no symptom of life ever appeared after. He had arrived at Oxford on the 25th of August, and had received great benefit from the change of air, and by God's blessing on tar-water, insomuch that for some years he had not been in better health than he was the instant before he left us.”

Six days after he died, he was buried in the Cathedral of Christ Church.

¹ In a letter dated Christ Church, October 16, 1753. See Beardsley's 'Life of Johnson,' p. 174—in which this interesting letter appeared for the first time, in 1874.

CHAPTER III.

SIRIS AND THE SUPERSENSIBLE.

THE third and latest stage of Berkeley's philosophical development is reached in 'Siris.' This is his last word in a life-long endeavour—often interrupted by movements from place to place, and by pursuit of social ideals—to reach the essentially reasonable view of things in which philosophy should consist, and towards which the different speculative systems of the world may be regarded as so many approximations. In exploring 'Siris,' we naturally ask how far Berkeley's philosophic insight carried him; and whether, as there seen in its final stage, it contributes any element of lasting value to the common stock of the world's philosophical endeavours. A true and complete philosophy must be in harmony with all the facts of our complex, intellectual and moral, experience. A new system deserves acceptance, in proportion as it agrees with itself, and with the essential parts of this experience: it deserves credit in proportion to the energy of belief by which it is then animated.

'Siris,' Berkeley used to say, cost him more meditative thought and studious reading than any of his other

books. This does not surprise one who examines its contents. It contains much that has been gathered on remote by-ways of past philosophy, as well as on the main tracks. A growing inclination towards Platonism, in its Neoplatonic mystical form, and an affectionate sympathy with Greek ways of thinking, are manifest on almost every page. The physical hypothesis of the universal efficacy of tar-water, encouraged by daily companionship with Plato and the Neoplatonists, led him, by subtle transitions, from the vital essence of plants and animals to the vital spirit of the universe; from that to the necessary dependence of all merely phenomenal causation on what transcends nature; and at last to the intuition of the whole phenomenal world, organic as well as inorganic, as realisable for reason only in and through Spirit. The outcome of 'Siris' is a struggle to apprehend supreme Intellect or Spirit, as the ground of that intelligibility of the phenomenal things of sense which had engaged the eager argumentative activity of the youth in Trinity College. This mental struggle finds expression in the curious "chain" of aphorisms, about the interpretability of sensuous phenomena; about the dependence of space and time upon the contents of an experience which must be placed and dated, in order to a rational construction of its meaning; about the essential unreasonableness of a universe grounded in unintelligent fate; about the impossibility of satisfying the philosophising reason otherwise than by acknowledging, in one form or other, free rational Will, as the external, or at least the immanent, cause of all; and about the inexplicable mystery of triune Deity. Whether the Mind thus supreme is "abstracted

from the external world, and to be considered by itself, as distinct from and presiding over the created system ;" or whether "the whole universe, including mind together with the mundane body, is conceived to be God, and the creatures to be partial manifestations of the divine essence"—there is "no atheism," he is ready to grant, "in either case, whatever misconceptions there may be—so long as Mind or Intellect is understood to preside over, govern, and conduct the whole frame of things." In either way we have, within the transitory things of sense, a natural order that is steady, and a higher government going on, with a moral purpose that is absolute. This Eternal Fact, however it may be expressed in thought, is what is meant by God.

The change of the point of view in 'Siris' is from negation to construction. Instead of the argumentative unsubstantiation of phenomenal things, we have now Spirit as the foundation and practical realisation of all. This change was accompanied by a significant verbal change. What in the 'Treatise on Human Knowledge' are called "ideas" are in 'Siris' called "phenomena." "Idea," on the other hand, is used in 'Siris' almost always in its Platonic meaning. The early phenomenalistic Nominalism—expressed by the use of "idea" in a meaning that is strange to us—is here transformed into a Platonic Realism, in which Berkeley often appears as if struggling to reach a knowledge that is empty, because the help of the sensuous imagination has been withdrawn. The Ideas of 'Siris' are not like the "ideas" of Locke ; nor yet like Berkeley's own "ideas of sense," whose *esse* is *percipi*—"inert, inactive objects of perception." They are "self-existent, necessary, active prin-

ciples." Neither are they the "abstract ideas" against which he argued so vehemently at Trinity College and long after. As "abstract," these were not phenomena of sense or imagination; and yet as Lockian ideas they were phenomena. The inconsistency of a phenomenal representation of universality Berkeley was then fond of exposing. But the "Ideas" of 'Siris' are very different. They are "most real beings, intellectual and unchangeable; and therefore more real than the fleeting, transient objects of sense, which, wanting stability, cannot be objects of science, much less of intellectual knowledge." The most refined human intellect, exerted to its utmost reach, can only seize "some imperfect glimpses" of the Ideas now dawning upon him, obscured as they are in this mortal life of sense by things corporeal and imaginable.

The text on which the metaphysical part of 'Siris' is a commentary, is the principle—assumed to be self-evident—that law and system in nature must itself be caused—must be the manifestation of eternally active Universal Mind. The occasion for commenting on this text was a supposed biological law, according to which the vital element contained in tar is the "cause" of healthy life in a diseased animal organism into which it is introduced in combination with water. This, if really a law of nature, would be an example of the merely phenomenal causation with which alone biology can be concerned. All the laws in nature are examples of this sort of causation. It makes what we call Nature. The philosophical question which lies behind this is, Whether people are rightly said to find causality at all

in the merely phenomenal conditions that are thus called causes? These, no doubt, it is the prime office of students of physical and biological science to ascertain; in so doing they interpret nature, as nature now exists, charged with its great unfulfilled prophecies. Is the discovery of these prophecies, however, the discovery of what is *ultimately* involved in causation and power? Can we properly be said to have satisfied the search for cause, when we have only found that the phenomena of sense, or the conscious states and acts, about whose origin we are curious, issue as natural sequences from certain antecedent phenomena in inorganic or organic bodies?

The often-repeated answer to this question given in 'Siris' is, that we can in no instance whatever say that "cause" has been found when only phenomenal conditions, organic or otherwise, have been found. The phenomenal antecedent is itself, in every case, an effect. Each phenomenal "cause" is itself only a caused, and therefore not the real, cause; for it presupposes phenomenal antecedents or conditions, without which it could not itself exist; and these in turn presuppose still ulterior phenomenal antecedents, as their conditions, without which they could not be manifested; and so on, in an endless regress. But the greatest of all *effects* is that the whole phenomenal world is in fact thus connected as the system of interpretable signs we call Nature. If it were not so connected it would not be a world; there could be no such thing as experience; at least the experience would be insane, unintelligible, chaotic. Everything then would be independent of everything else; indeed there could be

no phenomenal thing at all, for each phenomenon would be independent of every other, isolated, and therefore incapable of making a part of a real thing. The "world," after the withdrawal of phenomenal concatenation, would at once dissolve, and its present reality would disappear in unintelligible impressions.—Still, the web of phenomenal connection that is presupposed in science, and in ordinary experience too, does not comprehend within it, according to Berkeley, the unphenomenal cause which we are in quest of, when we seek philosophically for the rational meaning of events. Real power cannot be found among phenomena, nor in phenomenal organisms. Events in sense no doubt send us in quest of it. But the established rules which the things of sense and their events obey, instead of satisfying us in this quest, are only so much added to the sum of the facts that demand explanation. The true seat of power and causality is within the veil. It is in the supersensible or transcendent; not among phenomena, nor in the world of phenomenal experience. Can we follow it within the veil?

That depends upon the possibility of our having, either a sort of knowledge that is unphenomenal, or else a faith that transcends both the data of the senses and faith in merely physical law. The answer, in short, presumes a philosophical theory of human knowledge. Berkeley did not attempt what Kant tried afterwards: he did not deliberately set himself to settle the boundary within which "knowledge" must be confined, in order to be real knowledge. Kant did this, and announced that on trial he had found the way to all supposed transcendent reality barred—that there was no scope for the

functions of the understanding, in elaborating real knowledge, a single step beyond phenomena and phenomenal things. Intellect, according to Kant, has objective validity only so far as there are aspects of existence presented, for it to enter into and convert into real knowledge. Whenever men try to think beyond this boundary, thought must collapse ; there can be no reality in the supposed knowledge got. The causal craving, accordingly, is confined within this sphere. We are obliged, as rational beings, to assume a phenomenal parent, or caused cause, in a chain of natural causation, for each new phenomenal birth ; and we are forbidden, with a due regard to our own limits, to go outside the sphere of phenomenal or caused causes, in quest of the free or terminating cause. If we do so, we are warned that, as we have then parted from the matter which gives reality to our conceptions, our judgments must become empty and invalid, leaving us without ground for either affirmation or denial.

Berkeley has no conception of this sort of intellectual criticism. In the absence of it, his position is not easy to define ; nor the evidence on which he rests in his flight in 'Siris' into the world beyond sense. He seems to say that we have supersensible experience, and to imply that he had secured footing within the supersensible region, in the common sense conviction of his own spiritual existence, with which, like Descartes, he had started in his principles of human knowledge. For he had steadily maintained that we are conscious of ourselves as spirits—conscious, too, of our spiritual individuality and continued identity. He had thus found in *himself* a first, free, and unphenomenal cause.¹ He had

¹ He so guarded himself that Hume's universal scepticism is no

latterly expressed this, by saying that, though we can have no "idea" of ourselves as spirits—for a self is not a phenomenon—yet we have a "notion" which we connect with the personal pronouns; we know what "I" means, and also what "you" means. This unphenomenal knowledge of spirit, which Kant afterwards repudiated, was the bridge over which Berkeley passed, from the purely passive world of phenomenal things and phenomenal causes, in which exclusively natural science has its home, into the world of free spiritual agency, where alone there is rest and satisfaction for the causal tendency. He might, perhaps, have agreed now to put it thus:—The craving for a cause, which originates in the moral consciousness of self, is evoked by the spectacle of phenomenal changes. This obliges us to assume the orderliness or intelligibility of their coexistence and succession in a system of nature. But man cannot find final satisfaction in natural order. The search for causes among phenomena would be an infinite search; for each phenomenal cause must be in turn an effect. To explain the rationality of the whole spectacle, we must turn to reason or spirit, from which we started in common consciousness with Descartes. We find in the macrocosm only what we at first found in embryo in the microcosm—objective Spirit or Reason, in which our

legitimate expansion of the "Principles of Human Knowledge." Berkeley presents himself as an advocate of the common sense or common consciousness in two respects. (1.) In his acknowledgment of faith—immediate, or at least implied in moral experience—in the transcendent reality of individual agency. (2.) In maintaining—also as ineradicable faith—that sensible things, as given in the senses, are *only* phenomenal things; and that we perceive them *immediately*, in their phenomenal reality, and do not need to prove this by reasoning.

own individual spirit may be said to participate, and of which we had experience in the primary act of knowledge, when we found anchorage in our own spiritual reality.

It is through the rational faith in causality that the phenomenal things of sense are so concatenated, in subordination to Spirit, that there is phenomenal connection between the present, the past, and the future. Without this connecting principle, which is the essence of reasonableness, not only is natural order at an end, but the individual things of sense themselves must dissolve in chaos. The particular manner of their constitution, and the particular laws according to which they resolve into a physical system, are no doubt "arbitrary"—if by this is meant, that the constitution might be conceived to be different, and the laws other than they actually are. But that there should be constitution and law of some kind among phenomena is not an arbitrary alternative. It is, on the contrary, a necessity that is implied in the fact that Reason or Intellect is at the root of all. It is the result of the phenomenal world being, in itself and in its constitution and laws, dependent on Spirit. There may be no absolute or rational necessity in the present phenomenal connections: there is rational necessity, however, for the existence of phenomenal connection of some sort; for this is involved in the conviction of the supremacy of Spirit, which is the primitive voice of conscious man. The principle of causality, so understood, is the universal form of the original fact out of which human knowledge arises, which Berkeley thus reaffirmed after Descartes, and then universalised.


Our discoveries of the particular phenomenal connec-

tions of coexistence and succession, which now hold good in nature, Berkeley had, years before, expressly referred to sense and its "suggestions." The intellectual obligation to refer the phenomenal world and all its actual connections to a hyper-phenomenal cause, efficient and final, was recognised by him as due to intellect proper, as distinguished from the tendency to suggest, produced by custom. "To be suggested," he had already said in the 'Vindication of Visual Language,' "is one thing, and to be inferred is another. Things are suggested and perceived by sense; we make judgments and inferences by the understanding. We infer causes (proper) from effects, effects from causes (proper), and properties one from another, where the connection is necessary."¹ In all this there was an approach to the more emphatic recognition of reason, as an element presupposed in sense, and superior to mere sense, which became transparent in 'Sirius.'

Here are some expressions by which in 'Sirius' the supersensible realities of intellect and the spiritual world, which alone give stability and cohesion to the world of nature, are enforced, in what is really an appeal to our ultimate philosophical faith:—

"Though it be supposed the chief business of a natural philosopher to trace out causes from their effects, yet this is to be understood not of agents, but of component parts in one sense, or of laws or rules in another. In strict truth all agents are incorporeal, and as such are not properly of physical consideration. . . . The mechanical philosopher inquires properly concerning the rules or modes of operation alone, and not concerning the cause; forasmuch as nothing

¹ 'Works,' vol. i. p. 389.



mechanical is or really can be a cause. . . . It passeth with many, I know not how, that mechanical principles give a clear solution of the phenomena. The Democritie hypothesis, saith Dr Cudworth, doth more handsomely and intelligibly solve the phenomena than that of Aristotle or Plato. But things rightly considered, perhaps it will not be found to solve any phenomena at all. . . . Those principles do not solve—if by solving is meant assigning the real, either efficient or final cause of appearances, but only reduce them to general rules. There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity in the phenomena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules : and these rules are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the visible world whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pass in the natural course of things. . . . As this natural connection of signs with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of rational discourse, and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent cause.”

What may be called biological psychology of course, on this view, shares the fate of all other professedly philosophical or ultimate, but really scientific and merely natural, explanations. The “modes of motion of the cerebral substance,” of which Professor Huxley speaks,¹ may be connected, as sign and thing signified, with correlative states of consciousness. An established connection of this sort, however, even if it could be verified of every conscious act and state through which man passes, only constitutes one set of rules in the system of effects called nature, as nature goes on under the usual phenomenal conditions. It does not carry us a step towards the power to which this and every other part of nature’s phenomenal language is to be referred ; though

¹ See Huxley’s ‘Hume,’ pp. 76-82.

the latent prophecies with which in this instance our organism would be charged might be put to much useful account, in the medical management of our bodies. And this is so, whether we read the phenomena in terms of matter and motion or in terms of sensations. Sensations are in themselves as far from proper power or causality as motions are. They are as remote as motions themselves from Idealism proper, and from moral or unphenomenal causality.

Philosophy, with Berkeley, ever turns its eye towards the hyper-phenomenal reality. It had been the endeavour of his early life to dispel the supposition of an active intervening medium called "matter." But throughout, what he really wanted to do was, to show the irrationality of absolute independence of Mind being attributed to this supposed active medium. Its present "activity," he tried to demonstrate, must be a dependent activity; but if all so-called "action" throughout the phenomenal world of sense were acknowledged to be ultimately the action of Mind or Spirit, he would probably have been satisfied with this acknowledgment, as a sufficient unsubstantiation of matter.

Nor does he mean that all the action in the universe is the action of one Supreme Spirit, which would thus become one Supreme Substance, in itself neither Spirit nor Matter. Berkeley professed to find other spiritual agents besides God. He did not intend to reduce all to God and phenomena. On the contrary, unlike Spinoza, he recognised the existence of free agents, finite yet responsible, subject to a moral government conducted through the medium of the phenomenal order. In referring, for instance, to the motion of the heart and

other organs of the body—while objecting to the hypothesis that “unknowing nature” is their cause—he adds that “the true inference is, that the self-thinking individual or human person is *not* the real author of these natural motions.” Why? Because, “in fact, no man blames *himself* if they are wrong, or values *himself* if they are right.”¹ These words make personal responsibility the test for distinguishing the agency of finite spirits from the agency of the Supreme Spirit or Universal Mind.

While Berkeley’s eye was thus turned to the supersensible, towards which he was making ready to take his intellectual flight, he felt the difficulty of the position, and the impediments in the way of the ascent:—

“Human souls in this low situation, bordering on mere animal life, bear the weight and see through the dusk of a gross atmosphere, gathered from wrong judgments daily passed, false opinions daily learned, and early habits of an older date than either judgment or opinion. Through such a medium the sharpest eye cannot see clearly. And if by some extraordinary effort the mind should surmount this dusky region, and snatch a glimpse of pure light, she is soon drawn backwards, and depressed by the heaviness of the animal nature to which she is chained. And if again she chanceth, amidst the agitations of wild fancies and strong affections, to spring upwards, a second relapse speedily succeeds into this region of darkness and dreams. Nevertheless, as the mind gathers strength by repeated acts, we should not despond, but continue to exert the prime and flower of our faculties, still recovering, and reaching on, and struggling into the upper region, whereby our natural weakness and blindness may be in some degree remedied, and a taste attained of truth and intellectual life.”²

¹ ‘Works,’ vol. ii. p. 461.

² *Ibid.*, p. 498.

'Siris' is the philosophy of Causation, *first* in its scientific or physical, and *next* in its metaphysical or theological phase.¹ The whole book is devoted to this correlation and contrast.

Throughout the former half at least of the book, we contemplate phenomena of sense undergoing transformation into other phenomena of sense, in a steady succession of orderly metamorphoses. This is the language of nature, of which positive science is the interpretation. The other or spiritual side of existence is then turned towards us. We are there made to see as through a glass darkly the phenomenal causes, which are not real causes but effects of causes, resolving themselves into the unity of reason, in unphenomenal cause or power; and with this side theology or metaphysics has to do. Thus there is the scientific way of looking at the universe, in which it is seen to be a system of significant, and therefore interpretable, appearances; a language that is arbitrary, inasmuch as it might have been, or may become, different from what it now is—but which, by necessity of reason, must be language of some sort; for unless the appearances were also trustworthy signs there could be no such thing as experience. Then there is the moral or spiritual intuition and trust. Towards this we are struggling when we aspire beyond interpretable phenomena that can be placed and dated, and look towards the universal rational agency in which they all centre; itself uncaused, and therefore causally inexplicable, since for Reason no reason can be given other than itself. The conception

¹ Some might object to this extension of the word "cause," but that is a matter of verbal concern.

of causality, *first* applied to the phenomenal universe, thus becomes *at last* the most general expression for faith in the reality, transcendent or at least immanent, of Eternal Spirit or Reason. He who supposes all things to be ordered rationally or by mind, should not pretend to assign any other necessary cause for them.¹ The rationality of the order is itself sufficient for reason and philosophic faith.

It follows on this interpretation of causality, which seems to contain the rudiments of truth, that scientific imagination and faith—concerned with coexistence and succession among phenomena of sense, and religious imagination and faith—concerned with spiritual life and moral agency,—must be in harmony, when each works within its sphere. The conjectured laws of phenomenal evolution, and of endless integrations and disintegrations of the phenomenal universe, or indeed any supposed laws in nature (if verified), are as little at variance with a theological conception of things as the law of gravitation. Yet an eye for merely physical causation deadens insight, in sincere lovers of truth, for the facts and necessary conditions of our moral experience, which transcend phenomenal science; in the same way as, at an opposite extreme, the one-sided religious faith of other lovers of truth repudiates, as atheistic materialism, the uniformity of physical law, and the phenomenal dependence of consciousness in man upon correlative functions of the human organism.

The contrast and correlation of Sense and Intellect is another way of expressing the double aspect of causation; and the train of thought in 'Siris' often assumes

¹ 'Siris'—*passim*.

this form. Some pregnant expressions are used when it does so. Here is one which, in anticipation of Kant, implies that even science and common experience involve uniting reason :—

“Strictly the sense knows nothing. We perceive indeed sounds by hearing, and characters by sight. But we are not therefore said to understand them. After the same manner, the phenomena of nature are alike visible to all; but all have not alike learned the connection of natural things, or understand what they signify, or know how to vaticinate by them.”¹

Again :—

“Sense and experience acquaint us with [*i.e.*, accustom us to] the course and analogy of appearances or natural effects. Thought, reason, intellect introduce us into the knowledge of their causes. Sensible appearances, though of a flowing, unstable, and uncertain nature, yet having first occupied the mind, they do, by an easy prevention, render the after-task of thought more difficult; and as they amuse the eyes and ears, and are more suited to vulgar uses and the mechanic arts of life, they easily obtain a preference, in the opinion of most men, to those superior principles, which are the later growth of the human mind arrived to maturity and perfection; but, not affecting the corporeal sense, are thought to be so far deficient in point of solidity and reality—sensible and real, to common apprehensions, being the same thing. Although it be certain that the principles of science are neither objects of sense nor imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to truth.”²

The immanence in sense of supreme reason or intellect seems almost involved in some turns of expression in ‘*Siris*.’ Nature is “reason immersed in

¹ ‘*Works*,’ vol. ii. p. 460.

² *Ibid.*, p. 464.

matter ;" philosophy is the endeavour fully to disengage the immanent reason. Existence is reason entering into sense. Without its presence sense is unintelligible ; without phenomena of some sort reason is only latent. The thought, when it takes this form, struggles for adequate expression :—

"Comprehending God and the creatures in one general notion, we may say that all things together make one universe, or τὸ πᾶν. But if we should say that all things make one God;—this would indeed be an erroneous notion of God, but would not amount to atheism, as long as mind or intellect was admitted to be τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, the governing part. It is, nevertheless, more respectful, and consequently the truer notion of God, to suppose Him neither made up of parts, nor to be Himself a part of any whole whatever. All those who conceived the universe to be an animal, must, in consequence of that notion, suppose all things to be One. But to conceive God to be the sentient soul of an animal is altogether unworthy and absurd. There is no sense nor sensory, nor anything like a sense or sensory, in God. Sense implies an impression from some other being, and denotes a dependence in the soul which hath it. Sense is a passion : and passions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things as pure mind or intellect ; but nothing by sense, nor in nor through a sensory."¹

It is not so with intellect or reason in man. "We are embodied." Intellect in us is at present conditioned by the phenomenal things we call our bodies. In passages in 'Siris,' there is a transition from contemplation of pure Intellect or God to contemplation of intellect as finite men share in it, which reminds the reader of sentences in Pascal :—

¹ 'Works,' vol. ii. p. 476.

"Man is a compound of contrarieties, which breed a restless struggle in his nature, between flesh and spirit, the beast and the angel, earth and heaven, ever weighed down and ever bearing up. . . . It is the same in regard to our faculties. Sense at first besets and overbears the mind. The sensible appearances are all in all: our reasonings are employed about them: our desires terminate in them: we look no further for realities or causes;—till intellect begins to dawn, and cast a ray on this shadowy scene. We then perceive the true principle of unity, identity, and existence. Those things that before seemed to constitute the whole of Being, upon taking an intellectual view of things, prove to be but fleeting phantoms."¹

As men rise from the life of sense towards the reason that is found to shine in and through sense, they approach that union with God which is the chief end of man. Berkeley finds this Divine or Universal Reason at the root of our personal being or spiritual individuality—as he ascends on the chain in which "each lower faculty in us is a step that leads to one above it,"—the uppermost bringing us to God, who *is* Reason. There is that in us, he insists, which is not given by sense; though it is in us only in a latent state, till it is awakened by reflection, so that "this sort of learning seemeth in effect reminiscence." Ideas are not innate, if an idea means a phenomenon; but the rational constitution of things is innate in that intellect which we share with God. Here is a pregnant passage in this connection:—

"Aristotle held that the mind of man was a *tabula rasa*, and that there were no innate ideas. Plato, on the contrary,

¹ 'Works,' vol. ii. p. 478.

held original ideas in the mind;—*i.e.*, notions which never were or can be in the sense. . . . Some perhaps may think the truth to be this :—that there are properly no ideas [*i.e.*, phenomena], or passive objects, in the mind but what were derived from sense ; but that there are also besides these her own acts or operations. . . . This notion seemeth somewhat different from that of innate ideas, as understood by those moderns [*e.g.*, Locke] who have attempted to explode them.”¹

The account given in ‘*Siris*’ of what psychologists call “faculties” of cognition in man is in harmony with all this :—

“The perceptions of sense are gross. . . . By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the soul ; and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or ascent, we arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to memory. These become subjects for fancy to work upon. Reason considers and judges of the imaginations. And these acts of reason become new objects of the understanding. In this scale each lower faculty is a step that leads to one above it. And the uppermost naturally leads to the Deity ; which is rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of the discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive.”²

Some of the most beautiful expressions in ‘*Siris*’ are those which describe the “restlessness” of the finite mind of man, when—becoming obscurely conscious of participation in the universalising intellect—he strives to shake off the slumber in which he is, through sense, disposed to remain, so as to “recover the lost region of light,” but in which a “perfect intuition” of the supreme intellectual order is granted to be unattainable.

‘*Siris*’ so much magnifies causation and philosophy

¹ ‘*Works*,’ vol. ii. pp. 484, 485.

² *Ibid.*, p. 482.

on the transcendent side, that the phenomenal almost disappears. The light of the Universal Mind shines so brightly, that there is less need for unsubstantiating and reducing to impotence the "active medium" called Matter, by which it had been obscured. Now and then, however, Berkeley's thoughts return to the old groove, as he finds support for them in the insight of earlier thinkers. Thus he brings Aristotle as well as Plato to defend the proposition that "actual knowledge and the thing known are all one"—otherwise expressed by Parmenides, when he taught that "to understand and to be are the same thing." Again,—“As to an absolute actual existence of sensible or corporeal things, it doth not seem to have been admitted either by Plato or Aristotle.” And if passages are found in Aristotle which appear to imply that the phenomenal objects of sense exist independently of mind, he reminds us that Aristotle distinguishes “a twofold existence—potential and actual. It will not, therefore, follow that, because a thing *is*, it must *actually* exist.”¹ There is a *potential* existence which things have, distinct from their actual or intelligible existence, as significant phenomena interpreted by us. For they exist in Supreme Intellect and Will; and this unphenomenal existence is only potential, relatively to individual human minds.

The relative and dependent, because phenomenal, character of Space is as favourite a thought as ever in ‘Siris,’ but less is said about the phenomenal and created existence of Time. “Natural phenomena” are

¹ ‘Works,’ vol. ii. p. 486.

pronounced to be "only natural appearances. They are therefore such as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective¹ natures are therefore the same—passive without anything active, fluent and changing without anything permanent in them." Yet "they are not only first considered by all men, but most considered by most men. They and the phantoms that result from those appearances—the children of imagination grafted upon sense—such, for example, as pure space—are thought by many the very first in existence and stability,—and to embrace and comprehend all other beings."² When Berkeley, as here, uses the word "space," he does not mean a huge entity that has an actual existence independently of phenomena and conscious spirit, within which God and the universe are contained. Space with him, so far as it has a positive meaning, is the coexistence of actual sense impressions, or of potential ones measured by successions of sensations; negatively, it is the absence of sense impressions. Time is change in the states and acts of which we are conscious; negatively, it is the absence of such changes.

After all, perhaps this is only a paradoxical way of expressing what has been felt, and expressed in other ways, by deep thinkers from Plato to Kant. According to Kant, time and space relations have no ontological reality. They are only necessary preconditions of our becoming conscious of phenomena as objects. Berkeley does not say this; for, instead of their necessity, he dwells upon their arbitrariness, their being the issue of creative will rather than necessary involvements of

¹ "Objective"—*i.e.*, phenomenal or apparent.

² 'Works,' vol. ii. p. 477.

finite experience. But with Berkeley, as with Kant, space and time are virtually relations among phenomena, or mental functions limited by the horizon of the phenomenal world. They are not boundless external entities; individual experience is their limit in the actual; and neither an actual nor a potential infinity can be predicated of them ontologically.

Berkeley and Kant, each in his own way, thus far close those sublime avenues towards the Infinite that seemed to open, in our convictions of the Boundlessness, as a matter of fact, by which our bodies are surrounded, and of the Endlessness, as a matter of fact, within which our mortal lives are contained. A sense of these was a powerful incitement to the metaphysical imagination of Pascal, for instance, and it has been a means of rousing dormant reflection on the ultimate meaning of things, in many minds inferior to his. Men feel the fascination of their little spots in space, and their infinitesimal periods in time, being actually parts of what, as boundless, becomes unimaginable in one relation; as infinitely divisible, unimaginable in another. It is thus that thought has found exercise for itself, in vainly applying the category of quantity to the Infinite. The "space" about which we speak—whose finite place relations man practically understands; and the time about which we speak—whose dates and other finite relations man can also understand—we find, when we try, that we are intellectually obliged to lose, the one in a Boundlessness that is inconsistent with the very imagination of place, and the other in an Endlessness that transcends all dates.

Yet Berkeley's ways of thinking on this subject and

also Kant's, lead us by other routes than the common one to a similar goal. All alike seem to carry thought towards a point at which place and date, space and time, as quantities, are withdrawn from God or Supreme Intellect; and also from reality at the Divine point of view. They are all different ways of asserting that these perceptions belong to a lower sphere, and that they awaken the sense of sublimity from their very impotence. They are ways of showing that God is not within the space which loses itself in Boundlessness, nor within the time which loses itself in Endlessness. This is just to say that for God, or in the Perfect Thought, place disappears, and past, present, and future times are nothing; or, otherwise, it is to say that space and time are only modes of representation for finite conscious beings, which have no account when things are viewed, as man cannot view them, *sub specie eternitatis*. Men image things according to their finitude, but not as they are in themselves. For God or Supreme Intellect, things exist neither placed nor dated; but how they so exist we cannot tell, unless we can pass in imagination beyond quantitative space into Boundlessness, and beyond periods of time into Endlessness. Are not space and time thus constant evidence that man cannot mentally realise existence according to the Divine Thought—that our placing and dating intelligence must be inadequate to the placeless and dateless Intellect?

CHAPTER IV.

SCEPTICISM—AGNOSTICISM—GNOSTICISM—FAITH.

SOME years before the death of Berkeley, his immaterialism, and the assault on metaphysical abstractions with which it was connected, were spoken of eulogistically in two works, which attracted little attention on their first appearance; although they gave rise afterwards to the chief revolution that has occurred in the methods and conceptions of modern philosophy, since its birth in the writings of Descartes. David Hume's 'Treatise of Human Nature' was published in 1739; his 'Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding' followed in 1748. In these books the influence of Berkeley's peculiar way of thinking, upon a philosophic mind of extraordinary power, was for the first time distinctly perceptible. That influence had previously appeared only in the forgotten criticisms of men not strong enough to affect the main current of European philosophical opinion.

It is curious that although when Berkeley died the 'Treatise of Human Nature' had been before the world for fourteen years, and the 'Inquiry' for four years, and though both, along with allusions to Berkeley,¹ were

¹ For instance, in the 'Treatise of Human Nature' (B. I. Pt. i.

full of discussions which went to the root of materialism and the theory of causation, yet no allusion to Hume is found in any of Berkeley's writings. There is indeed no evidence that Hume was known to him even by name. On the other hand, the important statements about Berkeley made by the Scotch philosopher refer only to his early writings. The 'Essay on Vision,' the fragment on 'Human Knowledge,' and the 'Three Dialogues,' were obviously familiar to the author of the 'Treatise of Human Nature.' It does not appear that he had heard of 'Siris.' At any rate, if he had, it was probably on account of its tar-water nostrum; not

sect. 7), where he pronounces the phenomenalist nominalism of Berkeley "one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters." In the 'Inquiry' (vol. ii., Note N) he observes that most of the writings of Berkeley "form the best lessons in scepticism which are to be found among the ancient and modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted." In thus transforming Berkeley into an unconscious sceptic, Hume ignores the Berkeleyan appeal to common sense on behalf of the beliefs (a) that the interpretable phenomena of sense, viewed objectively, are the real things; and (b) that in his moral consciousness of *himself*, as a free self-acting spiritual person, each of us reaches the ontological reality of substance and cause, and the spiritual basis of things—the datum universalised in 'Siris.' Sense phenomenism is only the introduction to Berkeley's spiritual philosophy. If it were the whole of it, he might be classed with the agnostics, or even the sceptics. And with reference to identity and causal connection, Hume himself confessed, in a passage already referred to, that "the difficulty was too hard" for his understanding. "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions."—(Appendix to vol. iii. p. 305 of 'Treatise of Human Nature.' Compare this with vol. i. pp. 436-457.) It is difficult to determine to what extent Hume meant in the end to allow "faith" to be read into his professed scepticism. (J. S. Mill was arrested by a like difficulty in the way of pan-phenomenalism, and the reduction of Mind to "a series of feelings." See his 'Examination of Hamilton,' pp. 241, 242, third ed.)

certainly as the repository of principles which subordinate to themselves the phenomenalist immaterialism prominent in the little volumes that emanated from Trinity College in Dublin.

Still Hume must be regarded as immediately following Berkeley in the philosophical succession of European thought. The next great intellectual move was made by him. It consisted in an expansion or exaggeration of the one part of his predecessor's theory, which Hume had come to regard as the whole. Hume was also Berkeley's only immediate successor in subtle genius and intrepid philosophical analysis. In the two books already named, he pursued, with kindred ingenuity and acuteness, to extreme negative and sceptical issues, the war against metaphysical abstractions in sense, on which Berkeley had entered with the ardour of youth, as the means of clearing the way to a vision of the super-sensible. Berkeley's assault upon abstractions, with his destructive criticism of mathematical quantity, and of an independent material world, had probably more than anything else to do with the intellectual awakening of Hume, and with the direction taken by his thoughts. Hume in his turn set modern thought on the lines on which we find it at the present day. This has happened, partly through the discipleship of those now called Positivists or Agnostics, who have possessed themselves of his heritage; partly, however, through the antagonist reconstructive activity which his sceptical dissolution of knowledge aroused. And the antagonism has worked either in the name of common sense or the ineradicable beliefs of mankind, as in Reid; or in the name of speculative and practical reason—of what

is necessary to our thought and to our moral agency, as in Kant.

Berkeley's latest phase of thought, given in 'Siris,' and Hume's publication of his sceptical disintegration of all knowledge, both fall within the third or Cloyne period of Berkeley's life; but the work of each, in this period of their lives, remained unaffected by and unaffecteding the work of the other. Yet the 'Treatise of Human Nature' and 'Siris,' both in their way works of genius, were significant facts in the historical sequel. Berkeley, Hume, Reid, and Kant, are four representative names in the philosophy of the eighteenth century. They are connected in rational as well as in chronological succession. The three last had reached middle life when Berkeley died. Hume, indeed, had then ended his course as a speculative philosopher; but Reid and Kant were only beginning to publish their thoughts. The three names were all unknown to Berkeley when he so suddenly passed away at Oxford.

About that time other names of historic importance, representative men too, were becoming known. That of Hartley became in due time famous by the 'Observations on Man,' which appeared in 1749, in which the laws of mental association were offered as the only and sufficient solvent of human knowledge and mental life. Hartley's representative place has been commemorated by Coleridge, in one of the most remarkable chapters of the 'Biographia Literaria.' Almost contemporaneously with the 'Observations on Man,' Condillac's 'Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines' laid the foundation of French empiricism, in a caricature of Locke. Francis Hutcheson, too, the countryman of Berkeley and the

pioneer of Reid, had magnified common sense or ineradicable faith, in works published before Berkeley embarked for America, and his death took place only three years after the appearance of 'Siris.' But Hartley, Condillac, and Hutcheson, seem to have been all outside the life that was wearing away at Cloyne, and that ended at Oxford.

In Berkeley's mental history, revealed as a whole in the writings of its three stages, one seems to hear a sort of prelude or rehearsal of each of the three acts in which European philosophy has since presented itself. The subtle argumentative analysis and negative phenomenalism, so prominent in the Trinity College treatises, was the Berkeley to whom Hume and afterwards John Stuart Mill avowed allegiance. The appeals to the common faith or common sense, in our consciousness of self, and in connection with the favourite thought of significant and interpretable sense phenomena, of all which 'Alciphron' and the 'Vindication' are so full, forecast Reid, while they recall the *cogito* of Descartes. Lastly, the philosophical rationalism of 'Siris,' which sees in the phenomenal things of sense the creative working of that *intellectus ipse* in which each separate conscious spirit shares, in its way anticipates Kant and Hegel. What corresponds to the association and evolution philosophy—in his phenomenalism; to the philosophy of common sense—in his appeals to common convictions; and to transcendental philosophy—in the recognition of universal constitutive reason,—may all, I think, be found in Berkeley—although he himself had only an obscure consciousness of this.

The reaction that followed Hume's revolutionary speculations disengaged the three elements that were thus latent in Berkeley. The first disengaged itself in English and French association psychology, and latterly in agnostic Positivism. The second appeared in the "vigorous protest" on behalf of common sense or the natural action of our intellectual and moral faculties, so characteristic of Reid and the Scotch psychologists usually classed with him. The Platonic intellectualism of 'Siris' has found its counterpart in the Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophies. These three types of philosophy have occupied the interval between the revolution of Hume and the present age. The first came from the reconstructive efforts of Hume himself. The second is the conservative recoil of the moral and practical side of human nature. The third seeks to satisfy the utmost demands of reason in a perfect manifestation of the reasonableness of the universe. Individual thinkers cannot, it is true, be summarily placed in cut-and-dry fashion in one or other of these three places. Their more characteristic features may be those of the first, or of the second, or of the third variety, but then these may be blended with other features which belong more to the other two types.

Although these three kinds of philosophy may be traced in germ in the thought of Berkeley—when looked at all round—the connection between his thought, and the subsequent development of either the common sense or the gnostic kind, was coincidence more than conscious succession. Hume alone was distinctly conscious of the Berkeleyan influence. He read phenomenal scepticism between the lines in the 'Treatise on Human Know-

ledge.' He interpreted all existence in this light; and so, in his hands, the material world and all else along with it melt into phenomena capriciously connected in coexistences and successions. This exclusive attention of Hume to one aspect only of Berkeley has probably helped more than anything else to the popular association of their names as twin patrons of "scepticism;" and also to Berkeley's being placed beside Locke and other supposed "empiricists," who it is fancied had not the courage of their opinions, and whose unconscious scepticism was logically laid bare in the 'Treatise of Human Nature.'

Hume undid all received knowledge and belief, by setting out with the assumption that the common theory of the experts of his time was empiricism. At least, he supposes knowledge to depend ultimately on impressions or phenomena, and to be in the position of needing to argue its way to belief in self and in not-self, but without any intellectual presuppositions or first principles to enable it to do so. This, under the formula, "common theory of ideas," was what Reid, unconsciously to himself, was fighting against, in his long battle with "ideas," as our only data for reasoning our way to reality. For the weakness Reid attributed to that theory lay in its merely phenomenalist character, which left phenomena destitute of interpretability, and incapable of being the signs of anything. They could, as such, be signs neither of the merely phenomenal material world of Berkeley, nor of an unphenomenal world of matter; still less could they symbolise the Ideal world of supersensible realism. Hence it was in the "idea" or mere phenomenon — irrelative and unintelligible — that Reid

believed he found the seed-plant of scepticism and agnosticism. This subjective idealism or mere phenomenalism he charged against what he calls the "Cartesian system," which, itself and in its Lockian modification, was supreme in the century that followed the death of Descartes.¹ Its first advocates, he said, had tried, on its data, to vindicate our complex physical and moral experience—to prove the existence of matter, and even to prove their own existence as conscious agents; but their "proofs" were signal failures. They could not but be so, if they had only ideas or phenomena to start from, and if even the existence of a subject of these ideas or phenomena had to be introduced by an *ergo*.² Hume's strength, Reid thought, lay in his insight into this weakness of the Cartesian system.

It is easy to see how knowledge and belief disintegrate in Hume's hands, when he avails himself of this interpretation of the "Cartesian system;" or of the covert and incoherent empiricism, attributed to Locke, but not to Descartes, by more recent and more learned critics of the past than Reid. Ordinary beliefs, as well as science and philosophy, can then at once be dissolved into impressions or unintelligible phenomena. Hume insists, with Locke, in referring all that claims acceptance in our knowledge or belief to the test of experience. Hume's "experience," however, is only isolated impressions—transitory unintelligible phenomena. So what

¹ See Reid's 'Inquiry into the Human Mind, or the Principles of Common Sense' (1764)—Introduction and Conclusion.

² As in the "*cogito ergo sum*" of Descartes, according to Reid's interpretation of it. But compare what is said in Professor Veitch's powerfully reasoned "Introduction" to his Translation of the *Method and Meditations of Descartes* (1879).

he really means is, that one has no right to believe anything that has no counterpart in some phenomenon (Descartes and Locke call it "idea," and he himself calls it "impression") to which one can point as evidence of its validity. Our primary data are not "perceived things," as Reid afterwards held they were, but only the phenomena, out of which Berkeley taught that the things of sense are composed—in virtue, however, of a significance and interpretability due according to him to the grounding of all in Reason. By the rigid application of the phenomenal criterion, the spiritual intellectualism of Berkeley was made by Hume to disappear. Except as a transitory phenomenon or feeling, the personal pronoun "I" could have no legitimate standing with him, because no possible phenomenal meaning. Equally meaningless, as Berkeley himself allowed, are "space" and "time," except in their phenomenal meaning. Then, too, as no phenomena could be perceived in any of the five senses, or imaged in the phantasy, that corresponded to what we were supposed to intend by "identity," "substance," "cause," or "power"—these words, and their supposed intellectual relations, also disappear in the cloud-land of illusion. The transcendent beliefs which are the cement or cohesion of real knowledge, along with the individual conscious personality which all belief presupposes, and in and through which we are brought into participation with the universe of experience, are one after another removed—because in their nature unphenomenal. In the end we find ourselves, if we follow Hume on these lines, committing mental suicide, in the act of descending into an abyss where all assertions and all

denials are alike uncertain, and indeed all alike incapable of being made, in the complete sceptical suspense of intellectual action. Such was the issue of a method which refused to recognise as real anything beyond what a Berkeleyan might have called the phenomenal side of reality, and which proceeded on what Reid denounces under the name of the "ideal system." It ended in the disengagement of reality — permanence and cohesion — not from the things of sense only, but also from the conscious persons, out of whose powers and capacities the things of sense draw their meaning and human interest.

This was the outcome of the 'Treatise of Human Nature.'

Hume's 'Inquiry' pointed to a way of partial recovery of lost belief, in the form of a "sceptical solution of sceptical doubts," although Hume still confessed his own philosophical inconsistency in believing anything. The "sceptical solution" went to work in this way. Repeated companionship of similar phenomena has been found, he attests, though he cannot tell why it should be so, gradually to fuse companion phenomena together, in the intense and complex impressions commonly called beliefs. For beliefs seem to him to be only inexplicable habits of feeling that inexplicably follow an inexplicable custom of companionship among phenomena. Phenomena thus come to cohere in those clusters or aggregates we call individual things; and our consciousness correspondingly becomes a perception of the things. Individual things, so formed by unintelligible associations, are found further to be connected among themselves, under the laws of coexistence and succession which experimental science makes known.

In this great fact of arbitrary phenomenal association, which Hume employs for the constructive part of his philosophy, one can still trace Berkeley. For it recalls the habitual "suggestions" of arbitrary coexistences and successions—in Berkeley's explanation of how we learn to see—in his explanation of our perceptions in all the senses—and in his explanation of induction. It is just his analysis of perception and induction into expectation, and of expectation into habit. But the habit was not with Berkeley rooted in unreason. It was the unconscious expression of supreme all-pervading Mind. Its *rationale* was the constitution of things in "mind," if not expressly in rational thought. He considered habit, founded on the custom of experience, to be the phenomenal occasion, not the actual constitution, of intellectual life; and also the substitute for intellectual activity after custom has done its work—the un-fatiguing way of preserving intellectual results in individual memories. For habit is itself a phenomenon, and, like the phenomena of sense, needs something unphenomenal to transform its results into rational science.

A philosophy like Hume's, which insists on keeping exclusively to the phenomenal side of reality, fails to find even phenomenal things. It can make assertions and denials at all only by acts in which it is inconsistent with itself. But, on the other hand, in the ordeal thus applied to knowledge and belief, weak points are found in current philosophies, and so the way is prepared for improvements in the philosophical conceptions of the future. Otherwise this scepticism is an intellectual amusement which can conduct to no results; for it can neither be proved nor dis-

proved logically. "A refutation" of Humist scepticism is not possible, except by a previous assumption of what, to avoid begging the question, has to be proved. Neither Reid nor Kant can be said to refute Hume. He professes, as a "universal sceptic," to show the essential absurdity of experience; and he demands evidence of the trustworthiness of the very faculty of reason by which he pretends to have reached this result—if the sceptic can without contradiction be supposed to reach "results," either negative or positive. Hume is not refuted, on his own ground, by Reid's vigorous appeal to our ineradicable beliefs, as trustworthy; nor by Kant's critical analysis of necessities of thought implied in the existence of mathematics, and of physical experience. To show, by means of suspected faculties, that the "experience" which has been charged with illusion, because only phenomenal, really presupposes more than phenomena, is to presume as real what the sceptic asks to be proved real. There is always an abstract possibility that our faculties may be false; but if even self-consciousness and memory must be vindicated before they can be used, we can never get to work at all.

Yet this scepticism, in itself alike incapable of proof or disproof, besides the mental exercise which it afforded, was a useful propellent force. It made men of thought rethink ultimate beliefs, and criticise anew the essential constitution of knowledge. And it is always practically refuted, by the imperishable trust which reason reposes in its own validity; so that no human mind can permanently surrender to it.

This has been illustrated in those protests on behalf of fundamental faiths of humanity which transcend

phenomena; and also by those struggles to show the essential reasonableness of experience or real knowledge, which the history of philosophy records since the days of Hume. For Hume's writings have been the direct or indirect occasion of the philosophical activity of Europe for more than a century. They have obliged physicists and moralists and theologians to reconsider their assumptions, and to trace the roots of knowledge further back, if they were to assure themselves, in a rational way, that it was rooted at all.

If phenomena alone are the reason as well as the physical causes of all knowledge and belief, can anything at all be believed, consistently with this supposition? Mere phenomena, as irrelative, must go where Berkeley sent the unphenomenal matter that inconsistently claimed to be phenomenal. They must either mean nothing, or else their meaning must be incoherent. Phenomenal things could not have become what they are without something, in the form of either constitutive faith or constitutive thought, that transcends phenomena. Of that faith or thought Berkeley was at first only dimly aware, under the name of "suggestion"—which was really rational habit, unconscious of its own rationality. Going deeper, he also acknowledged a common sense or common faith. At last, the constitutive principle became in his eyes the reason in which we are in communion with the Universal Mind. Suggestion or association, common sense, and Universal Reason—all latent in Berkeley, became, as I have already said, through Hume's disintegrative influence, disengaged, for more critical treatment, and have since been made factors in new philosophical formations. Let us look at these formations.

First of all, phenomenal science itself undertook to give a philosophic account of itself, without any transcendental help beyond faith in merely physical causation. Accordingly, one of the chief intellectual formations, in the interval since Hume, has been what is now called Positive or Agnostic Philosophy. In this pan-phenomenalism, knowledge is limited to physically produced beliefs in coexistences and successions—extended by “inferences from particulars to particulars”¹—all at last regarded as an evolution, through habit and association, individual or inherited. With regard to everything beyond, this sort of philosophy is professedly agnostic.

Agnosticism must be distinguished from the universal scepticism that does not admit either of proof or disproof. The latter dissolves the cement of all belief, even beliefs in relations of coexistence or succession among phenomena. The former only alleges that outside the coexisting and successive phenomena of sense there is nothing to be cemented—that all assertions or denials about supposed realities beyond the range of natural science are illusions. Agnosticism is Berkeley's sense significance and interpretability—isolated from all the rest of his teaching—incoherently accepted—and then rejected in its Berkeleian issues. Atheism and Theism are, I believe, alike incapable of being proved or disproved, and are alike foreign to human life, at the point of view of merely physical and biological Science.

This incoherent empiricism was Hume's own way of recovery from total suspense of all beliefs and all dis-

¹ The inductive and deductive extension of phenomenal knowledge is methodised by J. S. Mill, for instance, in his ‘*Logic*.’

beliefs.¹ It finds expression with him in the "sceptical solution" of "sceptical doubts."² This "solution" consists in acknowledging the reconstructive tendency of custom or association, as the physical cause (Berkeley would call it natural sign) of our beliefs about law in nature being what they are. "Wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reason or process of the understanding, we always say that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. *Perhaps we can push our inquiries no further.*"

This "sceptical solution" is the only philosophic reasonableness that is recognised in the natural science philosophy of the present day, with its far-reaching and beautiful conception of Evolution, as in Mr Herbert Spencer. But evolution itself, if proved, would be only an expression of physical causation—of phenomenal significance and interpretability—though it may yet turn out to be the most comprehensive of all merely phenomenal laws, and the highest expression of the sense symbolism, or physical causation, which Berkeley has so emphatically contrasted with spiritual and transcendent causality.

¹ In his 'Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.' "Total suspense" was the state in which he was in the 'Treatise of Human Nature' some years before.

² 'Inquiry,' sect. v.

A second philosophical formation, since Hume's time, appears at the opposite extreme to Positivism or Agnosticism—not without illustrating how curiously extremes may approach one another. It has arisen in this way. Critical search into experience was initiated by Kant. He went in quest of something necessary to thought, without which, as an ingredient, phenomena could not become intelligible experience. This critical search, with an expenditure of speculative genius,¹ has at last issued in a Gnosticism which offers—as the truly reasonable or philosophical conception of the universe of things and persons—a single general principle which, in its rational consequences, is credited with explaining all existence in the perfect unity of the Divine Thought. Some anticipatory sounds of like import may be heard even in 'Siris.' But it first became distinct after the Kantian criticism of experience, in justification of the categories and of a rational phenomenalism. Fichte's dissatisfaction with any professed philosophy that failed to attain intellectual unity, confirmed the philosophical prejudice of Germany against what Bacon (speaking of theology) calls "abruptness,"—that is to say, acknowledgment of an unexplained residuum of mystery, which forbids the perfection of philosophical science. "As for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to be sought. In divinity [or philosophy] many things must be left abrupt." Yet the Hegelian seems to claim, as attainable philosophy, an intuition of the rational artic-

¹ In this country, within the last few years, as in Dr Stirling's 'Secret of Hegel' (1865), Professor Green's edition of Hume (1874), Mr Wallace's 'Logic of Hegel' (1874), Professor Caird's 'Philosophy of Kant' (1877), Professor Adamson's 'Philosophy of Kant' (1879), and Principal Caird's 'Philosophy of Religion' (1880).

ulation of the universe of things and persons in the unity of the creative thought. This, if really attained, would eliminate mystery from our physical and moral experience, and convert philosophy into absolute science. If it has fulfilled its promise, it has translated all faith into rationalised thought. But I cannot find that this all-comprehensive system really tallies with the experience which it is bound to formulate adequately, and also to explain; or that it has yet got so far as to solve even so clamant a difficulty as the existence within the universe of immoral agents and moral evil.¹ We ask for intellectual relief for moral difficulties, and we are offered the "organisation of thought." We look for bread and we find a stone.

To be distinguished from, if not intermediate between, the Positivists or Agnostics, who are satisfied with the "sceptical solution" of sceptical doubts, and the Gnostics, who offer a key to the knowledge of the Infinite—there have been and are those, both before and since Hume, who, with faith in the absolute reasonableness of the universe, have not faith in the possibility of either ordinary or philosophic men being able to reach and apply the transcendent or divine thought in which this reasonableness consists. Legitimate relief from

¹ The distinction between phenomenal things and acting persons—between nature and individual moral agency—which this Gnosticism fails, as far as I see, to explain, or even to provide for, is touched, for example, in Wordsworth's well-known noonday hymn:—

"Look up to Heaven! the industrious Sun
Already half his race hath run;
He cannot halt nor go astray,
But our immortal Spirits may."

scepticism in a rational restoration of belief—wise philosophy for finite intelligence—is by them sought elsewhere. It is claimed as the result of a surrender to certain transcendent “tendencies to believe,” often latent in individuals, which nevertheless are the common consciousness or common sense—in short, the Faith of Mankind. This Faith is not made by philosophy, and philosophy cannot be filled in without it. Through Faith individual human spirits, with their finite share in the universal thought of the Supreme Spirit, reach their apprehension of Infinity, and also their finite practical comprehension of what is phenomenally real. It is in this attitude that we have, in preceding chapters, found Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley; and that we might have found Pascal and Buffier, or long afterwards their countrymen, Jouffroy, Royer Collard, and Cousin. A philosophy grounded on Faith was the highest lesson of Reid and his successors, especially Hamilton, in Scotland; more covertly of Kant, in Germany, in the moral solution offered, in his practical reason. In an impressive form, it was the essence of the teaching of Jacobi.

Philosophical restoration of what is called Faith, because it cannot be expanded into rational unity as an imaginable system, has, in most of these instances, been prompted more by wise moral reaction against sceptical suicide, than by speculative interest in the attainment of rational unity. This philosophy does not offer an intellectual system of the actual universe—a comprehension of it in the Infinite. On the contrary, it offers faiths, verified by much reflection, as the philosophical basis and constitution of all philosophical knowledge. It sees in philosophers, when they are doing their proper

work, the intellectual and moral police for protecting men against speculations that discredit those impulses to believe which are independent of philosophy. It assigns to philosophy an office that has been likened to that of the spear of Achilles, which healed the wounds given by itself. It is the aim of this philosophy to revive by reflection dormant faith, physical and spiritual; and to interpret, as far as possible, human tendencies to believe, that might be blighted by "sceptical solutions," or that might be sublimated in transcendental claims to re-think, from the central point of God, the Divine Thought according to which the world of phenomenal nature and finite moral agents exist. It condemns, as demonstrably irrational, the expectation that any human philosophy can deduce this complex, phenomenal and unphenomenal, universe, out of a single fundamental principle. It distinguishes between the Eternal Intellect, that sees all in each and each in all, and the finite or faith-constituted knowledge, in which moral agents share, in their "broken" fashion, in Divine Knowledge. Those who look philosophically at things from this point, are satisfied that they find what is deepest and truest, in their relations to reality, not in pure thought, but in the faith—reasonable inspiration—irresistible impulse to believe—from which, when in a normal healthy state, a human being cannot escape. They are satisfied that the ideal state of wisdom is not to be attained by man in or through his share of knowledge; and that if "philosophy" must be the purely intellectual attainment of the all-comprehensive rational unity of phenomenal things and self-conscious spirits, as at the Divine point of view, then there can for man

be no philosophy. *Their* philosophy is the rational intuition that *this must be so*—that the sense of its being so is the predicament in which man finds himself at last, when he applies reason adequately to the ultimate question. It is the awakening through reflection of elements of common consciousness, which cannot be translated into human or imaginable thought under conditions of time; and the confession that, for finite intelligence with a finite experience, timeless or transcendent thought about real things and persons must be a highly attenuated formalism, which leaves in as much darkness as before the philosophic questions of chief human interest regarding the destiny of conscious spirits.

I find no reason to doubt that human thought cannot be sublimated philosophically into Divine Thought—that a human philosophy of what must appear to men under relations of time is necessarily “broken”—and that it has to be cemented by beliefs which refuse to be fully resolved into pure thought, though the reasonableness of their office may be vindicated.


The three elements, dimly discernible in Berkeley, disengaged by the scepticism of Hume, which have thus given rise to three opposed philosophical formations, each of which now struggles for predominance, have severally their right to exist, as so far genuine elements involved in the attempt to know things and persons philosophically. May it not be said of Agnosticism and Gnosticism, that each is right in much that it affirms, but wrong in something that it denies, and that mutual explanations might induce approximation to the Philosophy of Faith? Perhaps the next step in advance may be the realisa-

tion of a better understanding of the mutual relations of Agnosticism, Gnosticism, and Faith. Present in a crude way in Berkeley—then disengaged by Hume for antagonism with each other—they may, in the next movement of European and American philosophy, be reconnected, in a better union than Berkeleyism offers, as the issue of what has happened in the interval.

Is there nothing, then, to which the philosopher can look as eternally fixed? Though man fails to unfold, in unbroken intellectual order, the actual divine manifestation in the worlds of nature and spirit, for the complete satisfaction of his speculative curiosity,—is there not the moral anchorage to which Butler with grave and anxious countenance points, when he proclaims the supremacy of conscience, and at which Kant hears the voice of the awful categorical imperative? Although a purely intellectual solution of the mystery of existence, in Divine Science of the Infinite, may be unattainable, we can still be told by Butler, and, at the end of a more subtle course of reasoning, by Kant, that we ought to live the absolutely good, even while we cannot realise in thought the perfect rational unity of the actual universe that is revealed to man only under relations of time.

This, unconsciously to himself, is in a manner wrapped up in Berkeley's lifelong philosophic thought. That thought becomes, when we pursue it further than he did, a sublime intuition of the phenomenal realities of sense, inorganic and organic, as established media for the intellectual education of finite spirits by means of physical sciences; for intercourse between individual moral agents; and for a revelation of the Eternal Spirit, in whom the

merely phenomenal things of sense, and moral agents too, have their being. It includes the fundamental faith that the universe exists for an eternal moral purpose, so that our experience in it, with the conditions of thought and belief presupposed in the experience, must be practically trustworthy and reasonable. According to this conception, the Government of Nature, with the physical and biological sciences in which it has been partially interpreted, is subordinate and ancillary to Moral Government. The universe consists of persons or conscious moral agents, and also of phenomenal things which are in a process of constant creation; and the things seem to be made for and regulated by the persons. The one of Kant's two great objects of admiration and awe is only the minister of the other. The "starry heavens" pass away; space, under whose relations phenomenal things are presented, becomes lost in the unimaginable Infinite of Boundlessness; time, which the heavenly bodies measure, becomes lost in the unimaginable Infinite of Endlessness. But Moral Government and moral agents cannot thus be lost or pass away.



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